Shirley P. v. Norman P.

Citation189 A.3d 89,329 Conn. 648
Decision Date07 August 2018
Docket NumberSC 19870
Parties SHIRLEY P. v. NORMAN P.
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut

Frank W. Russo, South Windsor, with whom, on the brief, was Jon D. Berman, South Windsor, for the appellant (defendant).

Adam J. Teller, East Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Brandy N. Thomas, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Vertefeuille, Js.

MULLINS, J.

The plaintiff, Shirley P., brought the present action, seeking the dissolution of her marriage to the defendant, Norman P., after the defendant allegedly sexually assaulted her. While this dissolution action was pending, the defendant was convicted of several criminal offenses arising from the alleged assault. The defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction in that case to the Appellate Court. Thereafter, while the criminal appeal was pending, the dissolution trial commenced. At that trial, the court allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of the criminal conviction. More specifically, the court ruled that the defendant's conviction had preclusive effect in this dissolution action under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Consequently, following the trial in the present case, the court concluded, solely on the basis of the evidence of the criminal conviction, that the defendant exclusively was responsible for the marital breakdown. Accordingly, the court entered a property division award that heavily favored the plaintiff. The defendant then filed the present appeal.1

In this appeal, the defendant claims that, because the judgment of conviction was subject to a pending appeal at the time of the dissolution trial, that judgment was not final. The defendant contends that, therefore, the trial court improperly gave the criminal judgment collateral estoppel effect in the present dissolution action.

Subsequently, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of conviction in the criminal case. See State v. Norman P. , 169 Conn. App. 616, 151 A.3d 877 (2016), aff'd, 329 Conn. 440, 186 A.3d 1143 (2018). As a result, the parties were ordered to submit supplemental briefs on the effect, if any, of the reversal of the defendant's criminal conviction on the defendant's claim in the present appeal from the dissolution judgment. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Thus, given the reversal of the defendant's criminal conviction, which this court has recently upheld; see State v. Norman P., 329 Conn. 440, 465, 186 A.3d 1143 (2018) ; the precise issue now before us is whether the property award, which was based on that conviction, must also be reversed. To answer that question, we are guided by the principles established in Butler v. Eaton , 141 U.S. 240, 242–44, 11 S.Ct. 985, 35 L.Ed. 713 (1891), which held that a second judgment based upon the preclusive effect of the first judgment should be reversed if the first judgment is reversed. Therefore, under the circumstances presented, we conclude that the reversal of the defendant's criminal conviction strips that judgment of any collateral estoppel effect that it may have had in this dissolution action. Because the fact of the criminal conviction was the sole basis for the property division award, we also conclude that the award must be reversed.

The record reveals the following procedural history and facts that were either found by the trial court or are undisputed. On August 10, 2012, the defendant was arrested and charged with sexual assault of the plaintiff and other felony offenses in connection with an incident that took place at the parties' residence on August 2, 2012. On October 20, 2012, the plaintiff commenced the present action seeking dissolution of her marriage to the defendant. The plaintiff consented to the defendant's request to delay the divorce trial until the completion of his criminal trial.

The defendant ultimately was convicted of several criminal charges and, on February 26, 2015, was sentenced to a lengthy term of incarceration. He filed an appeal from the judgment of conviction on May 14, 2015. See State v. Norman P. , supra, 169 Conn. App. at 616, 151 A.3d 877.

On May 21, 2015, the day before the dissolution trial was scheduled to commence, the defendant filed three motions: a motion to stay the trial until the appeal from his criminal conviction was resolved; a motion to preclude the admission of evidence of his criminal conviction; and a motion for a pretrial hearing to present evidence concerning the unfairness of the criminal proceeding. In his motion for a pretrial hearing, the defendant contended that it would be unfair to give collateral estoppel effect to his criminal conviction in the dissolution action because the conviction was the result of "numerous erroneous trial court rulings." Attached to his motion for a pretrial hearing were copies of the appeal from his conviction as well as his motion for a new trial in the criminal proceeding. In those filings, the defendant set forth, at length, claims that the trial court in his criminal case had made numerous erroneous rulings that affected the validity of the verdict.

On May 22, 2015, just before the trial began, the trial court conducted a hearing on the defendant's three motions. The court denied the defendant's motion for a stay on the ground that the dissolution action had been pending since November 6, 2012, and any further delay would prejudice the plaintiff. With respect to the motions to preclude evidence of the criminal conviction and for a pretrial hearing on the fairness of that conviction, the court concluded that, "[i]n any dissolution action, the [c]ourt is called upon to evaluate the situation as it exists at the time of trial. And there are apparently facts that will be offered as to a conviction that would be relevant to the issues in this case; the court is not going to preclude evidence of that."

