Shine v. TD Bank Fin. Grp.

• Decision Date: 02 August 2011
• Docket Number: Civil No. 09-4377 (RBK/KMW)
• Parties: BRIAN J. SHINE, Plaintiff, v. TD BANK FINANCIAL GROUP, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

BRIAN J. SHINE, Plaintiff,

v.TD BANK FINANCIAL GROUP, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 09-4377 (RBK/KMW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CAMDEN VICINAGE

Dated: August 2, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

KUGLER, United States District Judge:

This matter arises out of alleged employment discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and disability by T.D. Bank, N.A. ("TD Bank"). During the pendency of litigation, the parties conducted extensive negotiations and reached an agreement. After the parties executed the settlement agreement, the Court dismissed the matter. Presently before the Court is the motion by Plaintiff Brian J. Shine to reopen the matter and to appoint pro bono counsel, (Doc. No. 25), and the motion to seal filed by Defendants, (Doc. No. 26). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motions are DENIED, and Defendants' motion to seal is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

The background facts of this case are outlined in the Court's Opinion dated July 12, 2010. Therefore, the Court will provide additional facts as necessary to decide the pending motion.

On August 29, 2009, Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint includes ten causes of action: (1) "Equal Rights under the law (42 U.S.C. § 1981)"; (2) "CivilAction for deprivation of Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983)"; (3) "Conspiracy to interfere with and failure to prevent violations against the Civil Rights of Mr. Shine[,] 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and 1986"; (4) "Damages for the intentional discrimination in employment of Mr. Shine[,] 42 U.S.C. § 1981a"; (5) "Civil Action for Deprivation of Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983)"; (6) "Unlawful Employment Practices and Intentional Discrimination (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, 2000e-3)"; (7) "Violations of Immigration law and discrimination of Mr. Shine on the basis of National Origin[,] 8 U.S.C. § 1324 et seq.[,] Unlawful Participation in Violation of Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act[,] 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968"; (8) "Violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963"; (9) Violation of Title I and Title VI of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990"; and (10) "Retaliation and Wrongful Termination by Defendants." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 234-74).

On January 29, 2010, Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. On July 12, 2010, the Court entered an Order: (1) granting Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts Two, Three, Five, Seven, and Eight in their entirety; (2) granting Plaintiff summary judgment regarding Counts Six and Nine against the individual Defendants; and (3) granting Plaintiff summary judgment regarding the portions of Count Ten alleging unlawful retaliation. (Doc. No. 14, at 20). In the same Order, the Court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts One and Four in their entirety, and the portions of Count Ten alleging wrongful discharge. (Doc. No. 15).

Subsequently, the parties conducted extensive negotiations. On October 7, 2010, by telephone, Plaintiff asked defense counsel, Christine O'Hearn, to discuss a potential settlement. (O'Hearn Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. A). On October 8, 2010 at 9:18 a.m., O'Hearn replied via email, informing Plaintiff that Defendants rejected his prior settlement offer, but that if he wanted to make a new settlement offer, she would relay the message to TD Bank. (Id. ¶ 4). On October 8,2010 at 1:01 p.m., Plaintiff sent O'Hearn an email demanding "payment of $50,000.00," and reiterating that he was "interested in settlement." (Id. 5; Ex. B). On October 11, 2010, O'Hearn sent an email to Plaintiff rejecting his $50,000.00 offer and making a counteroffer of $2,500.00 in exchange for execution of a settlement agreement and release. (Id. ¶ 6; Ex. C). On October 12, 2010, Plaintiff sent an email to O'Hearn rejecting the $2,500.00 offer and making a counteroffer of $5,000.00. Specifically, Plaintiffs email states "if [TD Bank] is willing to double the offer to $5,000.00 and refrain from pursuing legal fees and/or expenses we have a deal." (Id. ¶ 7; Ex. D). The same day, O'Hearn accepted Plaintiffs counteroffer via email, and sent Plaintiff the settlement agreement and release. Paragraph 9 of the settlement agreement states:

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. Shine acknowledges that he has read all of the terms and conditions of this Agreement, and that he has had an opportunity to discuss it with an attorney of his choosing prior to signing if he so desires. Shine understands that by signing this Agreement and accepting the terms set forth above, he is receiving benefits to which he otherwise [sic] not be entitled. Shine understands that he is receiving such benefits as a result of entering into and complying with the terms and provisions of this Agreement. Shine acknowledges that he is signing this Agreement voluntarily and knowingly in exchange for the Settlement Payment described herein, which she [sic] acknowledges is adequate and satisfactory.

