Shinholster v. Graham

• Decision Date: 30 November 1981
• Docket Number: TCA 80-1019.
• Citation: 527 F. Supp. 1318
• Parties: Jack B. SHINHOLSTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Bob GRAHAM, Governor of the State of Florida, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

527 F. Supp. 1318

Jack B. SHINHOLSTER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Bob GRAHAM, Governor of the State of Florida, et al., Defendants.

TCA 80-1019.

United States District Court, N. D. Florida, Tallahassee Division.

October 9, 1981.

On Motion for Reconsideration November 30, 1981.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jack B. Shinholster, pro se.

Marc E. Taps and Judith Fendrich, Legal Services of North Florida, Tallahassee, Fla., for plaintiffs.

Gerald B. Curington, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Claire D. Dryfuss, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Tallahassee, Fla., for defendants.

STAFFORD, Chief Judge.

This cause having come on for consideration upon the magistrate's report and recommendation (Document 39) dated October 9, 1981, and the court having considered the report and recommendation and the objections of defendants (Document 41) and determined that the same should be adopted, it is

ORDERED:

1. The magistrate's report and recommendation is adopted and incorporated by reference in this order of the court.

2. The defendants' motion for partial summary judgment should be, and the same is hereby, granted. Plaintiffs' civil rights claims for damages and pendent state tort claims for damages are dismissed and are hereby struck from the plaintiffs' amended complaint.

ORDER, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ROBERT L. CRONGEYER, Jr., United States Magistrate.

This civil rights matter comes on for consideration of the defendants' third affirmative defense, as presented in their answer (document 24). The defendants have raised the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as an affirmative defense, but since the failure to exhaust available and adequate administrative remedies could result in dismissal in the early stages of this action, the defendants' affirmative defense shall be treated as a motion to dismiss.

The defendants have also filed a motion for partial summary judgment (document 28) on the issue of liability for damages. The defendants assert that inasmuch as they are being sued solely in their official capacities, suit for damages against them is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Additionally, the defendants contend that the plaintiffs' pendent state tort claim is similarly barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity inasmuch as the plaintiffs have failed to comply with conditions precedent to a waiver by the State of Florida of its sovereign immunity from damages attributable to the state's officials, employees, or agents.

I. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Patsy v. Florida International University, 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981), held that in appropriate cases brought pursuant to Section 1983, Title 42, United States Code, plaintiffs must have exhausted state administrative remedies before a federal court may entertain the civil rights lawsuit. In order for there to be a requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it must first be shown that "certain minimum conditions have been met before resort to state administrative remedies can be made a prerequisite to proceeding under Section 1983." Id. at 912. The minimum conditions delineated in Patsy which must be satisfied by the administrative remedies claimed to be applicable in this case are:

1. Florida statutes or administrative agency rules must provide an orderly system of review or of appeal.

2. Florida administrative agencies must be able to grant relief "more or less" commensurate with the relief requested by the plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims.

3. Relief from the Florida administrative agencies must be available within a reasonable time.

4. The procedures for obtaining relief through the Florida administrative agencies must be fair, must not be unduly burdensome, and must not be used to harass or otherwise discourage persons with legitimate claims.

5. Interim relief must be available through the Florida administrative agencies to prevent irreparable injury and to preserve the plaintiffs' rights under Section 1983 until the administrative process has been concluded.

Id. at 912-13. If a certain administrative scheme fails to satisfy any of these minimum conditions, exhaustion of that administrative remedy is not required. On the other hand, as the court in Patsy declared:

Where these minimum standards are met, the court will need to further consider the particular administrative scheme, the nature of the interest the plaintiff seeks to protect, the values served by the exhaustion doctrine and the proper balance of these interests in this type of case.

Id. at 913.

Likewise, the court must consider if any of the several exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine apply which would thereby preclude requiring exhaustion of a particular administrative scheme.

The minimum conditions specified in Patsy, 634 F.2d at 912-13, are essentially a restatement of the "plainly inadequate" administrative remedies exception. The "plainly inadequate" exception enunciated in Patsy is:

Exhaustion is not required when the prescribed administrative remedy is plainly inadequate because either no remedy is available, the available remedy will not give relief commensurate with the claim, or the remedy would be so unreasonably delayed as to create a serious risk of irreparable injury.

