Sholley v. Town of Holliston, 97cv10676-PBS.

• Decision Date: 01 April 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97cv10676-PBS.,97cv10676-PBS.
• Citation: 49 F.Supp.2d 14
• Parties: Earl SHOLLEY, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF HOLLISTON, Alan Bolduc, and David Gatchell, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

49 F.Supp.2d 14

Earl SHOLLEY, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF HOLLISTON, Alan Bolduc, and David Gatchell, Defendants.

No. 97cv10676-PBS.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

April 1, 1999.

Gregory A. Hession, Belchertown, MA, pro se.

Stacey L. Parker, Hutchins, Wheeler & Ditmar, Boston, MA, pro se.

Mark D. Robins, Hutchins, Wheeler & Dittmar, Boston, MA, pro se.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCKET NO. 35)

SARIS, District Judge.

I adopt the Report and Recommendation without objection.

KAROL, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) for my Report and Recommendation on Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No 35). Plaintiff, Earl Sholley ("Plaintiff"), has filed a three-count civil rights action against the Town of Holliston ("the Town") and two of its police officers, Officer David Gatchell ("Gatchell") and Sergeant Alan Bolduc ("Bolduc"). The complaint arises out of Plaintiffs 1994 arrest for violation of a restraining order issued pursuant to G.L. c. 209A (a charge on which he was acquitted) and for his failure to submit to a police officer, in violation of G.L. c. 90 § 25 (a charge on which he was convicted). In essence, Plaintiff alleges that the individual defendants violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures when Gatchell, acting on information provided by Bolduc, arrested Plaintiff without probable cause. Plaintiff further claims that the Town violated the same Fourth Amendment right by maintaining a custom or policy of inadequately investigating situations involving restraining orders — a policy of "deliberate indifference" to the constitutional rights of its citizens.

For reasons discussed below, I conclude that were Plaintiff to show that there was no probable cause for his arrest, he would impliedly undermine his conviction for failure to submit. Supreme Court precedent prohibits this result. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Moreover, even if Heck did not bar Plaintiff's false arrest claim, summary judgment should enter in favor of the individual defendants because no reasonable jury could conclude that Gatchell arrested Plaintiff without probable cause or pursued him without the requisite justification. Where the arrest was justified as a matter of law, Plaintiff's state law count for intentional infliction of emotional distress must also fail. See Finucane v. Belchertown, 808 F.Supp. 906, 911 (D.Mass.1992). Plaintiff's corollary claim against the Town should be dismissed where Plaintiff has failed to prove a requisite element of municipal liability under section 1983 — a constitutional deprivation. Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff has pled and pursued a section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution with respect to a baseless charge that he violated a restraining order, summary judgment should enter on behalf of Gatchell and Bolduc where no reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff has satisfied the elements of that tort. See Meehan v. Town of Plymouth, 167 F.3d 85, 88-89 (1st Cir.1999). I therefore recommend that all of Plaintiff's counts be DISMISSED and that judgment enter on behalf of Defendants.

I. Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment will be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Hinchey v. NYNEX Corp., 144 F.3d 134, 140 (1st Cir. 1998). The facts must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Borschow Hosp. & Med. Supplies, Inc. v. Cesar Castillo Inc., 96 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir.1996).

II. Background¹

On March 1, 1994, the Framingham District Court issued an abuse prevention order against Plaintiff. Pursuant to G.L. c. 209A, the ex parte order required Plaintiff, among other things, to stay at all times at least 300 yards away from his daughter, Kathryn Sholley, and to "stay away from [his daughter's] residence ... located at 29 Maple Dell Lane, Holliston." Abuse Prevention Order, attached as Ex. A to Complaint and Jury Demand, Docket No. 4. The order, which was to be in effect until a further hearing scheduled for March 8, 1994, did not specify a particular distance that Plaintiff was to maintain between himself and the residence. Id.

