Shivel v. Vidro, Motion No. 399.

• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Writing for the Court: WIEST
• Citation: 294 N.W. 78,295 Mich. 10
• Decision Date: 07 October 1940
• Docket Number: Motion No. 399.
• Parties: SHIVEL v. VIDRO, County Treasurer of Kent County (MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMMISSION, Intervener).

295 Mich. 10
294 N.W. 78

SHIVEL
v.
VIDRO, County Treasurer of Kent County (MICHIGAN STATE TAX COMMISSION, Intervener).

Motion No. 399.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Oct. 7, 1940.

Mandamus proceeding by Bertha E. Shivel against Thomas Vidro, County Treasurer of Kent County, Mich., to compel the County Treasurer to accept a proffered tax, wherein the Michigan State Tax Commission intervened as defendant. From a judgment denying writ of mandamus, the plaintiff appeals in the nature of certiorari.

Affirmed.

[294 N.W. 79]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Kent County; Cornelius Hoffius, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Linsey, Shivel, Phelps & Vander Wal, of Grand Rapids, for appellant.

Thomas Read, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd and Arch M. Black, Asst. Attys. Gen., and Fred N. Searl, Pros. Atty., of Grand Rapids, for appellees.

Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, Shaeffer & Dahling, Beaumont, Smith & Harris, Bulkley, Ledyard, Dickinson & Wright, and Butzel, Eaman, Long, Gust & Bills, all of Detroit, amici curiae on constitutional

[294 N.W. 80]

validity of Intangibles Tax Law.

Paul E. Krause, Corp. Counsel, John H. Witherspoon, Chief Asst. Corp. Counsel, and John G. Dunn, Asst. Corp. Counsel, all of Detroit, amicus curiae in answer to questions submitted.

Robert S. Marx, Lawrence Levi, and Carl Runge, all of Detroit, amicus curiae.

WIEST, Justice.

Plaintiff holds a secured pecuniary obligation within the meaning of Act No. 142, Pub.Acts 1913, and tendered to the treasurer of Kent county the tax thereon required by that act and, upon his refusal to accept the tax on the ground that Act No. 301, Pub.Acts 1939, imposing a specific tax on intangibles, superseded the old act, petitioned the circuit court for the county of Kent to issue a writ of mandamus, directing the county treasurer to accept the proffered tax and, upon denial of the writ, prosecutes this appeal in the nature of certiorari.

Plaintiff contends that Act No. 301, Pub.Acts 1939, is void in that it imposes, in point of law, an ad valorem tax without the uniformity required by § 3, art. 10, of the Constitution of 1908, and without assessment of property at its cash value as commanded by § 7, art. 10, of the Constitution; that a specific tax cannot, under the State Constitution, be imposed upon intangible personal property; that, if the act be held to impose a specific tax, it is arbitrary, discriminatory, inequitable and violates § 4, art. 10 of the Constitution, and that the title to the act does not adequately express its object and, therefore, plaintiff is entitled to pay the tax under Act No. 142, Pub.Acts 1913.

If the tax imposed by the 1939 act is properly specific and not in violation of constitutional mandate, and the title to the enactment is sufficient, the case ends.

It is of passing notice, but not of determinative value, that the tax plaintiff seeks right to pay under the act of 1913 was specific.

Section 1(b) of Act No. 301, Pub.Acts 1939, imposes a specific tax on intangible personal property such as-‘accounts receivable, moneys on hand or on deposit or in transit, interest bearing obligations for the payment of money, including bonds, certificates of indebtedness, debentures, notes, and certificates of deposit, either secured or unsecured, annuities, royalties, shares of stock in corporations, associations, and joint stock companies, certificates of ownership in enterprises conducted for profit, (not, however, including partnership agreements,) equitable interests in any of the foregoing classes of intangible property, and any and all other credits and evidences of indebtedness.’

The act provides machinery for accomplishment of its purpose and has the following title: ‘An Act to provide for the imposition and the collection of a specific tax upon the ownership of intangible personal property; to provide for the disposition of the proceeds thereof; to prescribe the powers and duties of the state tax commission with respect thereto; to prescribe penalties; to make an appropriation to carry out the provisions of this act; and to repeal all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act.’

This title, though short, is comprehensive of the provisions embodied in the act.

As said in Re Lewis' Estate, 287 Mich. 179, 183, 283 N.W. 21, 22: ‘The title to an enactment is required to be...