Shokirjoniy v. City of Clinton Twp.
| Decision Date | 29 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:18-cv-8904-BRM-DEA |
| Parties | SHAKHZOD SHOKIRJONIY, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CLINTON TOWNSHIP, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Before the Court is Defendant Jonathan Danberry's ("Danberry") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Shakhzon Shokirjoniy's ("Shokirjoniy") Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (ECF No. 32.) Shokirjoniy opposes the Motion. (ECF No. 34.) Having reviewed the filings submitted in connection with the Motion and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons below, Danberry's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.
This civil-rights action arises out of a traffic stop involving Shokirjoniy by police officers in Clinton Township ("Clinton"), a municipality located in Hunterdon County, New Jersey, his detention by police, and later encounters with law-enforcement officials. (Am. Compl. (ECF No. 30) ¶¶ 10-27, 30-52.) However, this Motion was filed by Defendant Jonathan Danberry, a police officer from the neighboring municipality of High Bridge, New Jersey. (ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 7, 14.) Therefore, the Court will recount only those events or allegations pertaining to Danberry.
Shokirjoniy is a resident of Miamisburg, a city in Montgomery County, Ohio. (Id. ¶ 1.) Danberry is a police officer for the High Bridge Police Department ("High Bridge Police"). (Id. ¶ 7.) Defendant Sgt. Andy McCluskey ("McCluskey") is a police officer with the Clinton Township Police Department ("Clinton Police"). (Id. ¶ 3.) Defendants Joe Sangiovanni ("Sangiovanni") and Defendant Peter Schlesier ("Schlesier") are police officers with the Clinton Police Department. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 5.)
Early in the morning of July 21, 2017, Shokirjoniy was stopped by Clinton police officers who were parked on Route 31 in front of a Speed Way gas station in such a way that Plaintiff could not enter the station. (Id. ¶ 10.) The police officers may have parked there because they had pulled over another car. (Id. ¶ 12.) After Shokirjoniy made a U-turn to go around the police car,McCloskey pulled over Shokirjoniy's car. (Id.) Danberry and Schlesier walked over to Shokirjoniy's car. (Id. ¶ 14.)
The officers asked Shokirjoniy where he was coming from and where he was going. (Id. ¶ 14.) Shokirjoniy told the officers he was coming from "across seas" and that he was returning home to Ohio. (Id.) At some point, one of the officers told Shokirjoniy one of his brake lights was out. (Id. ¶ 15.) After asking for and receiving Shokirjoniy's driver's license, the officers took the license back to their cruiser. (Id. ¶ 16.) On returning to Shokirjoniy's car, the officers told Shokirjoniy his New York license was expired. (Id. ¶ 17.) Shokirjoniy responded that "his fines had been paid in New York." (Id. ¶ 18.) The officers then asked Shokirjoniy if there were any illegal substances in his vehicle. (Id. ¶ 19.) Schlesier "stated there was [sic] drugs in the vehicle," and Shokirjoniy admitted he had marijuana in the car. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 21.) The officers searched Shokirjoniy's vehicle. (Id. ¶ 21.) Shokirjoniy says both that he did not consent to the search and that he eventually did consent to the search. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 23.) "McCloskey had [Shokirjoniy] sign a waiver for the search." (Id. ¶ 24.) After roughly thirty to forty minutes, the officers took Shokirjoniy to "the station" and placed him, handcuffed, in what he calls a camera room. (Id. ¶ 25.) Shokirjoniy was in handcuffs for an additional twenty to thirty minutes. (Id. ¶ 26.) Eventually, Shokirjoniy was fingerprinted, photographed, and given three tickets: one for an illegal lane change, one for a broken middle taillight, and one for possession of marijuana. (Id. ¶ 27.) Confusingly, Shokirjoniy then alleges that, at the conclusion of events at the police station, "the ticket never given at the initial stop constituting [sic] racketeering and ticket fixing scheme." (Id. ¶ 28.) When Shokirjoniy was taken back to his car, "the officers refused to allow him to see what break [sic] light was out because they knew you don't need a middle stop light to operate an automobile." (Id. ¶ 29.)
While the Second Amended Complaint includes allegations involving another encounter with McCloskey when Shokirjoniy returned to New Jersey on January 19, 2018, for trial on his three tickets and he prefaces his allegations with a sentence that this encounter involved the "same defendants," he mentions only the names of McCloskey and Sangiovanni as officers involved. (See id. ¶¶ 30-51.) Shokirjoniy also alleges several agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, at the request of Defendant Eric Perkins, identified as "a City Judge with the City of Clinton," to "shake" down Shokirjoniy because Plaintiff brought this litigation. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 52.) Shokirjoniy does not expressly name Danberry as having any role in any subsequent events.
On May 7, 2018, Shokirjoniy filed a Complaint alleging four counts: (1) against McCloskey for violating his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by searching his person and vehicle during the initial July 2017 traffic stop without probable cause; (2) against McCloskey and the other officers for chilling his right to free speech under the First Amendment during his January 2018 encounter with Clinton police officers; (3) against McCloskey, Schlesier, Danberry and other unnamed officers for violating his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for unreasonably detaining him after the initial July 2017 traffic stop without probable cause.2 (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 52-78.)
On July 18, 2018, Shokirjoniy filed an Amended Complaint to add counts alleging violations of rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as claims under New Jersey's Tort Claims Act, the New Jersey Legal Malpractice Act, and the New Jersey Unfair Practices Act. However, only two further counts are listed in the Amended Complaint: Count V, alleging a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and Count VI's alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. (Id. ¶¶ 95, 96.)
Defendants McCloskey, Sangiovanni, Schlesier and the City of Clinton filed an Answer on January 23, 2019. (ECF No. 14.) Danberry applied for a Clerk's order to extend the time to file an Answer, an application that was denied as out of time. (See ECF No. 16, Dkt. entry for February 5, 2019.) Danberry filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 7, 2019. (ECF No. 18.) On March 14, 2019, Shokirjoniy filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 20.) Before that Motion could be fully briefed, Shokirjoniy filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint. (ECF No. 26.) Following an on-the-record status conference with the parties, the Court granted the Motion to Amend and terminated both Danberry's Motion to Dismiss and Shokirjoniy's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 29.)
Shokirjoniy filed the Second Amended Complaint on August 19, 2019. (ECF No. 30.) The Second Amended Complaint adds a malicious prosecution claim, a count referencing the Eleventh Amendment stating that New Jersey can be sued by a resident of Ohio, and another search-and-seizure count, this time involving a flashlight. (Id. ¶¶ 107-12.)
On September 13, 2019 Danberry filed this Motion. (ECF No. 32.) Shokirjoniy filed his opposition on September 23, 2019. (ECF No. 34.) That same day, Shokirjoniy moved to file a Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 35.) This Motion to Amend was opposed by McCloskey, Sangiovanni, Schlesier, and the City of Clinton. (ECF No. 37.) At an on-the-record statusconference with the parties, the Court denied that Motion. (See ECF No. 40.) Danberry did not file a Reply to Shokirjoniy's opposition.
A. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court is "required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 228. "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). However, the plaintiff's "obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true, those "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged." Id. This "plausibility standard" requires that the complaint allege "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," but it "is not akin to a probability requirement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Detailed factual allegations" are not required, but "more than an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation" must bepleaded; it must include "factual enhancements" and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).
"Determining...
To continue reading
Request your trial