At approximately 7:00 P.M. on March 4 of that year, Officer Gatchell was driving his police cruiser on Central Street in Holliston. Gatchell observed Plaintiff behind the wheel of his van, which was stopped at the intersection of Central Street and Maple Dell Lane. Plaintiff's wife, Elizabeth, who was in the process of exiting the van, called out to Gatchell that "it was all right, he's just dropping me off." Pl.Aff., Docket No. 39, ¶ 5; Pl.Dep., attached as Ex. B to Docket No. 38, at 61; Elizabeth Sholley Aff., Docket No. 44, ¶ 5. Elizabeth Sholley states that Gatchell replied "O.K.," rolled up his window and drove off. Elizabeth Sholley Aff. at ¶ 5.²

Gatchell knew that a restraining order had entered against Plaintiff and contacted the Holliston Police Department by radio to determine whether that order was still in effect and, if it was, to verify its terms. Def. and Pl. Statements of Undisputed Material Facts, ¶ 34. Gatchell states (and no one denies) that he spoke to Bolduc, who accurately reported that the restraining order was in effect and inaccurately reported that the order required Sholley to remain 300 yards from the Maple Dell Lane residence. Gatchell Aff. at 8. Based on Bolduc's report, and the fact that the intersection of Central Street and Maple Dell Lane was less than 300 yards from 29 Maple Dell Lane, Gatchell concluded that Plaintiff was in violation of the abuse prevention order. Id. at 9. Knowing that Plaintiff had already left the intersection where he had dropped off Ms. Sholley, Gatchell pulled his cruiser over on Central Street and waited for Plaintiff to arrive.

At some point after Plaintiff passed Gatchell on Central Street, Gatchell activated his emergency lights in an attempt to pull Plaintiff over. Although the parties dispute precisely when Gatchell activated his lights, Plaintiff acknowledges failing to stop after realizing that Gatchell wished to pull him over. Pl.Dep. at 64-65. Plaintiff states that he intended to seek asylum in his church because he feared harassment by the police and because there were no other witnesses in the area. Pl.Dep. at 66; Pl.Aff. at ¶ 8. In the meantime, Gatchell radioed for assistance from two other police cruisers in the area.

Upon arriving in the church parking lot, Plaintiff fled from his vehicle and ran toward the church rectory. Before Plaintiff was able to enter it, a police officer grabbed his arm, but Plaintiff broke free and succeeded in entering the rectory. A short time later, Gatchell and two other officers arrested Plaintiff, handcuffed him, and took him to the Holliston Police Station for booking. Bolduc was not present at and did not participate in the arrest.

At the station, Bolduc processed Plaintiff. Plaintiff remained silent through much of the booking process, and, although his native language is English, responded to many of Bolduc's questions in Spanish, because, he says, his arrest "was an absurd situation." Pl.Dep. at 96. Plaintiff was then taken to a holding cell, where he remained for between three and four hours until he complained of tightness in his chest and chest pain. Pl.Dep. 101-03. Plaintiff was transferred by ambulance to a local hospital around midnight, admitted, and treated for onset atrial fibrillation. After successful treatment, Plaintiff was discharged on March 7.

Gatchell, but not Bolduc, signed a criminal complaint charging Plaintiff with violating the March 1 abuse prevention order and with failure to submit to a police officer. Plaintiff eventually pled guilty to the failure to submit charge and was assessed the statutory $100 fine. A community service obligation was also imposed. Plaintiff was acquitted of the alleged restraining order violation.³

III. The Instant Action

Plaintiff brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on March 4, 1997. In Count I of his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Town of Holliston had a custom or policy of "inadequately or improperly investigating issues involving restraining orders." Plaintiff argues that this policy resulted in his being arrested without probable cause, as well as in "severe physical and emotional distress, in his reputation and dignity." Complaint, ¶¶ 18-21.

In Count II, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Gatchell and Bolduc's conduct resulted in his being arrested without probable cause. Plaintiff also states that Gatchell and Bolduc "maliciously prosecuted" him. Complaint at ¶ 25.

In Count III, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Gatchell and Bolduc by their conduct caused him "severe emotional distress" under Massachusetts law. Plaintiff invokes this court's supplemental jurisdiction with respect to Count III. Complaint at ¶ 2; see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

The court denied without comment Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted on August 15, 1997. Docket No. 10. Pursuant to the court's scheduling order, discovery was completed on July 1, 1998. Docket No. 24.

IV. Discussion

A. False Arrest

Defendants argue persuasively that Plaintiff's false arrest claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a section 1983 plaintiff may not recover damages "for allegedly unconstitutional conviction ... or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or...