Shoor-Elias Glass Co. v. Raymond Const. Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 73-210-A,SHOOR-ELIAS,73-210-A
• Citation: 114 R.I. 714,339 A.2d 250
• Parties: TheGLASS CO. v. RAYMOND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 250

339 A.2d 250

114 R.I. 714

The SHOOR-ELIAS GLASS CO. v. RAYMOND CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.

No. 73-210-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 9, 1975.

[114 R.I. 717] Halpert & Scoliard, Sheldon R. Scoliard, Providence, for plaintiff-appellee.

Swan, Keeney, Jenckes & Asquith, Conrad M. Cutcliffe, Edward W. Moses, Providence, for defendant-appellant.

OPINION

PAOLINO, Justice.

This action was brought by a subcontractor, Shoor-Elias Glass Co. (hereinafter sometimes referred to as subcontractor) against Raymond Construction Co., Inc., the general contractor (hereinafter sometimes referred to as contractor) for alleged balances due for glass and glazing on five separate construction jobs. These balances include the unpaid portion of the original contract price plus some charges for extra work done by the subcontractor. The contractor in its answer denied any balance due and counterclaimed for damages caused by alleged delays of the subcontractor. The case was heard before a trial justice, sitting without a jury, and he rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff subcontractor in the amount of $5,196, which was the balance due on the contracts. The trial justice awarded no damages for the alleged extra work done by the subcontractor, nor did he award damages for alleged delays claimed by the general contractor. The contractor seasonably appealed from the judgment entered in the Superior Court.

The first contention made by defendant is that the trial justice's decision did not comply with Super.R.Civ.P. 52(a). The relevant portion of Rule 52(a) states:

'In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury * * * the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon * * *.'

The defendant alleges that the trial justice failed to set forth sufficient fact-finding upon which he based his conclusions. This requirement to 'find the facts specially,' has been construed in Rowell v. Kaplan, 103 R.I. 60, 235 A.2d 91 (1967). Therein we stated:

'* * * we will not in every instance insist upon strict compliance with the fact-finding requirements of rule 52(a).' Id. at 70, 235 A.2d at 97.

We further stated:

'* * * the rule does not demand discursive statements or an extensive analysis of the evidence. Findings, even though brief, will suffice if they are definite and pertinent, cover the factual issues which have relevance to the controlling legal questions, and dispose of the contested issues.' Id. at 71, 235 A.2d at 97-98.

Thus, the trial justice in the case at bar need only make specific findings on factual issues relevant to the controlling legal questions which are endemic to the contested issues.

Turning to the trial justice's decision, we believe that the trial justice has stated sufficient facts which indicate the basis for his holdings on the contested issues involved. The essential factual issues were outlined in his recitation of the statement of facts. That statement demonstrates that the prime issue in the controversy was the alleged delays which each party claimed against the other. A reading of the trial justice's decision indicates he made sufficient factual findings, based on the evidence, to give this court an understanding of...