The court further concluded that, "as to the issues that were apparently concluded by the conviction that has been described in an offer of proof ... the court is bound to respect that judgment. And we will not relitigate here the criminal trial." Accordingly, the court denied the defendant's motions to preclude evidence of the conviction and for a pretrial hearing to present evidence that the conviction was unfair. The court noted, however, that "the existence of [a pending] appeal [from the criminal conviction] is something that can be demonstrated and may well enter into the court's deliberations on the overall outcome of the matter ...."

At trial, the plaintiff called the defendant as a witness, and he testified that he had been convicted of sexually assaulting the plaintiff and of other criminal offenses arising from the events on August 2, 2012. Thereafter, the trial court issued a memorandum of decision in which it found that "the conduct of the [defendant] in August, 2012, which resulted in his arrest for and conviction of offenses including the sexual assault of the [plaintiff], was the cause of the breakdown of the marriage." As a result, the court found that the defendant "bears sole responsibility for the marriage breakdown." The court concluded that the factors enumerated in General Statutes § 46b-812 "clearly call for a property division which heavily favors the plaintiff," and it rendered a property division award accordingly. The court rendered no alimony award. The reasons the court gave for declining to award alimony were that the plaintiff had not requested alimony, the defendant would have no opportunity to earn income while he was incarcerated, and the defendant would require income after his release.

In support of its conclusion that it could give preclusive effect to the defendant's criminal conviction despite the pending appeal, the court noted that it was required to "make its decision based on circumstances as they now exist, not as the defendant hopes they might be in the future." The court responded to the defendant's complaint that, if the plaintiff received a favorable property award and the defendant's conviction were later reversed on appeal, he would "be left with a disproportionately small share of the marital property" by noting that, if that occurred, the defendant "would have the opportunity to resume gainful employment and retain all of his earnings ...."

Following the court's ruling, the defendant filed a motion to reargue. In that motion, he contended that the trial court improperly had determined that the conduct that resulted in his criminal conviction was the cause of the marital breakdown without allowing him to present evidence relating to the validity and reliability of the conviction. He also contended that the dissolution action should have been stayed pending resolution of his appeal in the criminal proceeding. The trial court denied the motion. The defendant then filed the present appeal.

In this appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly gave collateral estoppel effect to the criminal judgment of conviction because that judgment was subject to a pending appeal and, therefore, was not final. After filing his appeal in the present case, the Appellate Court released its decision reversing the defendant's criminal conviction and remanding the criminal case to the trial court for a new trial. See State v. Norman. P. , supra, 169 Conn. App. at 644, 151 A.3d 877. As a result, the parties to this appeal were ordered to file supplemental briefs addressing the effect of the reversal of the defendant's criminal conviction on his claims in the present case.3

In his supplemental brief, the defendant contends that the reversal of his criminal conviction deprives that judgment of preclusive effect and requires the reversal of the property division award. The plaintiff contends that, to the contrary, because the trial court properly rendered the property division award on the basis of the record as it existed at the time, this court has no authority to set aside the award. In the alternative, she...

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3 cases
  • State v. Ashby
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 6, 2020
    ...existence of any agreement."18 Records of that proceeding are the proper subject of judicial notice. See, e.g., Shirley P. v. Norman P. , 329 Conn. 648, 660, 189 A.3d 89 (2018).19 We note that this approach is consistent with the standard of review applied to the agency prong of Massiah by ......
  • Allstate Insurance Company v. Tenn
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • February 23, 2022
    ...Records of these proceedings before the Superior Court are a proper subject of judicial notice. See, e.g., Shirley P. v. Norman P. , 329 Conn. 648, 660, 189 A.3d 89 (2018) ; Karp v. Urban Redevelopment Commission , 162 Conn. 525, 527–28, 294 A.2d 633 (1972).2 The relevant portions of the ca......
  • Trinity Christian Sch. v. Comm'n on Human Rights
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 7, 2018
2 books & journal articles
  • Review of the Year 2019 in Family Law: Case Digests
    • United States
    • ABA General Library Family Law Quarterly No. 53-4, January 2020
    • January 1, 2020
    ...for bad-faith conduct, and (4) husband was not entitled to a hearing on attorney fees. Divorce Connecticut. Shirley P. v. Norman P. , 329 Conn. 648 (2018). The Court held that when a property distribution award heavily favors one party and is awarded based solely on a criminal conviction, a......
  • 2018 Connecticut Appellate Review
    • United States
    • Connecticut Bar Association Connecticut Bar Journal No. 92, 2019
    • Invalid date
    ...75, 191 A.3d 983 (2018). [33] 328 Conn. 709, 183 A.3d 1164 (2018). A lawyer now in the authors' office represents the defendants. [34] 329 Conn. 648, 189 A.3d 89 (2018). [35] 328 Conn. 134, 176 A.3d 1146 (2018). The statute at issue is General Statutes § 42-150bb. [36] 328 Conn. 444, 180 A.......

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