Shoopman v. Long
| Decision Date | 22 January 1969 |
| Citation | 87 AdvSh 853,449 P.2d 439,252 Or. 341 |
| Parties | Evelyn SHOOPMAN, Administratrix de bonis non of the Estate of William Shoopman, Deceased, Respondent, v. John David LONG, Appellant, and Gary Kiesecker, Defendant. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Lorin M. Ricker, Enterprise, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant.
Robert V. Chrisman, Enterprise, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent.
Before McALLISTER, P.J., and SLOAN, O'CONNELL, GOODWIN, DENECKE, HOLMAN and MENGLER, JJ.
Defendant Long appeals from an adverse verdict in an action for the alleged wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent. The death occurred in an automobile accident near Enterprise, Oregon. One of the issues in the case was the speed at which defendant was driving his car at the time of the accident. There was testimony of one witness who had observed defendant's car immediately before the accident that the car was going at a very high rate of speed. In addition, there was evidence of the time interval that had elapsed between the time that defendant had left his place of employment at Wallowa, Oregon, and the time of the accident. The time factor indicated high speed for the distance traveled.
One witness, a man named Yokom, was permitted to testify as to the speed of defendant's car at a point about 12 miles from the point of the accident. The admission of the testimony of the witness Yokom is assigned as error. It is claimed that the observation of the witness was too remote to have been admitted.
This court has followed the rule that admissibility of evidence of speed at some point other than at the scene of an accident is within the trial court's discretion. Hanson v. Schrick, 1939, 160 Or. 397, 85 P.2d 355; May v. Mack et al., 1960, 225 Or. 278, 356 P.2d 1060. The discretion mentioned in the cases should be more accurately described as the process of judging the offered evidence in its relationship to all of the evidence relative to speed. If it fits into a pattern with the other evidence and shows continued speed it should be admitted. If the evidence stands alone, as in May v. Mack, supra, it should be rejected. In the latter case, the witness had testified to the speed 11 miles distant and that was all of the evidence connecting the accident with the speed that had been observed by the remote witness. In May v. Mack, supra, we held that 'The testimony offered (of the remote speed) was not competent without an offer of further evidence connecting it with the accident and was properly excluded.' 225 Or. at 284, 356 P.2d at 1062.
The instant case presents the antithetical situation: The total testimony of Yokom, and...
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Carter v. Moberly
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