(Id. ¶ 10; Ex. E). O'Hearn also advised Plaintiff to review the agreement and contact her with any questions or concerns. (Id. ¶ 8).

Plaintiff executed the agreement on October 13, 2010. (O'Hearn Decl. Ex. G). O'Hearn received a copy of the executed settlement agreement from Plaintiff via regular mail on October 14, 2010 at 1:00 p.m. (O'Hearn Decl. ¶ 12). After receiving the executed settlement agreement, O'Hearn forwarded the agreement to TD Bank for execution. (Id. ¶ 14).

On October 15, 2010, O'Hearn received the following email that Plaintiff sent onOctober 14:

I changed my mind Christine . . . I'm not being bullied into silence. I'm fighting your clients for the unadultered Hell they put me through even after I requested numerous transfers.

Again, where are all the cell records? Where are all the "dates and times of flatulence?"

I'm not accepting this offer Christine.

Where [sic] on a first name basis seeing that you had nothing to do with the horrible acts of your clients against me.

Again, $50,000.00 and this whole matter is settled. Firm offer. Your clients have nothing to go after even if this or any other court beyond the American Rule.

This communication I will also be sending to the judge. I'm worth far more than $5,000.00[.] Your clients put me through Hell and in the interests of Justice I hereby repeal my agreement to your client's gross and repugnant offer.

(Id. ¶ 15; Ex. I). Plaintiff sent the email on October 14 at 11:28 p.m. On October 15, 2010, O'Hearn discovered that Plaintiff also sent her the following email on October 14, 2010 at 11:40 p.m.:

Where is this information? Hidden or destroyed by your clients? And for future reference I'm calling far more than 10 witnesses for depositions. About 150 would be a fair guess as to the customers I dealt with and the "diverse nature" of the store you your self [sic] noted in the record.

Like I told Mitchell in Fall of 2006, I'll take this to the SCOTUS . .

.

I find you to be a most agreeable and lovely woman, Christine. We can settle for $50,000.00 or we can fight this to SCOTUS. My emails to Caroline are protected under Crawford v. Metro.

(Id. ¶¶ 16; Ex. J). O'Hearn responded to Plaintiffs email by advising Plaintiff that the parties settled the matter. (Id. ¶ 17; Ex. K). O'Hearn also informed Magistrate Judge Williams that theparties executed a settlement agreement, and sought leave to file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. (Id. ¶ 20; Ex. M). On October 22, 2010, Magistrate Judge Williams scheduled an in-person status conference for October 29, 2010.

On October 16 at 1:11 a.m., Plaintiff responded via email to O'Hearn's message, stating: "I'm not settling Christine. Your clients abused me and you know it. My civil rights were violated repeatedly. You can enforce this settlement all you want but you and I both know the money being offered is far below what I'm entitled to as a victim of their horrible actions." (Id. ¶ 18; Ex. L). On October 25, Plaintiff sent O'Hearn an email stating "The W-9 is in the mail. I'm done fighting." (Id. ¶ 22; Ex. N). Thereafter, O'Hearn received Plaintiff‘s W-9 form, and informed Magistrate Judge Williams that the parties settled the matter. As a result, Magistrate Judge Williams cancelled the in-person status conference. (Doc. No. 23).

On October 28, 2010, Plaintiff sent an email to O'Hearn requesting that Defendants expedite his settlement check. (O'Hearn Decl. ¶ 24; Ex. Q). Plaintiff received the settlement check and a copy of the executed settlement agreement on October 28, 2010. (O'Hearn Decl.¶ 25; Ex. R). Plaintiff cashed the settlement check on November 1, 2010. (O'Hearn Decl. ¶ 25-26; Ex. S).

On February 22, 2010 - four months after executing the settlement agreement and cashing the settlement check - Plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the case, alleging that he entered the settlement agreement under duress. The parties submitted their respective briefs and the motion is ripe for review.

II. STANDARD

A motion to reopen a case may be treated as either a motion for relief from a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) or a motion to reconsider under Rule59(e) and Local Civil Rule 7.1(i). Choi v. Kim, 258 F. App'x 413 (3d Cir. 2007). In this case, because Plaintiff failed to file a motion for reconsideration within fourteen days after this Court issued an Order dismissing the matter (as required by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i)), the Court will construe Plaintiff's motion as a motion for relief from final judgment under Rule 60(b).

Rule 60(b) provides, in relevant part: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been vacated; or applying it prospectively is no

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