Shirley v. State

Decision Date09 September 1988
Docket NumberNo. 76825,76825
PartiesSHIRLEY v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Harry J. Bowden, Atlanta, for appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Joseph J. Drolet, Richard E. Hicks, Joyce M. Averils, Asst. Dist. Attys., for appellee.

BEASLEY, Judge.

Defendant appeals his convictions of rape, OCGA § 16-6-1, and kidnapping, OCGA § 16-5-40. His enumerations of error raise the single question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. See Lewis v. State, 186 Ga.App. 92(1), 366 S.E.2d 305 (1988).

1. Even without a motion to dismiss the appeal, it is the duty of the reviewing court to entertain the threshold question of its jurisdiction where there may be any doubt. Thurmond v. State, 59 Ga.App. 333(2), 200 S.E. 807 (1939); Jackson v. State, 203 Ga. 570, 47 S.E.2d 588 (1948). There is a motion by the State to dismiss on the ground that the notice of appeal was premature because a motion for new trial was still pending below.

Formerly, an appeal from a judgment on a verdict brought while the case was pending on motion for new trial was premature and of no validity. Kurtz v. State, 115 Ga.App. 665(1), 155 S.E.2d 735 (1967); Strauss v. Peachtree Assoc., 156 Ga.App. 536, 275 S.E.2d 90 (1980). This is no longer true for two reasons. First, the decision relied upon by the State, Boothe v. State, 178 Ga.App. 22, 342 S.E.2d 9 (1986), has been overruled by Eller v. State, 183 Ga.App. 724, 360 S.E.2d 53 (1987). See Gillen v. Bostick, 234 Ga. 308(1), 215 S.E.2d 676 (1975). Thus, premature filing is not a ground of dismissal in criminal cases, at least insofar as a criminal defendant is concerned. Compare State v. Rimes, 177 Ga.App. 872, 341 S.E.2d 710 (1986).

Second, when confronted with a situation where one party timely filed a motion for new trial and the other party filed a notice of appeal within the statutory period in Housing Auth. v. Geter, 252 Ga. 196, 197, 312 S.E.2d 309 (1984), our Supreme Court recognized that a notice of appeal may divest the trial court of jurisdiction, but the divestiture is delayed until the motion for new trial is ruled upon and either a notice of appeal to that ruling is taken or the time for appeal has expired. The court also noted that the trial court may, on its own motion, grant a new trial within the statutory period even though a notice of appeal has been filed. OCGA § 5-5-40(h). The opinion held that the proper means of placing the issue before the appellate court was to file a motion for stay of the direct appeal.

Atkinson v. State, 170 Ga.App. 260(1), 316 S.E.2d 592 (1984), involved a defendant who filed both a timely notice of appeal and motion for new trial. This court interpreted Geter and determined that we had jurisdiction of the notice of appeal in the absence of a motion to stay. Accord Rich v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Ga.App. 663(1), 337 S.E.2d 370 (1985). Defendant has not filed an application for a stay of the appeal. Nevertheless, because we are confronted with a timely motion for new trial and what is designated an out-of-time notice of appeal, the source of our jurisdiction remains questionable and requires inquiry into the posture of this case.

Verdict was rendered on December 8, 1987, and defendant was sentenced that same day. Defendant discharged his retained counsel and the trial court appointed the Fulton County Public Defender on December 10 to represent defendant at a hearing to determine whether he was indigent. Apparently there was no hearing but on January 4, 1988, still within thirty days of judgment, the Public Defender was appointed as defendant's appeal counsel. The following day, defendant, who was by then at the Georgia Diagnostic Center at Jackson, mailed to the Fulton Superior Court Clerk a motion for new trial on the general grounds, a motion for appointment of counsel, a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and an affidavit of poverty. These documents were received and filed on January 6, again within 30 days of the final judgment. See OCGA § 5-5-40(a). Defendant's subsequent request for a transcript was filed on January 11. On January 15 an inter-office memorandum from the clerk to the trial court recited that defendant's motion for new trial, filed on January 6, was pending and that no notice of appeal had been filed. On January 25, "[g]ood and sufficient reason having been shown," the trial court allowed defendant to file an out-of-time appeal, and notice of appeal was filed on January 27 by defendant's appointed counsel. A February 24 inter-office memorandum between clerk and trial court noted the pendency of the notice of appeal but recited that no motion for new trial was filed.

