Shockley v. Laclede Elec. Co-op., 17666

• Decision Date: 21 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 17666,17666
• Parties: Ronald James SHOCKLEY, Employee-Petitioner-Appellant, v. LACLEDE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, Employer-Respondent-Respondent, and Federated Rural Electric Insurance Group, Insurer.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 44

825 S.W.2d 44

Ronald James SHOCKLEY, Employee-Petitioner-Appellant, v. LACLEDE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, Employer-Respondent-Respondent, and Federated Rural Electric Insurance Group, Insurer.

No. 17666.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

Feb. 21, 1992.

Cynthia L. Turley, Ronald D. White, Williams, Robinson, Turley, Crump & White, Rolla, for employee-petitioner-appellant.

Raymond E. Whiteaker, Janis L. Prewitt, Woolsey, Fisher, Whiteaker & McDonald, Springfield, for employer-respondent-respondent.

FLANIGAN, Chief Judge.

On April 10, 1989, Ronald Shockley filed a claim ["the amended claim"] for workers' compensation with the Division of Workers' Compensation, Department of Labor & Industrial Relations of Missouri. The claim bore the title "First Amended--Previously Closed File." It was based on an accident which occurred on April 9, 1986, causing injuries to Shockley, which arose out of and in the course of his employment for Laclede Electric Coop. On June 11, 1991, the commission entered a "Final Award Denying Compensation." Shockley appeals.

In an earlier proceeding Shockley, on April 29, 1986, filed a claim for compensation benefits based on the April 9, 1986, accident. The employer filed an answer to the claim. On June 8, 1987, Shockley, then 38 and represented by counsel other than his present counsel, and the employer and insurer, also represented by counsel, entered into a "Contract of Compromise and Release" pursuant to § 287.390. ¹

The agreement stated: The parties were operating under and subject to the provisions of Missouri Workers' Compensation Law; compensation had been paid in the amount of $13,562.72; medical aid had been provided in the amount of $10,792.25; there were now disputes between the parties as to whether Shockley suffered from an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment, a dispute as to the nature and extent of the injuries, a dispute as to the causal relationship between the alleged occurrence and the claimed injuries and a dispute as to additional medical expenses; "because of said dispute, it is agreed by said parties to enter into a compromise lump sum settlement under § 287.390 for the amount of a lump sum of $25,631.27, for a total of $39,193.99."

The agreement further stated that Shockley "states that he understands that by agreeing to this settlement, he is forever closing out his claim under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law, and that he will receive no further compensation or medical aid by reason of this alleged accident, that he has a right to a hearing of his claim and that as a result of such hearing he might receive more money than is provided to him by this settlement and with this understanding he is asking the Administrative Law Judge to approve this settlement."

In the agreement, Shockley's attorney stated that he had fully advised Shockley of his rights under the Missouri Workers' Compensation Law and recommended that the settlement be made. The settlement was approved by an administrative law judge.

In its order of June 11, 1991, denying the amended claim, the commission stated "that it has no jurisdiction to enforce or review the parties' compromise settlement at this juncture. Any relief against the approved settlement can be had only in a court of equity upon proof of fraud or mistake."

"Decisions of the Commission in workers' compensation proceedings that are clearly an interpretation or application of law, as distinguished from a determination of fact, are not binding upon [the court of appeals] and fall within [the appellate court's] province of review and correction." West v. Posten Const. Co., 804 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Mo.banc 1991). "The court, on appeal, shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds and no other: (1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers;...." § 287.495.

Shockley's sole point is that the commission erred in entering the award denying the amended claim and that the award was entered without or in excess of the commission's powers because: (a) the stipulation for compromise settlement was entered in violation of 8 CSR 50-2.010(31) in that the administrative law judge failed to require Shockley to appear in person before approving the proposed settlement; and (b) the award fails "to fully relieve" the effects of the work-related injury, even after settlement or award on hearing, because the award fails to provide for payment for future prosthetic devices as required by § 287.140.

For the reasons which follow, this court holds that the commission correctly concluded that the settlement of June 8, 1987, deprived it of jurisdiction to review that settlement and that Shockley's appeal has no merit.

