Shoemake v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.

Citation233 F.Supp.2d 828
Decision Date31 October 2002
Docket NumberNo. 1:02-CV-359.,1:02-CV-359.
PartiesWilliam SHOEMAKE, Plaintiff, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

Joe J. Fisher, II, Provost & Umphrey, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff.

Benton Randall Bond, Union Pacific Railroad Company, Houston, TX, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

RADFORD, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company's ("Union Pacific") Motion to Transfer Venue to the Western District of Louisiana, Lake Charles Division [docket # 6]. Plaintiff, William Shoemake, has filed his Response to Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion to Transfer Venue [# 7].

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case arises out of alleged injuries that Plaintiff sustained on August 21, 2001, while working as a conductor/switchman for Union Pacific. See Plaintiff's Original Complaint [# 1]; Joint Case Management Plan [# 8]. Plaintiff alleges that he was injured when he fell from a moving railcar. The incident at issue occurred at a train yard in Lake Charles, Louisiana. Plaintiff has asserted his negligence claims under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq.

Defendant argues in its Motion to Transfer Venue that an application of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (the change of venue statue) and the pertinent factors weigh in favor of transferring this matter to Western District of Louisiana. Plaintiff contends that venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont Division, under the 1404(a) analysis and Mohamed v. Mazda, 90 F.Supp.2d 757 (E.D.Tex.2000).

This case has been transferred to the undersigned United States Magistrate for adjudication pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The referral was ordered by the Honorable Thad Heartfield [# 11], upon consent of the parties.

DISCUSSION
A) Proper Venue for FELA Actions

FELA is a special venue statute. A FELA action "may be brought in a circuit [district] court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action." 45 U.S.C. § 56. Obviously, to be considered at all, the plaintiff's choice of forum must be one which is permitted under the relevant venue statute. In re Horseshoe Entertainment, 305 F.3d 354, 359 (5th Cir.2002). Here, both the plaintiff's choice of forum (Eastern District of Texas) and the Western District of Louisiana are proper venues for this action because both are districts in which Union Pacific was conducting business "at the time of commencing such action." 45 U.S.C. § 56. It is uncontroverted that Plaintiff's cause of action "might have been brought" in the Western District of Louisiana, Lake Charles Division. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Lands v. St. Louis Southwestern R.R. Co., 648 F.Supp. 322, 324 (E.D.Tex.1986). Because both districts meet the requirements of the FELA special venue provision, the burden is on the Defendant as movant to establish that transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 is proper.

B) Transfer of Venue Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404

The goal of § 1404 "is to prevent waste of time, energy, and money and to protect litigants, witnesses, and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense." Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964) (citations omitted). Accordingly, any party may call upon the court to consider whether a more appropriate forum exists. The court is empowered to transfer an action to another federal venue under Section 1404. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Hanby v. Shell Oil Co., 144 F.Supp.2d 673, 676 (E.D.Tex. 2001). It is within the sound discretion of the court to decide to transfer venue. Hanby, at 676 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b); Jarvis Christian College v. Exxon Corp., 845 F.2d 523, 528 (5th Cir.1988); Gajeske v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6158, at *10 (E.D.Tex. Apr. 5, 2000)).

Section 1404 applies to FELA actions. See Robertson v. Kiamichi R.R. Co., 42 F.Supp.2d 651, 654 (E.D.Tex.1999). As the parties agree, the burden is on the moving party (here, Defendant Union Pacific) to demonstrate why there should be a change of forum. Id. To prevail on its motion to transfer venue, the movant must demonstrate that the balance of convenience and justice substantially weighs in favor of transfer. Mohamed v. Mazda, 90 F.Supp.2d 757, 768 (E.D.Tex.2000)(citing Gundle Lining Constr. Corp. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 844 F.Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D.Tex.1994)).

