Shively v. Green Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., CASE NO. 5:11CV2398
Decision Date | 28 February 2013 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 5:11CV2398 |
Parties | LISA SHIVELY, etc., et al., Plaintiffs, v. GREEN LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OF OPINIONAND ORDER
Pending is Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and for Dismissal for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (ECF No. 18). Defendants move the Court for an order granting them judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Furthermore, Defendants move the Court for dismissal of Plaintiffs Lisa and James Shively's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The Court has been advised, having reviewed the record, the parties' briefs and the applicable law. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motion in part.
Plaintiffs Lisa and James Shively filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in November 2011 on their own behalf, and on behalf of their minor child, T.S. The eight-count Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14) seeks declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against the Green Local School District Board of Education (also "Board of Education" or "Defendant Board"), Michael Nutter, Wade Lucas, Cindy Brown, Mark Booth, Jeff Miller, and Jeff Wells (alsocollectively "individual Defendants") for alleged violations of Plaintiffs' civil rights. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Defendant Board and its employees failed to prevent or respond to gender- and religion-based bullying and harassment aimed at T.S., thereby violating Plaintiffs' constitutional rights, Title IX, and state law. Count I alleges a deprivation of Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count II alleges a deprivation of Plaintiffs' equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Count III is a First Amendment claim wherein Plaintiffs allege that T.S. was punished for exercising her right to identify herself as Jewish, a right Defendants failed to enforce. Count IV alleges that Defendants, by allowing religion-based bullying and harassment, violated T.S.'s right to the free exercise of her religion under the First Amendment. Count V alleges a claim under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Count VI alleges that Defendant Board's failure to train its employees regarding bullying constitutes a violation of the Board's obligations, resulting in liability pursuant to Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Count VII alleges a negligence state law claim against the individual Defendants. Finally, Count VIII alleges a state law claim of malicious purpose, bad faith, and wanton and reckless conduct against the individual Defendants.1
Plaintiffs allege that the bullying, both physical, verbal and electronic, went on for years:
Noting that school officials responded to the asserted bullying, Plaintiffs indicate that two alleged perpetrators were supposedly expelled and that Defendants Board and Nutter ultimately offered an alternative public school placement to T.S. ECF No. 14 at ¶¶ 13j, 24.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is reviewed under the same standard applicable to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008). The Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept all factual allegations as true, and make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008); In re Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 123 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1997). The complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 470 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). A motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(c) is appropriately granted "when no material issue of fact exists andthe party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
A cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it lacks "plausibility in th[e] complaint." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Plaintiffs are not required to include detailed factual allegations, but must provide more than "an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. at 678. A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Id. at 557. It must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. at 557 (brackets omitted).
Defendants' motion is also brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for a lack of jurisdiction. Rule 12(b)(1) permits dismissal for "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." Lack ofsubject-matter jurisdiction may be asserted at any time, either in a pleading or in a motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face, in which all allegations of the plaintiff must be considered as true, or it can attack the factual basis for jurisdiction, in which case the trial court must weigh the evidence and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists." DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2004). A party making a "factual attack" on subject-matter jurisdiction challenges the actual existence of the court's jurisdiction, i.e., a defect may exist even though the complaint contains the formal allegations necessary to invoke jurisdiction. See RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996).
Defendants launch a factual attack in that they challenge "whether Plaintiff Parents, who allege their child was teased, have standing to bring bullying claims on their own behalf." ECF No. 18 at 3. Because this is a question of fact, the Amended Complaint is not accorded the presumption of truth on these matters by the Court.
To continue reading
Request your trial