Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles
Decision Date | 04 August 1995 |
Docket Number | No. B081963,B081963 |
Citation | 37 Cal.App.4th 618,43 Cal.Rptr.2d 774 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 102 Ed. Law Rep. 259, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6237, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,583 William C. SHOEMAKER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants. |
Joseph H. Duff, DeWitt W. Clinton, County Counsel, Stephen R. Morris, Principal Deputy County Counsel, Law Offices of Hausman and Sosa, Jeffrey M. Hausman and Larry D. Stratton, Encino, for defendants and appellants.
Rees Lloyd, Glendale, for plaintiff and respondent.
Plaintiff William C. Shoemaker, M.D., was removed from the administrative positions he held with the Charles R. Drew University of Medicine and Science (the "University") and the Los Angeles County Martin Luther King, Jr./Drew Medical Center (the "Medical Center"). Upon Shoemaker's application, the trial court issued a mandatory preliminary injunction reinstating him to those positions pending trial. Defendants appeal from the order granting the injunction. We conclude that the court abused its discretion in issuing the injunction.
The evidence before the trial court on Shoemaker's application for a preliminary injunction established the following.
The University is a California public benefit corporation that operates as a private institution of higher learning. Its board of directors has adopted bylaws giving the president of the University broad authority over academic and administrative affairs. The bylaws provide in part that the president "shall be responsible for all administrative areas" and "shall have full power of appointment, direction and supervision of the Faculty."
The University is affiliated with the Medical Center as a result of several contractual arrangements. The Medical Center, a county hospital, is operated by the County of Los Angeles through the department of health services.
The University has a department of emergency medicine, which conducts a residency training program at the Medical Center. As part of this program, residents from the University help staff the Medical Center's emergency medicine services department. The residency program receives academic accreditation through the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (the "Accreditation Council" or "Council"). Periodically, the academic, research, and clinical aspects of the residency program are reviewed during a site visit by the Accreditation Council's Plaintiff Shoemaker was, and still is, a University faculty member, with an academic appointment as a professor of surgery. Further, he was, and still is, employed by Los Angeles County at the Medical Center as a civil service employee, classified as a physician specialist. His principal area of service at the Medical Center has been in the department of surgery, where he has distinguished himself as a trauma surgeon and critical care specialist.
Residency Review Committee (the "Review Committee"). 1
In or about 1989, the University and the Medical Center commenced a search for someone to head their respective departments of emergency medicine. In soliciting job candidates, the Medical Center used a bulletin to describe its available position as follows: (Italics added.)
In January 1991, Shoemaker was appointed to fill the vacant administrative positions: he became the chairman of the University's department of emergency medicine and the chief of the Medical Center's emergency medicine services department.
In 1993, the Review Committee evaluated the University/Medical Center residency program in emergency medicine. By letter dated November 24, 1993, the Accreditation Council announced its intention to withdraw accreditation of the program, effective June 30, 1995. The Council gave program officials until January 4, 1994, to respond to the proposed loss of accreditation. If officials did not timely respond, the proposed loss of accreditation would become final. In explaining its position, the Council stated in part:
In a letter of December 17, 1993, the president of the University informed Shoemaker that he would be replaced as chairman of the University's department of emergency medicine: A similar letter, dated December 23, 1993, from the acting medical director (and approved by the director of health services) notified Shoemaker that effective January 3, 1994, he would no longer serve as chief of the Medical Center's emergency medicine services department. 2
Although Shoemaker was removed from his administrative positions at the University and the Medical Center, he retained his status as a professor of surgery (with the University) and as a physician specialist (with the Medical Center). His compensation, benefits, classification, and grade at the Medical Center remained the same. His salary at the University decreased because he was no longer the chair of a department.
On January 14, 1994, in a memorandum addressed to all faculty and staff, the University president announced that
On January 3, 1994, Shoemaker filed a verified complaint and an application for a temporary restraining order seeking to prevent his removal from his administrative positions. The court denied the restraining order and issued an order to show cause ("OSC") why a preliminary injunction should not issue. The question framed by the OSC (as subsequently amended) was whether Shoemaker could be removed from his administrative posts without being accorded "the due process rights provided by constitutional and statutory law, and the Civil Service Rules of Los Angeles County."
Before the hearing on the preliminary injunction, Shoemaker applied a second time for a temporary restraining order, which the court denied. On January 21, 1994, Shoemaker filed a verified, first amended complaint alleging various causes of action against the University, its president, the County of Los Angeles, the department of health services, and its director. 3
On January 31, 1994, the court granted plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction, ordering defendants to: (1) refrain from removing Shoemaker as chairman of the University's department of emergency medicine and chief of the Medical Center's emergency medicine services department unless and until they provided him with due process and complied with civil service rules; (2) refrain from appointing a replacement for Shoemaker unless and until he was properly removed from his positions; and (3) rescind all orders removing Shoemaker from his administrative posts.
Defendants timely appealed from the order granting the injunction. Thereafter, we issued a writ of supersedeas staying enforcement of the preliminary injunction so as to preserve the status quo pending appeal. (Code Civ.Proc., § 923.)
"The law is well settled that the decision to grant a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court." (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 69, 196 Cal.Rptr. 715, 672 P.2d 121, citations omitted.) "A trial court will be found to have abused its discretion only when it has ' "exceeded the bounds of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence." ' (Ibid.) "Further, the burden rests with the party challenging the [trial court's ruling on the application for an] injunction to make a clear showing of an abuse of discretion." (Ibid., citations omitted.)
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