To apply the proper principles we must first ascertain the validity of the motion and the notice of appeal. Historically in Georgia, an out-of-time appeal was granted because to refuse to do so would deprive defendant of his constitutional rights. Among the initial cases recognizing the right to an out-of-time appeal was Roberts v. Caldwell, 230 Ga. 223, 196 S.E.2d 444 (1973), where on review of a habeas corpus action the Supreme Court found defendant was denied appellate counsel on his first appeal, relying upon Swenson v. Bosler, 386 U.S. 258, 87 S.Ct. 996, 18 L.Ed.2d 33 (1967), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963). See Wilson v. Downie, 228 Ga. 656, 187 S.E.2d 293 (1972) [which determined that defendant waived his right to appeal]. Another landmark case, McAuliffe v. Rutledge, 231 Ga. 1, 200 S.E.2d 100 (1973) and 231 Ga. 745, 204 S.E.2d 141 (1974), involved the grant of an out-of-time appeal via habeas corpus because defendant was deprived of his first appeal by ineffective assistance of counsel who failed to obtain a timely extension of time for filing the transcript.

Deprivation of constitutional rights with respect to the appeal procedure continued to be the source of out-of-time appeal grants in subsequent cases. See Thornton v. Ault, 233 Ga. 172, 210 S.E.2d 683 (1974); Hopkins v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 236, 215 S.E.2d 241 (1975); Kreps v. Gray, 234 Ga. 745, 218 S.E.2d 1 (1975); Bell v. Hopper, 237 Ga. 810, 229 S.E.2d 658 (1976); Brown v. State, 239 Ga. 435, 238 S.E.2d 21 (1977); Lay v. State, 242 Ga. 225, 248 S.E.2d 611 (1978); Williams v. Hopper, 243 Ga. 475, 254 S.E.2d 854 (1979); Deyton v. Davenport, 245 Ga. 672, 266 S.E.2d 488 (1980); Gregory v. Green, 249 Ga. 102, 288 S.E.2d 197 (1982); Webb v. State, 254 Ga. 130, 327 S.E.2d 224 (1985). Implicit in those cases was the proposition that the statutory requirements, although described as jurisdictional, perforce had to yield to constitutional mandate. Cf. Hester v. State, 242 Ga. 173, 249 S.E.2d 547 (1978). As a consequence and by way of parallel development, a deprivation of the right to appeal because of some constitutional infirmity, which would be grounds for habeas relief, was used to allow an out-of-time appeal directly without requiring the procedurally correct habeas corpus route.

An early example demonstrating this expedited process is Cunningham v. State, 232 Ga. 416, 207 S.E.2d 48 (1974), which, on certiorari from our dismissal of an appeal, required that the procedurally defective appeal be considered by this court because the abortive attempt to appeal by retained counsel denied defendant due process and equal protection of the law. For other examples, see Gaylor v. State, 247 Ga. 759, 279 S.E.2d 207 (1981); Cochran v. State, 253 Ga. 10, 315 S.E.2d 653 (1984); Curry v. State, 148 Ga.App. 59, 251 S.E.2d 86 (1978); Mobley v. State, 162 Ga.App. 23(1), 288 S.E.2d 702 (1982); Cannon v. State, 175 Ga.App. 741, 334 S.E.2d 342 (1985); Moore v. State, 176 Ga.App. 882, 339 S.E.2d 271 (1985); Conway v. State, 183 Ga.App. 573, 359 S.E.2d 438 (1987).

Nevertheless, whether by way of habeas corpus or a more direct approach, the basis for permitting an out-of-time appeal must have rested upon an issue of constitutional dimension concerning the appeal itself, such as ineffective assistance of counsel resulting from failure to file a timely appeal or counsel's abandoning an appeal desired by defendant, or failure to advise defendant of his right to appeal. Contra, see Mitchell v. State, 157 Ga.App. 181(1), 276 S.E.2d 864 (1981) [resting upon the principle of judicial economy]; Johnson v. State, 182 Ga.App. 477(1), 356 S.E.2d 101 (1987) [stating that a constitutional issue was unnecessary but finding defendant was deprived of right to appeal through ineffective assistance of counsel].

An out-of-time appeal is unauthorized if the loss of the right to appeal was attributable to defendant sleeping on or waiving his rights. Henry v. Hopper, 235 Ga. 196, 219 S.E.2d 119 (1975). Accord Westberry v. State, 257 Ga. 617, 361 S.E.2d 826 (1987); State v. Denson, 236 Ga. 239, 223 S.E.2d 640 (1976); Wilson v. Downie, supra. Cannon v. State, supra, 175 Ga.App. at 743, 334 S.E.2d 342, decreed that the trial court's order "reveal a specific determination as to whether the right to appeal was lost as the result of ineffective assistance of counsel or of appellant's own conduct."

Because an appeal may be filed within 30 days of an order disposing of a motion for new trial, OCGA § 5-6-38(a), the necessity for an out-of-time appeal based upon constitutional deprivation existed in this case only...

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