Shipton v. Sheridan

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Before BILLINGS; TITUS
• Citation: Shipton v. Sheridan, 531 S.W.2d 291 (Mo. App. 1975)
• Decision Date: 15 December 1975
• Docket Number: No. 9828,9828
• Parties: Clifford SHIPTON and Violet Shipton, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Michael L. SHERIDAN and Maureen H. Sheridan, his wife, Defendants-Respondents.

Page 291

531 S.W.2d 291

Clifford SHIPTON and Violet Shipton, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Michael L. SHERIDAN and Maureen H. Sheridan, his wife Defendants-Respondents.

No. 9828.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Springfield District.

Dec. 15, 1975.

Ted M. Henson, Jr., Poplar Bluff, for plaintiffs-appellants.

L. Dwayne Hackworth, Piedmont, for defendants-respondents.

Before BILLINGS, C.J., and STONE and TITUS, JJ.

TITUS, Judge.

Plaintiffs instituted suit to quiet title to 3 3/10 acres (hereinafter the 'school lot') situate in the NE 1/4 NW 1/4 Section 13 Township 27 Range 5 in Wayne County. Defendants answered denying plaintiffs' claim to ownership and averred they owned the school lot by virtue of a deed from Willa Sheridan Burns as surviving spouse of Earl Sheridan. Sans a jury and without making findings of fact or conclusions of law, the trial court 'ordered, decreed and adjudged that the issues be found for the defendants and against the plaintiffs and that plaintiffs (sic) Petition is dismissed.' Plaintiffs appealed.

In 1918 John and Clara Sheridan, husband and wife, became the owners of the NW 1/4 Section 13 Township 27 Range 5 (hereinafter the 'northwest quarter'). In 1928 they conveyed the school lot to School District No. 54 a/k/a the Cool Spring School. The warranty deed, inter alia, stated: '. . . when the said (school district) quits using said above described real estate for school purposes such as a school house site and play grounds, then and in that event, said above described real estate shall revert to and become the property of the then owner of the farm from which said real estate was deeded to said School District at the time of said reversion.' The parties have assumed that the school lot, upon termination of the fee simple determinable created by the deed (Nowlin v. Columbia School District, 401 S.W.2d 394, 398(2) (Mo. 1966)), was to pass to the then owners of the northwest quarter.

The record before us leaves much to be desired as to the identity and viability of the persons involved. Clara Sheridan died intestate in 1952. We can only presume that John predeceased her and that Claude, Paul and Earl Sheridan were the only sons and living heirs of John and Clars Sheridan in 1955 when the next described conveyance was made.

Claude and Paul Sheridan, 'as heirs at law of Clara Sheridan, deceased,' and their wives in March 1955 conveyed to Earl and Willa Sheridan, husband and wife, 'an undivided two-thirds interest' in the northwest quarter 'Except School Lot . . . heretofore deeded off.' By a June 1965 warranty deed, Earl and Willa Sheridan conveyed the northwest quarter to plaintiffs 'EXCEPT School Lot . . . heretofore deeded off.'

The deed on which defendants relied in their answer filed December 17, 1973, was a 1972 quit claim deed given them by 'Willa Mae Sheridan Burns' to 'Pt. NW 1/4 (sic) NW 1/4 School Ground Section lot 13 Township 27 Range 5 2.80 acres Index 2629.' As can be seen, if this was an effort on the part of Willa to quit claim her interest in the school lot to defendants, the description was defective. Upon discovery of the defect, defendants before trial of the present case obtained a 1974 quit claim deed from Willa, 'widow of Earl William Sheridan,' to the school lot as it was described in the 1928 deed.

Both sides in this case proceeded on the assumption that the quoted clause appearing in the 1928 deed engrafted upon the estate conveyed to the school district a possible reversionary interest in whoever might be the owner of the northwest quarter when the school district quit using the school lot 'for school purposes such as a school house site and play grounds,' and that this 'possibility of reverter' was assignable. Moreover, all the parties seemed to agree that when Claude and Paul Sheridan in March 1955 conveyed their two- thirds interest in the northwest quarter to Earl and Willa Sheridan, the entire 'reversion' was thereby assigned to Earl and Willa because they were the then owners of the northwest quarter--in spite of the fact that the deed expressly excepted the school lot. From this point, plaintiffs insisted that since the event stated in the 1928 deed to effect the 'reversion' had not occurred by June 1965 when Earl and Willa conveyed the northwest quarter to plaintiffs, plaintiffs, as the owners of the northwest quarter when the even did subsequently occur, became vested with the 'reversionary interest.' On the other hand, defendants asseverated that the event stated in the 1928 deed occurred before Earl and Willa conveyed to plaintiffs, thereby then and there vesting Earl and Willa, as tenants by the entirety, with the 'reversionary interest' when it came into esse and that Earl and Willa did not thereafter convey or assign this interest to plaintiffs because the June 1965 deed to plaintiffs...