Shockley v. Crews

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
• Writing for the Court: STEPHEN R. CLARK, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
• Citation: Shockley v. Crews, 696 F.Supp.3d 589 (E.D. Mo. 2023)
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:19-cv-02520-SRC
• Decision Date: 29 September 2023
• Parties: Lance SHOCKLEY, Petitioner, v. Travis CREWS, Respondent.

696 F.Supp.3d 589

Lance SHOCKLEY, Petitioner, v. Travis CREWS, Respondent.

Case No. 4:19-cv-02520-SRC

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

Signed September 29, 2023

Jeremy S. Weis, Federal Public Defender —Kansas City Western District of Missouri, Kansas City, MO, Justin Thompson, Federal Public Defender, Columbus, OH, for Petitioner.

Michael J. Spillane, Attorney General of Missouri, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.

Memorandum and Order

STEPHEN R. CLARK, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction . . . 615

II. Background . . . 616

III. Standard of review . . . 617

IV. Motion for a Rhines stay . . . 618

A. Overview . . . 618

B. Standards for Rhines stay . . . 619

C. Discussion of motion for a Rhines stay . . . 619

1. Procedural default under Rule 29.15(b) exhausts Shockley's claims . . . 620

2. Rule-91 relief is not available to Shockley . . . 622

3. Shockley has intentionally delayed this proceeding . . . 623

V. Discovery motion . . . 623

A. Overview . . . 623

B. AEDPA and standards for a discovery motion . . . 624

C. Discussion of discovery motion . . . 625

1. Discovery requests for raised claims . . . 625

2. Discovery requests under § 2254(e)(2) and Shinn . . . 627

3. Discovery requests contrary to § 2254(e)(2) and Shinn . . . 628

4. Discovery request under Bracy . . . 629

5. Discovery requests without briefing . . . 630

VI. Habeas corpus petition . . . 630

A. The evidence against Shockley . . . 630

B. Claims adjudicated on the merits in state court . . . 632

1. Ineffective-assistance claims adjudicated on the merits in state court . . . 633

a. Strickland v. Washington . . . 633

i. Strickland's performance and prejudice prongs . . . 633

ii. The ABA's guidelines do not set the standard for effective assistance . . . 635

iii. Strickland and § 2254(d) . . . 638

b. Claim 1 . . . 638

i. Jury selection . . . 639

ii. Motion for a new trial . . . 641

c. Claim 5 . . . 643

d. Claim 7 . . . 644

e. Claim 9(a) . . . 644

f. Claim 10 . . . 645

g. Claim 12 . . . 647

h. Claim 14 . . . 647

i. Claim 15(a) . . . 649

j. Claim 17 . . . 650

k. Claim 20 . . . 651

l. Claim 23 . . . 652

m. Claim 24 . . . 655

2. Other claims adjudicated on the merits in state court . . . 656

a. Claim 3 . . . 656

b. Claim 4 . . . 658

c. Claim 16 . . . 660

d. Claim 18(a) . . . 661

e. Claim 19 . . . 662

f. Claim 25 . . . 663

i. Allegations regarding files on Sergeant Graham's computers . . . 664

ii. Allegations regarding Sheriff Greg Melton . . . 668

iii. Allegations of a criminal conspiracy . . . 671

iv. Allegations of suppression of evidence . . . 672

v. The Missouri Supreme Court's findings . . . 676

g. Claim 28 . . . 679

C. Procedurally defaulted claims . . . 683

1. Procedurally defaulted ineffective-assistance claims . . . 684

a. Claim 6 . . . 686

b. Claim 8 . . . 687

c. Claim 9(b) . . . 688

d. Claim 11 . . . 689

e. Claim 13 . . . 689

f. Claim 15(b) . . . 693

g. Claim 18(b) . . . 693

h. Claim 22 . . . 695

i. Claim 26 . . . 698

2. Other procedurally defaulted claims . . . 699

a. Claim 2 . . . 699

b. Claim 21 . . . 700

i. The factual and legal availability of a ballistics-evidence claim during state-court review . . . 701

ii. The competence of counsel in choosing not to raise a ballistics-evidence claim . . . 703

iii. The miscarriage-of-justice exception to the bar on procedurally defaulted claims . . . 704

c. Claim 27 . . . 705

VII. Law-and-justice standard . . . 706

VIII. Certificate of appealability . . . 707

IX. Conclusion . . . 707

I. Introduction

A jury found that Lance Shockley murdered Missouri Highway Patrol Sergeant Carl DeWayne Graham, Jr., and a Missouri judge sentenced him to death for his crime. In the nearly 19 years since the murder, Shockley has presented his case to Missouri courts on four occasions. After the Missouri Supreme Court twice affirmed his conviction and death sentence, Shockley now petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus on 28 grounds. The Court finds Shockley's arguments lack merit and denies his Petition.

II. Background

The Missouri Supreme Court described the pertinent facts as follows:

On November 26, 2004, [Shockley] was involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of his passenger. Over the next several months, [Sergeant Graham] conducted the investigation of the accident, which criminally implicated [Shockley].

