Shook v. Jacuzzi
| Decision Date | 12 July 1976 |
| Citation | 59 Cal.App.3d 978,129 Cal.Rptr. 496 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Carroll SHOOK and Carl O. Lundgren, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Rudy JACUZZI et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 37557. |
Smith & Burstein, Vallejo, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Capps, Bishop, Marraccini & Ducey, Ralph G. Capps, Walnut Creek, for defendants-respondents.
This appeal represents but one more unsuccessful effort to evade the clear statutory provisions which make workers' compensation procedures the sole remedy of an employee against his employer in industrial injury cases.
Both plaintiffs were employed by defendant International Manufacturing Company, whose president, Jacuzzi, is joined as a defendant. Each complaint alleges that plaintiff, acting in the course and scope of his employment, was injured while operating a machine used by International in its manufacture of automobile wheels. Each claimed and recovered compensation through the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. Each alleges that the machine was defectively designed and manufactured by International, Jacuzzi, and a third party, defendant Harmsworth, who is not a party to this appeal. It is not disputed that International's part in the design and manufacture was solely for the purpose of its own use in its own manufacturing process, and that it never set up a separate unit for that purpose, nor sold any such machine. Summary judgment was granted to defendants International and Jacuzzi. Plaintiffs appeal.
It is undisputed that the 'conditions of compensation' (Lab. Code, §§ 3600, 3601) concurred at the time of the employees' injuries insofar as International's wheel manufacturing business is concerned. In such a case, liability for workers' compensation exists 'in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to any person' (§ 3600), and 'the right to recover such compensation * * * is * * * the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer or against any other employee of the employer acting within the scope of his employment', with exceptions not applicable here (§ 3601).
Appellants, however, argue that International acted in a 'dual capacity' and that as designer-manufacturer of the device it is separately liable (Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal.2d 781, 249 P.2d 8). That case, however, is readily distinguishable. Ms. Duprey, a nurse employed by Dr. Shane, a chiropractor, was injured in the course of her employment. Dr. Shane, individually and through another chiropractor in his employ, thereafter undertook to treat her for that injury. The treatment was negligent, and she was allowed to recover for those distinct injuries in a malpractice action. In undertaking to treat the injured nurse, Dr. Shane assumed a role distinct in both time and nature from that of employer. Attempts to extend the rule of Duprey have been repeatedly rejected (e.g., Hazelwerdt v. Industrial Indem. Exch., 157 Cal.App.2d 759, 321 P.2d 831; Deauville v. Hall, 188 Cal.App.2d 535, 10 Cal.Rptr. 511; Dixon v. Ford Motor Co., 53 Cal.App.3d 499, 125 Cal.Rptr. 872; Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal.App.3d 116, 120--121, 123 Cal.Rptr. 812).
In another approach, appellants point to the provision of section 3600 that liability for compensation shall exist 'without regard to negligence,' and to condition (c) of the conditions of employment (§ 3600) providing for recovery 'where the injury is proximately caused by the employment, either with or without negligence.' They argue that these emphases on 'negligence' show that the compensation act is intended only to supersede actions against the employer for negligence. Their action, they insist, is not based upon negligence, but on the strict liability of their employer for faulty design and manufacture of equipment which caused the injuries. This narrow and inverted view completely overlooks the express provision that liability for compensation shall be 'in lieu of any other liability whatsoever' by the employer (§ 3600) and that workers' compensation shall be 'the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer' or a fellow employee (§ 3601). We note, too, that the Constitution (art XX, § 21) authorizing the compensation act describes liability 'irrespective of the fault of any party.' Appellants attempt to limit the application of the constitutional provision by quoting out of context a decision dealing with a...
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...stream of commerce. Comment, Torts of Electric Utilities, 11 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. at 793 (emphasis in original). Cf. Shook v. Jacuzzi, 59 Cal.App.3d 978, 129 Cal.Rptr. 496 (1976) (employee could not recover under theory of strict products liability for injuries caused by machine manufactured by e......
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...was also a general partner. (Dorado v. Knudsen Corp., 103 Cal.App.3d 605, 612, 163 Cal.Rptr. 477.) And in Shook v. Jacuzzi, 59 Cal.App.3d 978, 981-982, 129 Cal.Rptr. 496, the court recognized the dual capacity doctrine and its application to an employer guilty of faulty design or manufactur......
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Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery
...616, 102 Cal.Rptr. 815, 498 P.2d 1063. Two recent cases in the appellate courts are also distinguishable here. In Shook v. Jacuzzi (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 978, 129 Cal.Rptr. 496, the defective machine was designed Solely for the use of the employer in its own manufacturing process and was not ......
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