The Court emphasizes that when deciding whether to transfer venue, discretion must be exercised in light of the particular circumstances of the case. Robertson, 42 F.Supp.2d at 655. Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an "individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness." Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988)(quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945 (1964)). See also Mohamed, at 768; Jam Strait, Inc. v. American Prods. Co., Inc., 2002 WL 31246566, No. 02-2055, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18956, at *3 (E.D.La. Oct. 4, 2002). Therefore, however analytically "prophetic"1 a particular case may be, precedent requires that this court's focus remain on the factual context of the particular case at hand. As a result of the case by case approach, factual dissimilarities between Mohamed, for example, and this case are likely to lead to a differing conclusion upon application of the 1404(a) factors. The Court emphasizes that because transfer to an alternate forum is to be considered on such an individualized and factually-driven basis, "such a decision ultimately falls within the district court's sound discretion." Jam Strait, at *4 (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 22, 108 S.Ct. 2239).

The case-specific factors that a court must apply to a motion to transfer fall into two categories of interests: (1) the convenience of the litigants and (2) the public interests in the fair and efficient administration of justice. Robertson, 42 F.Supp.2d at 655; In re Triton Ltd. Sec. Litig., 70 F.Supp.2d 678, 688 (E.D.Tex.1999)(citing International Software Sys. Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 115 (5th Cir.1996)). This factor-based method of analysis originated in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert2 and has been applied to transfer of venue issues by the Fifth Circuit and courts within this district. See, e.g., Mohamed; Robertson; Hanby; International Software Sys.; Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales v. Repub. of Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375, 1389 (5th Cir.1992). Both parties agree on the application of the 1404 factors. They have been thoroughly set out in the briefings before the Court. Accordingly, the undersigned will only set out the factors as part of the legal analysis.

C) Factor Analysis

(1) Convenience Factors

a) Plaintiff's Choice of Forum3

The Fifth Circuit has clearly stated that a plaintiff's choice of forum is a factor to be considered but that in and of itself this factor is neither conclusive nor determinative. In re Horseshoe Entertainment; 305 F.3d 354, 359 (5th Cir.2002)(citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 433 F.2d 117, 119 (5th Cir.1970))(emphasis added). The general rule that the plaintiff's choice of forum is not to be disturbed does not obtain where it is clearly outweighed by other factors. Mizell v. Prism Computer Corp., 27 F.Supp.2d 708, 713 (S.D.Miss.1998)(citing Howell v. Tanner, 650 F.2d 610, 616 (5th Cir.1981)). Where the plaintiff's chosen forum has no factual nexus to the case, that choice caries little significance if other factors weigh in favor of transfer. Hanby v. Shell Oil Co., 144 F.Supp.2d 673, 677 (E.D.Tex.2001)(citing Robertson v. Kiamichi R.R. Co., 42 F.Supp.2d at 656 (E.D.Tex.1999))(emphasis added). While the court generally will defer to the plaintiff's choice of forum where factually justified, the plaintiff's choice of forum will be given close scrutiny where, as here, the plaintiff does not live within the Division of the Court. Dearing v. Sigma Chem. Co., 1 F.Supp.2d 660, 665 (S.D.Tex.1998)(citing United Sonics, Inc. v. Shock, 661 F.Supp. 681, 682-83 (W.D.Tex.1986)).

Plaintiff attempts to argue away the aforementioned precedent by contending that the "disappearing deference" standard as applied to plaintiff's choice of forum was "laid to rest" by Mohamed. See Plaintiff's Response to Motion to Transfer, p. 2. While this characterization of Mohamed may be true, this argument does not carry significant merit when the case law clearly weighs against the amount of sacrosanctity with which Plaintiff regards his choice of forum. The fact remains that the undersigned finds guidance from the Fifth Circuit mandating that the amount of deference given to a chosen forum should not yield an absolute determination in this case, contrary to Plaintiff's wishes. See Horseshoe, 305 F.3d at 359.

Plaintiff's reliance on Mohamed is also less persuasive when it is factually distinguishable from the case at hand. Plaintiff contends that Mohamed squarely rejects Defendant's "erroneous" suggestion that "when the plaintiff does not reside in his chosen forum nor have any operative facts which occurred within the forum, the plaintiff's choice is entitled to only minimal consideration." See Plaintiff's Response, at p. 2 (citing Defendant's Motion to Transfer). This assumed "rejection" is not exactly as Plaintiff construes it in the context of this proceeding. While the Honorable Judge Heartfield may indeed have found that the choice of forum should be given greater deference on the facts of Mohamed, this Court is not compelled to reach the same conclusion on the facts of this case. In Mohamed, the Court did find a nexus of connection between the case and the Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas, where venue was retained. The...

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