Shine v. Univ. of Chi., 12 C 8182
| Decision Date | 28 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | 12 C 8182 |
| Parties | JOSEPH SHINE, Plaintiff, v. THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Joseph Shine filed this suit against the University of Chicago under Section 510 of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Shine, a former Sergeant in the University Police Department, was terminated from his employment in July 2012. Shine alleges that the University's stated reason for his termination, unsatisfactory performance, was pretextual and that he in fact terminated in retaliation for his status as a potential class member and witness in a benefits lawsuit against the University. The University moved to dismiss Shine's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. According to the University, Shine's Complaint is deficient because it fails to allege that he exhausted administrative remedies available to him as required by ERISA. For the reasons stated herein, the University's Motion to Dismiss is granted.
The following facts are taken from Shine's Complaint and are assumed to be true for purposes of this Motion to Dismiss. See Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of Shine, the non-moving party. See Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank, 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Shine was employed in the University's Police Department from June 2, 1976 until July 12, 2012. (Pl. Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 6.) Shine began his employment with the Police Department as a full-time employee but switched to part-time employee status in 1983. (Id.) In April 2010, the University offered him a full-time police officer position. (Id. ¶ 11.) Shine accepted and resumed full-time status in June 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 11.) In March 2011, the University assigned him to work as interim/acting lieutenant and seven months later to a sergeant position. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) In March 2012, the University eliminated the lieutenant position. (Id. ¶ 14.) Shine, at this point a sergeant, assumed lieutenant duties along with sergeant duties to accommodate the University's operational needs. (Id.)
Shine alleges that the University's police chief had knowledge of an ERISA lawsuit against the University, Quinn v. University of Chicago, a/k/a Krok v. University of Chicago, 11 C 1092 (N.D. Ill.) ("Quinn lawsuit"). (Id. ¶ 15.) According to Shine, the police chief discussed the lawsuit with members of his staff. (Id. ¶16.) On April 19, 2012, the University received discovery disclosures in that lawsuit revealing Shine as a potential class member who may have discoverable information. (Id. ¶ 17.)
In the three months following the disclosure, Shine received a verbal warning, written warning, and a suspension, all based on minor, pretextual infractions. (Id. ¶ 18.) Shine received the first of these reprimands on April 29, 2012, when Commander Kevin Booker ("Booker") issued Shine a verbal warning related to "unsatisfactory performance of duties." (Id. ¶ 19.) Lessthan two weeks later, on May 8, 2012, Booker issued Shine a written warning, also related to "unsatisfactory performance of duties." (Id. ¶ 20.) On June 28, 2012, Booker issued Shine a second written warning related to "unsatisfactory performance of duties." (Id. ¶ 22.)
On July 5, 2012, the University held a mandatory sergeant meeting during which the Chief expressed dissatisfaction with the sergeants' work performance. (Id. ¶ 23.) The Chief informed the sergeants they could step down to work as regular police officers with "no hard feelings" if they could not adequately perform sergeant duties. (Id.) On July 12, 2012, without affording Shine an opportunity to accept the Chief's offer to step-down to the police officer position, Shine was issued a notice of discharge relating to "unsatisfactory performance of duties." (Id. ¶ 24.) Shine subsequently asked the University, through his attorneys, to reinstate him to a police officer position. (Id. ¶ 25.) The University refused. (Id.)
The University administers pension plans for its employees. The University's 1976 Retirement Income Plan for Employees1 ("Plan") provided that "[e]ach Employee who is employed by the University after January 1, 1976 shall become a Participant in the Plan ... on the first day of the first month following the later of (a) his thirtieth (30th) birthday and (b) theearliest anniversary of his employment date which is the end of two (2) consecutive 12-month periods during each of which he completed 1,000 hours of service for the University." (Id. ¶ 7, Ex. B § 3.3.) Shine completed two consecutive 12-month periods of service with the University in June 1978 and reached age thirty in 1984. (Id. ¶ 9.) Shine alleges the University failed to provide him with a copy of the Plan or a Summary Plan Description and misinformed Shine that he was not eligible for a pension prior to 2010. (Id. ¶ 10.) The Plan further provided that "[a]n Employee may elect to become a Participant in the Plan before the mandatory date ... as of the first day of the first month on or after any of the following dates: (a) the later of his twenty-fifth (25th) birthday and the earliest anniversary of his employment date, which is the end of a 12-month period in which he completed 1,000 hours of service for the University; (b) the date, before his twenty fifth (25th) birthday, which is the end of two (2) consecutive 12-month periods during each of which he completed 1,000 hours of service for the University; and (c) his thirtieth (30th) birthday, provided he is scheduled to perform 1,000 hours or more of service a year. (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. B § 3.4.)
The Plan also created a "Retirement Committee" which was responsible for rendering advice on the administration of the Plan and deciding appeals of the denial of claims. (Ex. B, § 12.1.) The Plan further set forth a procedure for making claims and for the review of claim decisions. (See Ex. B, § 12.3.) First, a Participant may request review of decisions by the Retirement Committee "within 60 days following his receipt of written notification of the denial of the claim." (Id.) The Retirement Committee is required to "decide the matter presented for review within sixty (60) days of receiving the request" and shall render a decision "no more than one hundred and twenty (120) days after receipt." (Id.) The Retirement Committee's decision "shall be in writing and shall include specific reasons for the decision ... and shall constitute thefinal disposition of the matter under the Plan." (Id.)
When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all facts alleged in the complaint and construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Killingsworth, 507 F.3d at 618 (citing Savory, 469 F.3d at 670); accord Murphy, 51 F.3d at 717. To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a compliant must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "Detailed factual allegations" are not required, but the plaintiff must allege facts that, when "accepted as true . . . 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). To determine whether a complaint meets this standard, the "reviewing court [must] draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court assumes their veracity and determines if they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679. A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. See Id. at 678.
"ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans." Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983)). Section 510 of ERISA, the Act's antiretaliation provision, makes it unlawful to, inter alia, "discharge, fine, suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against any person because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding" under ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §1140. In this case, Shine's alleges that he was discharged in response to being named as a potential witness in another ERISA proceeding against the University.
A plaintiff in an ERISA suit must exhaust his internal administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit in federal court. See Zhou v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 295 F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2002); Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir. 1997) () (citations omitted). The exhaustion requirement "furthers the 'goals of minimizing the number of frivolous lawsuits' and enables the preparation of a more complete factual record for judicial review." Zhou, 295 F.3d at 679 (quoting Gallegos v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 210 F.3d 803, 807-08 (7th Cir. 2000)). Exhaustion also "promote[s] a non-adversarial dispute resolution process, and decrease[s] the cost and time of claims settlement." Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1996) (...
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