Id. at 903.

Exhaustion is also not required when the plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a statute, rule, or policy, and the administrative agencies do not have the jurisdiction, nor the authority, to determine constitutional issues, or the administrative procedures neither contemplate, nor provide the capacity to consider and decide, claims of unconstitutional practices. Id.; Curtis v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980). Similarly, if the merits of the plaintiff's claims are "for all practical purposes coextensive with ... the questions of adequacy of the administrative remedy," exhaustion is not required. Patsy, 634 F.2d at 904. Finally, "exhaustion is not required if it would be futile to comply with the administrative procedures because it is clear that the claim will be rejected." Id.

A. FLORIDA ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT

The Florida Administrative Procedure Act (FAPA), Florida Statutes, Chapter 120, provides for a proceeding of an adjudicatory nature before an administrative hearing officer. Fla.Stat. § 120.57 (Supp. 1980). The defendants contend that administrative proceedings and remedies provided by the FAPA meet the "Patsy minimum standards" and are therefore adequate to trigger the requirement of exhaustion by the plaintiffs. The Fifth Circuit has disagreed and specifically has held in Curtis v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980), that the current FAPA is "plainly inadequate" for adjudicating the validity of agency rules (which, of course, include policies and practices constituting or having the effect of rules; see Fla.Stat. § 120.52(14) (1979); McDonald v. Dept. of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569, 581 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App. 1977); Florida Cities Water Co. v. Florida Public Service Commission, 384 So.2d 1280 (Fla.1980) (citing McDonald with approval) under the Constitution or federal statutes.

It is clear that although the FAPA excludes prisoners, from status as parties whose "substantial interests" are affected by Florida administrative decisions and can therefore challenge such decisions under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), the plaintiffs in this case do not fall within the definition of "prisoner" and therefore may be parties to a Section 120.57 administrative proceeding. See also Fla. Stat. § 120.52(10) (1979). Section 944.02(5) defines "prisoner":

"Prisoner" means any person who is under arrest and in the lawful custody of any law enforcement official, or any person convicted and sentenced by any court and committed to any municipal or county jail or state prison, prison farm, or penitentiary, or to the custody of the department of Corrections, as provided by law.

Fla.Stat. § 944.02(5) (1979).

The Fifth Circuit's rationale in Curtis for finding the FAPA "plainly inadequate" is based on the conjoining of the FAPA's failure to meet the second "minimum standard" with the exception to the exhaustion doctrine that the administrative proceedings neither contemplate nor provide the authority or capacity to consider and decide claims of unconstitutional practices, policies, or rules. The court in Curtis concluded that the FAPA, although normally permitting a Florida administrative hearing officer to grant injunctive and declaratory relief, fails to authorize the hearing officer to grant not only the "more or less" commensurate relief required by Patsy, but any relief sought by plaintiffs raising constitutional and civil rights claims, because the hearing officer lacks jurisdiction to consider and resolve constitutional issues. The Fifth Circuit stated:

Although Section 120.57 of the Act FAPA provides for a proceeding of an adjudicatory nature before an administrative hearing officer to challenge agency action, the authority of that hearing officer is limited. The Florida courts have held that "the administrative hearing officer lacks jurisdiction to consider constitutional issues...." Gulf Pines Memorial Park v. Oaklawn Memorial Park, Inc., 361 So.2d 695, 699 (Fla.1978). See also Department of Revenue v. Amrep Corp., 358 So.2d 1343 (Fla.1978); E.T. Legg & Co. v. Franza, 383 So.2d 962 (Fla. 4th Dist.Ct.App.1980). "The Administrative Procedure Act could not and does not relegate Fourteenth Amendment questions to administrative determination, nor restrict the occasions for judicial consideration of them ... nor otherwise impair the judicial function to determine constitutional disputes." Department of Revenue v. Young American Builders, 330 So.2d 864, 865 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App.1976).

. . . . .

... Because the administrative hearing provided by Section 120.57 could not resolve the claims advanced by the

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