Shipley v. Atlantic Greyhound Corporation, Civ. No. 920.

Decision Date28 July 1958
Docket NumberCiv. No. 920.
Citation164 F. Supp. 327
PartiesMary D. SHIPLEY, Plaintiff, v. ATLANTIC GREYHOUND CORPORATION, a Virginia Corporation, and the Union News Company, a New York Corporation, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia

George L. Ballard and G. Berk Lynch, Beckley, W. Va., for plaintiff.

John E. Jenkins, Jr., Huntington, W. Va., for defendants.

HARRY E. WATKINS, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a West Virginia citizen, alleges that on February 26, 1957, while a passenger on a bus owned and operated by defendant Atlantic Greyhound Corporation, a Virginia corporation, she entered as an invitee during a rest stop the bus terminal maintained in Huntington, West Virginia, by Greyhound, and was served food and drink in a restaurant in part of the building. She avers that the restaurant premises were owned by Greyhound and leased to the defendant the Union News Company, a New York corporation, and that Union News was operating the restaurant for the mutual benefit of the two defendants. Upon arising from the table where she had been served, plaintiff alleges that she fell due to an extremely slippery floor. She brings this action seeking damages, in excess of $3,000, for personal injuries sustained as a result of the fall. The complaint is in three counts, two predicated upon negligence of both defendants, and one count alleges the maintenance of a nuisance by both defendants.

Greyhound has made a motion to dismiss, urging that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against it, on the ground that the complaint shows on its face that the condition of the premises which caused plaintiff's fall was temporary in nature, so that Greyhound as owner-lessor is not legally responsible for the existence of such a condition.

Plaintiff and Greyhound in their briefs agree upon the general principle of landlord and tenant law that in cases of injury to a third party, an owner-lessor is not liable for a nuisance or dangerous condition of the property unless such condition existed at the time of the leasing of the premises. 32 Am. Jur., Landlord and Tenant § 822, p. 699; 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant §§ 424, 431; 11 Michie's Jurisprudence 702. The dispute between these parties is whether the dangerous condition or nuisance set forth in the complaint here is of a temporary nature or is inherent in the property.

In the first count, plaintiff alleges that she "stepped upon an extremely and unusually slippery portion of, or...

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