Section 287.390 provides, in pertinent part:

1. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as preventing the parties to claims hereunder from entering into voluntary agreements in settlement thereof, but no agreement by an employee or his dependents to waive his rights under this chapter shall be valid, nor shall any agreement of settlement or compromise of any dispute or claim for compensation under this chapter be valid until approved by an administrative law judge or the commission, nor shall an administrative law judge or the commission approve any settlement which is not in accordance with the rights of the parties as given in this chapter. No such agreement shall be valid unless made after seven days from the date of the injury or death.

Approval of a settlement by the commission or an administrative law judge is a prerequisite to its validity. § 287.390.1; § 287.610.2; Sheets v. Hill Brothers Distributors, Inc., 379 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Mo.1964); Tokash v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 346 Mo. 100, 139 S.W.2d 978, 981-982 (1940).

In Morgan v. Duncan, 361 Mo. 683, 236 S.W.2d 281 (1951), the court said, at 284:

[A] final settlement, approved by the Commission as provided in [§ 287.390] is irrevocable and conclusive, and the order of approval is not reviewable. Any relief against the approved settlement can be had only in a court of equity upon proof of fraud or mistake.... The order approving a final settlement under [§ 287.390] is sometimes called an "award," but it is not actually an award in a legal sense; yet its conclusiveness is quite as absolute as if it were an unappealed-from award, or even as if it were the final judgment of a court.

At 285 the court said:

It is presumed the Commission performed its duty in connection with the settlement by determining that the settlement was "in accordance with the rights of the parties as given in" the Workmen's Compensation Law, including necessarily the finding that the claim was compensable under the Law and the Commission consequently empowered by the Law to approve or disapprove the settlement.

Morgan was an action in equity to set aside an order of the commission approving a final settlement of a compensation claim.

A settlement is made by the parties and is wholly voluntary. The commission has no power to coerce a settlement. It has only a veto power to refuse to approve a settlement already made if the commission deems it not in accordance with the rights of the parties. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d 945, 959 (1939). A settlement under § 287.390 is not an award which is subject to review under § 287.470. State, ex rel. Wors v. Hostetter, 343 Mo. 945, 124 S.W.2d 1072, 1079-1080 (1938). A settlement, when approved, is the basis of res judicata and estoppel by judgment. Id.

Decisions of the court of appeals are, of course, consistent with the foregoing principles. Any relief from a settlement approved by the commission under § 287.390 can be had only in a court of equity on proof of fraud or mistake. Ley v. St. Louis County, 710 S.W.2d 493, 495-496 (Mo.App.1986); Trokey v. United States Cartridge Co., 222 S.W.2d 496, 501 (Mo.App.1949); Mosier v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 205 S.W.2d 227, 232 (Mo.App.1947); Bliss v. Lungstras Dyeing & Cleaning Co., 130 S.W.2d 198, 201 (Mo.App.1939). The required showing, in an equity action, is fraud or mistake in the very act of obtaining the order of approval of the compromise. Ley v. St. Louis County, supra, at 496. The commission has no power to expound any principle of law or equity. Bliss v. Lungstras Dyeing & Cleaning Co., supra, at 201. A settlement, when approved by the commission, is conclusive and irrevocable. Haase v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Mo.App.1990).

Where, as here, a claimant requests the commission to set aside a compromise settlement previously approved, the commission must reject the request for lack of jurisdiction. Trokey v. United States Cartridge Co., supra, at 501; Mosier v. St. Joseph Lead Co., supra, at 232. When a settlement is approved, "the jurisdiction of the Commission is exhausted, and the matter is at an end so far as the Commission is concerned." Mosier, at 232.

Since the commission properly determined that it had no jurisdiction to question the validity of the settlement of June 8, 1987, approved by an administrative law judge, prong (a) of Shockley's point has no merit.

In support of prong (b), Shockley argues that the order of June 11, 1991, is erroneous "even after settlement" because the award "fails to provide for payment of future prosthetic devices as required by § 287.140.7." The amended claim sought such payment.

Section 287.140.7 reads:

7....