On March 20, 2005, at approximately 12:20 p.m., [Shockley] borrowed his grandmother's red Pontiac Grand Am (hereinafter, "the red car"), which had a bright yellow sticker on the trunk near the driver's side. Between 1:45 p.m. and 4:15 p.m. that afternoon, various witnesses noticed a red car with a bright yellow sticker affixed to the driver's side of the trunk parked on the wrong side of the road a few hundred feet from [Sergeant Graham's] residence.

At 4:03 p.m. that day, [Sergeant Graham] returned home, backed his patrol car into his driveway, and radioed dispatch he was ending his shift. As [Sergeant Graham] exited his vehicle, he was shot from behind with a high-powered rifle that penetrated his Kevlar vest. The bullet severed [Sergeant Graham's] spinal cord at the neck, immediately paralyzing him. [Sergeant Graham] fell backward and suffered fractures to his skull and ribs upon impact with the pavement. The killer then approached [Sergeant Graham], who was still alive, and shot him twice more with a shotgun into his face and shoulder. The recovered rifle bullet was deformed, but ballistics experts determined it belonged to the .22 to .24 caliber class of ammunition that would fit a .243 caliber rifle. Investigators later learned that, around 7 p.m. on the evening of [Sergeant Graham's] murder, [Shockley's] wife gave [Shockley's] uncle a box of .243 caliber bullets and stated, "[Shockley] said you'd know what to do with them."

[Shockley] returned the red car to his grandmother between 4:15 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. that same day. Investigators calculated it took approximately eighteen minutes to drive from [Shockley's] grandmother's house to the location where the red car with the yellow sticker had been parked near [Sergeant Graham's] home.

Two highway patrol investigators interviewed [Shockley] at his residence that evening. [Shockley] immediately denied killing [Sergeant Graham] and stated he spent all day working around his house with his neighbor, Sylvan Duncan (hereinafter, "Sylvan"). The next day, [Shockley] again met with investigators and elaborated on the alibi. [Shockley] claimed he was visiting relatives, including his grandmother, and he watched from his living room as Sylvan pushed brush. [Shockley] stated he knew [Sergeant Graham] was investigating him for the fatal accident and, without prompting, declared he did not know where [Sergeant Graham] lived.

Later that day, [Shockley] visited his grandmother and instructed her to tell the police he had been home all day the day [Sergeant Graham] was shot. When his grandmother told [Shockley] she would not lie for him, he put his finger over her mouth and said, "I was home all day."

Police arrested [Shockley] on March 23, 2005, for leaving the scene of the car accident that resulted in his passenger's death. The state subsequently charged [Shockley] with leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident, first-degree murder for [Sergeant Graham's] death, and armed criminal action. The state proceeded to trial only on the first-degree murder charge and sought the death penalty. [Shockley] was represented initially by several public defenders, including Thomas Marshall (hereinafter, "Marshall" and, collectively, "the first trial team"). [Shockley] later obtained private counsel and was represented at trial by Brad Kessler (hereinafter, "Kessler"), David Bruns (hereinafter, "Bruns"), and Mollyanne Henshaw (hereinafter, "Henshaw" and collectively, "trial counsel").

The state theorized [Shockley] killed [Sergeant Graham] to stop the fatal car accident investigation. [Shockley's] defense was it was ridiculous for him to believe, simply by killing [Sergeant Graham], law enforcement would halt its investigation into the accident. Trial counsel also argued the police improperly directed all their investigative attention toward him rather than pursuing other possible perpetrators.

After a five-day guilt phase proceeding, the jury found [Shockley] guilty of first-degree murder. During the penalty phase, the state submitted four statutory aggravators pursuant to 565.032.2: (1) [Sergeant Graham] was a "peace officer" and the "murder was committed because of the exercise of his official duty;" (2) [Shockley] was depraved of mind when he killed [Sergeant Graham] and, "as a result thereof, the murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman;" (3) [Sergeant Graham] was murdered "for the purpose of avoiding... or preventing a lawful arrest;" and (4) [Sergeant Graham] was a "potential witness in [a] past or pending investigation... and was killed as a result of his status as a ... potential witness."

The jury found the first, third, and fourth statutory aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury did not find unanimously the circumstances in mitigation outweighed those in aggravation. However, the jury was unable to agree which punishment to recommend. After overruling [Shockley's] motion for new trial, the circuit court imposed a death sentence pursuant to section 565.034.4.

Shockley v. State (Shockley II), 579 S.W.3d 881, 890-92 (Mo. 2019). Shockley appealed his conviction to the Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed. State v. Shockley (Shockley I), 410 S.W.3d 179 (Mo. 2013). Shockley then filed a postconviction-relief motion under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15, which the motion court denied after an evidentiary hearing. Docs. 33-107, 33-108. He appealed that decision, and the Missouri Supreme Court again affirmed. Shockley II, 579 S.W.3d at 921. Shockley now seeks a writ of habeas corpus in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

III. Standard of...