Shivel v. Vidro

• Citation: 294 N.W. 78,295 Mich. 10
• Decision Date: 07 October 1940
• Docket Number: Motion No. 399.
• Parties: SHIVEL v. VIDRO, County Treasurer of Kent County (MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMMISSION, Intervener).
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

295 Mich. 10

294 N.W. 78

SHIVEL

v.VIDRO, County Treasurer of Kent County (MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMMISSION, Intervener).

Motion No. 399.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 7, 1940.

Mandamus proceeding by Bertha E. Shivel against Thomas Vidro, County Treasurer of Kent County, Mich., to compel the County Treasurer to accept a proffered tax, wherein the Michigan State Tax Commission intervened as defendant. From a judgment denying writ of mandamus, the plaintiff appeals in the nature of certiorari.

Affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Kent County; Cornelius Hoffius, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Linsey, Shivel, Phelps & Vander Wal, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.

Thomas Read, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd and Arch M. Black, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Fred N. Searl, Pros. Atty., of Grand Rapids, for appellees.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Shaeffer & Dahling, Beaumont, Smith & Harris, Bulkley, Ledyard, Dickinson & Wright, and Butzel, Eaman, Long, Gust & Bills, all of Detroit, amici curiae on constitutionalvalidity of Intangibles Tax Law.

Paul E. Krause, Corp. Counsel, John H. Witherspoon, Chief Asst. Corp. Counsel, and John G. Dunn, Asst. Corp. Counsel, all of Detroit, amicus curiae in answer to questions submitted.

Robert S. Marx, Lawrence Levi, and Carl Runge, all of Detroit, amicus curiae.

WIEST, Justice.

Plaintiff holds a secured pecuniary obligation within the meaning of Act No. 142, Pub.Acts 1913, and tendered to the treasurer of Kent county the tax thereon required by that act and, upon his refusal to accept the tax on the ground that Act No. 301, Pub.Acts 1939, imposing a specific tax on intangibles, superseded the old act, petitioned the circuit court for the county of Kent to issue a writ of mandamus, directing the county treasurer to accept the proffered tax and, upon denial of the writ, prosecutes this appeal in the nature of certiorari.

Plaintiff contends that Act No. 301, Pub.Acts 1939, is void in that it imposes, in point of law, an ad valorem tax without the uniformity required by § 3, art. 10, of the Constitution of 1908, and without assessment of property at its cash value as commanded by § 7, art. 10, of the Constitution; that a specific tax cannot, under the State Constitution, be imposed upon intangible personal property; that, if the act be held to impose a specific tax, it is arbitrary, discriminatory, inequitable and violates § 4, art. 10 of the Constitution, and that the title to the act does not adequately express its object and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to pay the tax under Act No. 142, Pub.Acts 1913.

If the tax imposed by the 1939 act is properly specific and not in violation of constitutional mandate, and the title to the enactment is sufficient, the case ends.

It is of passing notice, but not of determinative value, that the tax plaintiff seeks right to pay under the act of 1913 was specific.

Section 1(b) of Act No. 301, Pub.Acts 1939, imposes a specific tax on intangible personal property such as-‘accounts receivable, moneys on hand or on deposit or in transit, interest bearing obligations for the payment of money, including bonds, certificates of indebtedness, debentures, notes, and certificates of deposit, either secured or unsecured, annuities, royalties, shares of stock in corporations, associations, and joint stock companies, certificates of ownership in enterprises conducted for profit, (not, however, including partnership agreements,) equitable interests in any of the foregoing classes of intangible property, and any and all other credits and evidences of indebtedness.’

The act provides machinery for accomplishment of its purpose and has the following title: ‘An Act to provide for the imposition and the collection of a specific tax upon the ownership of intangible personal property; to provide for the disposition of the proceeds thereof; to prescribe the powers and duties of the state tax commission with respect thereto; to prescribe penalties; to make an appropriation to carry out the provisions of this act; and to repeal all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act.’

This title, though short, is comprehensive of the provisions embodied in the act.

As said in Re Lewis' Estate, 287 Mich. 179, 183, 283 N.W. 21, 22: ‘The title to an enactment is required to be expressive of the purpose and scope of the enactment. If the enactment comes fairly within and is reasonably a component part of the purpose expressed in the title it is not an interloper but a part thereof and so proper as to be expected therein.’

The title is sufficient.

The power to levy taxes for governmental needs is in the legislature subject only to limitations and regulations found in the Constitution.

The tax is as follows:

‘Sec. 2. For the calendar year 1940, and for each year thereafter there is hereby levied upon each owner of intangible personal property not hereinafter exempted having a situs within this state, and there shall be collected from such owner an annual specific tax on each item of such property owned by him. The tax on income producing intangible personal property shall be 6 per cent of the income but in no event less than one-tenth of 1 per cent nor more than three-tenths of 1 per cent of the face or par value of each item (or in the case of corporate stock or other evidence of corporate ownership having no par or face value, of the average per share contribution to capital, surplus and other funds in consideration of which all of the then outstanding shares of stock of the same class of such corporation shall have been issued). The tax on non-income producing intangible personal property shall be one-tenth of 1 per cent of said face, par or contributed value. The value, for the purpose of this section, of any item of property the value of which changes during the year shall be the average value to be computed under such rules and regulations as the commission may adopt. If any item of intangible personal property subject to tax under this subsection is owned by the taxpayer for only a portion of the calendar year the tax levied hereunder shall be reduced in proportion.

‘Intangible personal property subject to tax under this act shall be exempt from all general property taxes under the laws of this state.’

The act provides for an annual, verified return by the taxpayer showing the personal property subject to taxation thereunder and remittance of the tax thereon.

The tax is specific, being levied directly by legislative enactment upon ownership of designated personal property and cannot be held arbitrary, discriminatory or inequitable, and the rule of uniformity required by art. 10, § 3, of the Constitution, in case of ad valorem tax, has no applicability.

In C. F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 672,...