Shinn v. Oklahoma City

• Decision Date: 05 September 1936
• Docket Number: A-9019.
• Citation: 61 P.2d 1126,59 Okla.Crim. 433
• Parties: SHINN v. OKLAHOMA CITY.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

61 P.2d 1126

59 Okla.Crim. 433

SHINN v. OKLAHOMA CITY.

No. A-9019.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

September 5, 1936

"Subject" of act is matter or thing forming the groundword thereof which may include many parts or things, so long as they are all germane thereto and are such that if traced back they will lead mind to subject as generic head.

Syllabus by the Court.

1.The state may, in the exercise of the police power, license and regulate chattel mortgage and salary loan brokers; and it may delegate authority to do so to municipal corporations.

2.Under the constitutional provision, section 3(a), art. 18 Const., providing that "Any city containing a population of more than two thousand inhabitants may frame a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the Constitution and laws of the State," a city adopting a charter is accorded full power of local self-government, and as such municipal corporation, under its charter, it has power to enact, ordain, and enforce ordinances for the purpose of protecting the public peace, order, health morals, and safety of the inhabitants, even though general statutes exist relating to the same subjects.

3.Where an ordinance has but one general subject, object, or purpose, and all of its provisions are germane to the same subject, and having a necessary connection therewith, however numerous its provisions may be, it is not multifarious, and does not constitute duplicity of subject within the meaning of section 6362, St.1931, or section 2, art. 5, Charter of Oklahoma City, relating to the unity of subject and title.

4.A city ordinance "providing for an occupation tax on persons engaging in the business of brokering chattel mortgages or salary loans, providing for an inspection fee on persons engaging in the business of brokering chattel mortgages or salary loans or engaging in the business of making chattel mortgage or salary loans,"held not subject to the objection that it violates the requirements of the statute(section 6362) or of the city charter that the subject of every ordinance should not embrace more than one subject.Held further, that said ordinance does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution as being an improper discrimination although it exempts national and state banks, trust companies, and building and loan associations.

5.An ordinance providing a fine and imprisonment as a means of enforcing a license tax does not trench upon the Constitution of this state.

Appeal from County Court, Oklahoma County; Ben C. Arnold, Special Judge.

O. W. Shinn was convicted of a violation of an ordinance regulating chattel mortgage and salary loan brokers, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Dudley, Hyde, Duvall & Dudley, of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.

Harlan Deupree, Municipal Counselor, and A. P. Van Meter, Ass't Municipal

p>Page Counselor, both of Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.

DOYLE, Judge(after stating the facts as above).

The contention of the defendant in this case is that this ordinance is unconstitutional, invalid, and void.

It is first argued that said ordinance embraces two distinct subjects, namely, loan brokers and money loaners, and is therefore invalid under section 6362, O.S.1931, which provides in part as follows: "Provided, further, that no ordinance shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title."

And under section 2, art. 5, of the Charter of the City of Oklahoma City, declaring that: "Every ordinance of the Board of Commissioners shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title. * * * provided, that if any subject be embraced in any ordinance contrary to the provisions of this section such ordinance shall be void only as to so much of the ordinance as may not be expressed in the title thereof."

The rule of law applicable to this contention is stated in 25 Ruling Case Law, § 88, page 842, as follows: "The term 'subject' as used in these provisions is to be given a broad and extended meaning, so as to allow the legislature full scope to include in one act all matters having a logical or natural connection.If all parts of an act relate directly or indirectly to the general subject of the act, it is not open to the objection of plurality.To constitute duplicity of subject, an act must embrace two or more dissimilar and discordant subjects, that by no fair intendment can be considered as having any legitimate connection with or relation to each other.* * * Matters which constitute, apparently, two distinct and separate subjects are not so, in the meaning of the constitutional provision, unless they are incongruous and diverse to each other.While this provision is mandatory, yet it is to be construed liberally.It is not intended nor should it be so construed as to prevent the legislature from embracing in one act all matters properly connected with one general subject."

And in section 90, page 884, Id., it is said: "The 'subject' of an act is the matter or thing forming the groundword of the act, which may include many parts or things, so long as they are all germane to it and are such that if traced back they will lead the mind to the subject as the generic head.There can be no surer test of compliance with the constitutional requirement of singleness of subject than that none of the provisions of an act can be read as relating or germane to any other subject than the one named in the title.An act is not unconstitutional because more than one object is contained therein where the objects are germane to the main subject, or they relate directly or indirectly to the main subject, and have a mutual connection with and are not foreign to the subject of such act, or when the provisions of the act are of the same nature and come legitimately under one subject."

In the case of Smith v. State,47 Okl.Cr. 184, 287 P. 835, it is said: "The purpose of the Constitution, declaring that every act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title, was not to hamper legislation but to check and prevent deception therein."

In State v. Coyle, 7 Okl.Cr. 50, 122 P. 243, this court said: "Every legislative act is presumed to be constitutional, and the courts should not declare an act to be unconstitutional unless it is clearly so.If there is doubt, the expressed will of the Legislature should be sustained."

In the case of Bartlesville Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Bartlesville Interurban Ry. Co.,26 Okl. 453, 109 P. 228, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 77, the Supreme Court said: "The requirement of a statute that the subject of any ordinance enacted by a city council shall be clearly expressed in the title is complied with where the title calls attention to the general subject of the legislation in the ordinance, and does not tend to mislead or deceive the people or council as to the purpose or effect of the legislation, or to conceal or obscure the same."

In the case of Ruth v. Oklahoma City,143 Okl. 62, 287 P. 406, was involved the question whether the subject of the ordinance, namely, to vote bonds and to acquire a park with the money was related so as to warrant both being included in the one ordinance, and the court held that the subjects were properly related and the ordinance embraced but one general subject.The second paragraph of the syllabus holding: "Title of ordinance calling attention to general subject of legislation, not tending to mislead, deceive, conceal, or obscure, is sufficient."It is obvious that the title is sufficient.The evident purpose of the whole scope of the ordinance is the regulation of chattel mortgage and salary loans and the regulation of loan brokers dealing in such loans, and to enforce the enactment by proper penalties; and all this may be comprehensively said to be the subject of the ordinance.It follows that the ordinance does not embrace more than one subject, as that language has been and should be construed.

It is next insisted that under said ordinance the city attempts to exact a license tax for the purpose of regulation and to impose certain regulations upon the business of loan brokers and money lenders, whereas, the business of money lending is a legitimate one and not subject to the visitorial powers of regulation sought to be imposed.

Counsel in their brief say: "Our contention in this regard is that the business of lending money is not one affecting the public health, morals or general welfare, or clothed with a public interest, either historically, or in view of its nature, so as to authorize the City to regulate it by an exercise of the police power; further that the regulation imposed is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and oppressive, and bears no logical relation to the object of the legislation."

Oklahoma City is under a charter form of government, adopted under the authority and in pursuance of section 3 (a), art. 18 of the Constitution, and this question must be determined upon a consideration of the powers granted under the constitutional provision, the statutes and under its charter.

In the case of In re Jones, 4 Okl.Cr. 74, 109 P. 570, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 548, 140 Am.St.Rep. 655, it is said: "The powers of a municipal corporation are only those granted by express words; those fairly implied in, or incident to, the powers expressly granted; and those indispensable to the declared objects and purposes of the incorporation."

Under the constitutional provision (section 3 (a), art. 18) a city adopting a charter is accorded full power of local self-government and as such municipal corporation, under its charter it has power to enact, ordain, and enforce ordinances for the purpose of protecting the public peace, order health, morals, and safety of the...