Shirley v. Hynes-Simms
| Decision Date | 11 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-00467 |
| Parties | THOMAS SHIRLEY, Plaintiff, v. AMANDA HYNES-SIMMS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
Thomas Shirley, an inmate of the Morgan County Correctional Complex (MMCX) in Wartburg, Tennessee, filed a pro se, in forma pauperis complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against MCCX Director of Mental Health Amanda Hynes-Simms, MCCX Warden Michael Parris, MCCX Warden Steve Jones, MCCX Warden Stacy Oakes, Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) Commissioner Tony Parker, MCCX Lieutenant Kevin Wall, MCCX Sergeant f/n/u Mason, MCCX Unit Manager Brandon Robinson, and MCCX Corporal f/n/u Delk. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff also filed three motions to amend his complaints (Doc. Nos. 9, 10, 11), a “Preliminary Motion for Temporary Restraining Order on all Defendants” (Doc. No. 11)[1], and a “Preliminary Injunctive Order for T.R.O and Cease and Dissist [sic] Motion” (Doc. No. 13).
Subsequent to filing his complaint, Plaintiff filed three motions to amend his complaint to add MCCX Counselor Brian Reynolds (Doc. No. 9), MCCX Therapist Brittney Hill and Hill's employer, Centurion Corp. (Doc. No. 10), and MCCX Therapists Tara Harvey and Amber Switzer (Doc. No. 11) as Defendants. Pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend shall be freely granted when justice requires. No Defendants have been served at this time, and the Court finds it appropriate to permit Plaintiff to amend his complaint as requested. Therefore, the Court will screen the original complaint, as amended, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity, ” id. § 1915A(a), and summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in § 1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).
The Sixth Circuit has confirmed that the dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under those statutes because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6).” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive scrutiny on initial review, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[A] district court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted)).
The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838 F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)). Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991), the courts' “duty to be ‘less stringent' with pro se complaints does not require us to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . . . .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
According to the complaint, while incarcerated at MCCX, Defendants violated “policy” and Plaintiff's federal civil and due process rights as well as committed “malicious intent, neglect, [and] abuse.” (Doc. No. 1 at 2). Specifically, Plaintiff was beaten twice daily by Correctional Officers for a two-month periods (Id. at 3); on June 6, 2021, Defendants would not process Plaintiff's grievance forms (Id.); Defendants permitted, and are permitting, “P.C.” inmates from C-pod and A-pod to serve Plaintiff food in which the inmates put hair and feces, and these inmates routinely steal Plaintiff's drinks, food, and condiments (Id.); Defendants will not allow Plaintiff to participate in mandatory therapy “out of cell group” (Id.); Plaintiff is kept in his cell 24 hours a day due to alleged staff shortages (Id.); and Defendants have refused to give Plaintiff haircuts or cleaning supplies for the past 60 days. (Id. at 4). In addition, according to Plaintiff, inmates housed in the mental health pod are treated differently than other inmates and are not afforded the same rights and opportunities. Plaintiff believes that Defendants have discriminated, and continue to discriminate, against him and other inmates housed in the mental health pod. (See Doc. No. 1).
The complaint further alleges that Plaintiff is “literally dying . . . of malnutrition” because he refuses to eat the meals provided to him and wants to be placed in the DeBerry Special Needs Facility where he can be fed through an IV. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff is a housed in a cell “that was burned with fire 6 times” and is not allowed a mattress or shoes. (Id.) Plaintiff “is in pain with no shoes, barefoot and sleeping on a metal slab.” (Id.)
The complaint alleges that Defendant Parker “is in charge of” MCCX and that he “allowed” the other Defendants to take the actions described in the complaint. (Id. at 2). The complaint also alleges that Defendant Hynes-Sims “has a say so in what goes on in the 26 Bldg. B pod.” (Id.)
The complaint as amended alleges that Defendant Reynolds assists the other Defendants “in housing Shirley in isolation and allows the abuse as stated same in claim.” (Doc. No. 9 at 1). In addition, Reynolds “refused/refuses to help transfer Shirley” and “ignores the abuses that Shirley documented.” (Id. at 2). In addition, the complaint as amended alleges that Defendant Hill retaliated against Plaintiffbecause he sued her boss. (Doc. No. 10 at 1). In particular, the complaint alleges that Hill refuses to input Plaintiff's work credits, failed to notify staff when the plaintiff attempted suicide, and refuses to permit Plaintiff to participate in “rec therapy” and group therapy. (Id.) Further, the complaint alleges that Defendant Hill “commits neglect, malicious intent, bias against mental health patients and cruel and unusual punishment.” (Id.) The plaintiff also names Hill's employer, Centurion Corp., as a Defendant. (Id. at 11).
Plaintiff's third amendment to the complaint alleges that MCCX therapists Tara Harvey and Amber Switzer also are responsible for the alleged above wrongs committed against Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 11 at 3).
MCCX Director of Mental Health Amanda Hynes-Simms, MCCX Warden Michael Parris, MCCX Warden Steve Jones, MCCX Warden Stacy Oakes, TDOC Commissioner Tony Parker, MCCX Lieutenant Kevin Wall, MCCX Sergeant f/n/u Mason, MCCX Unit Manager Brandon Robinson, MCCX Corporal f/n/u Delk, MCCX Counselor Brian Reynolds, MCCX Therapists Brittney Hill, Tara Harvey, and Amber Switzer, and Centurion Corp. are named as Defendants to this action.
First, the complaint alleges that TDOC Commissioner Parker “is in charge of TDOC's Morgan County Correctional Complex” and allowed all Defendants to violate Plaintiff's rights. (Doc. No. 1 at 2). However, Defendant Parker does not bear legal responsibility simply because of his role as TDOC Commissioner. There is no allegation that he had any involvement in any of the events described in the complaint. See, e.g., Frazier v. Michigan, 41 Fed.Appx. 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (); see also Braswell v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 419 Fed.Appx. 622, 627 (6th Cir. 2011) (). Plaintiff's claim against Commissioner Parker therefore will be dismissed.
Next the complaint alleges that unidentified MCCX correctional officers beat Plaintiff twice daily for a...
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