Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 96-CV-21.

• Decision Date: 16 July 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-CV-21.,96-CV-21.
• Parties: SHOPPERS FOOD WAREHOUSE, Appellant, v. Asuncion MORENO, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

715 A.2d 107

SHOPPERS FOOD WAREHOUSE, Appellant, v. Asuncion MORENO, Appellee.

No. 96-CV-21.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued December 18, 1997.

Decided July 16, 1998.

Michael P. Broderick, Silver Spring, MD, for appellant.

Jill F. Cohen, with whom Wayne R. Cohen, Washington, DC, was on the brief, for appellee.

Before SCHWELB, FARRELL, and REID, Associate Judges.

REID, Associate Judge:

The main issue presented by this case is whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over appellant, a nonresident corporation which advertised its grocery stores in the District of Columbia communications media, where appellee, a District resident, alleged she suffered personal injuries in one of appellant's Maryland stores located near the District's border. The trial court concluded that it had personal jurisdiction over appellant. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL SUMMARY

A District of Columbia jury found that appellee Asuncion Moreno slipped and fell in a grocery store owned by appellant Shoppers Food Warehouse MD Corporation and, as a result of Shoppers' negligence, sustained back and hand injuries. She was awarded damages in the amount of $197,307 for past and future medical expenses, mental anguish, and pain and suffering.¹ From the beginning of Ms. Moreno's lawsuit, Shoppers argued that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over it under D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(4) (1995) (causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia).² Later, Ms. Moreno claimed that even if jurisdiction were not based on subsection (a)(4), it rested on § 13-423(a)(1) (transacting any business in the District of Columbia).

Shoppers maintained that § 13-423(a)(4) did not apply because no tortious injury took place in the District. Furthermore, Shoppers argued that Ms. Moreno failed to show the applicability of § 13-423(a)(1) which, they asserted, must be read in conjunction with § 13-423(b). In its order of June 22, 1994, the trial court agreed with Shoppers that subsection (a)(4) was inapplicable because Ms. Moreno's injury occurred in Maryland, not the District. However, the trial court concluded that there was personal jurisdiction under subsection (a)(1) for the following reasons:

First, it is reasonable to require the Defendant to defend this suit in the District of Columbia. . . The Defendant owns numerous stores in Maryland and Virginia, several of which are located within a few miles of the District of Columbia border.

... The Defendant contracts with and advertises in The Washington Post, thereby targeting and soliciting customers in the District of Columbia area.... Furthermore, the Defendant has failed to "show that it is at a `severe disadvantage' in being required to defend in the District of Columbia" . . . (quoting Electronic Media Int'l v. Pioneer Comm., Inc., 586 A.2d 1256, 1258 (Me.1991)). Since the Plaintiff resides in the District, she has a strong interest in litigating this suit here.

Second, the Defendant, by contracting with Washington based businesses (i.e., The Washington Post, the District of Columbia Yellow Pages) for advertising purposes, has transacted business in the District of Columbia. Thus, the Defendant purposefully and voluntarily availed itself of the privileges and protections of the District of Columbia....

Finally, the Defendant's contacts with the forum state were of such quality and nature that it is reasonable for the Defendant to reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the District of Columbia. It is reasonable to conclude that the Defendant derives a substantial portion of its revenue from District of Columbia residents it specifically targets with advertisements that demonstrate how the Defendant's prices compare favorably with the prices in supermarkets....

Although the trial court did not explicitly mention § 13-423(b) in its June order, it referenced a prior trial court opinion, Daniels v. Knoff, 116 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. 2053, 2057 (Super.Ct.1988), involving an advertisement in the District by a nonresident corporation. That opinion stressed "the foreseeability of injury to District of Columbia plaintiffs as a result of defendant's actions and the consequences of its actions by soliciting and advertising for business in the District of Columbia."³ Accordingly, the trial court "concluded that there are enough contacts with the District of Columbia in this case to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement."

Shoppers appeals on the basis that the trial court's order of June 22, 1994, constituted error because: (1) personal jurisdiction over it could not be based upon § 13-423(a)(1) and (b); (2) the trial court erred in denying its motion for a directed verdict; and (3) the trial court erred in permitting the jury to award damages for a permanent injury. We find no reason to disturb the trial court's judgment.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Personal Jurisdiction

This court has never determined whether newspaper and other advertisements in the District by a nonresident corporation owning a chain of stores, some of which are located in very close proximity to the District's borders, are sufficient to meet the minimum contacts requirement of the District's longarm statute, and whether the advertising constitutes a sufficient nexus for the District's exercise of jurisdiction over a personal injury lawsuit where the injury took place in a store in a neighboring jurisdiction. Trial courts in the District that have examined this issue have disagreed. Different judges in both the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia have expressed different views at different stages of cases involving Shoppers as a defendant.⁴

We begin with certain fundamental principles that shape our opinion in this matter. First, in Trerotola v. Cotter, 601 A.2d 60 (D.C.1991), we said: "`A court may properly assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 1 where a statute authorizes service of process and 2 where such service is consistent with due process.'" Id. at 63 (quoting Smith v. Jenkins, 452 A.2d 333, 336 (D.C. 1982) (other citation omitted)). Thus, in accordance with the intent of Congress in enacting D.C.Code § 13-423, we must interpret that statute to "permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause" of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 810-11 (D.C.1976) (en banc); see also Hummel v. Koehler, 458 A.2d 1187, 1190 (D.C.1983); Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1369 (D.C.1978).<sup>5</sup> Second, if "`the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the District, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,'" Smith, supra, 452 A.2d at 336-37 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)),⁶ and could "`reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the District,'" Id. at 336 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)), it "would not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' ..." to "allow ... suit to be brought in the District of Columbia." International Union of Elec., Salaried, Mach., and Furniture Workers v. Taylor, 669 A.2d 699, 700 (D.C.1995) (citation omitted). Third, when jurisdiction is alleged based solely upon § 13-423, the nexus requirement set forth in § 13-423(b) must be met, that is to say, the claim for relief must "arise from" one of the jurisdictional acts, such as "transacting business," enumerated in § 13-423.

We now turn to an application of the foregoing principles. We conclude that Shoppers' advertising in The Washington Post and the Yellow Pages, designed to target and attract District residents to its nearby Maryland and Virginia stores, amounted to transacting business in the District of Columbia under D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(1),⁷ and that jurisdiction was proper provided Ms. Moreno established a nexus between her injury and Shoppers' advertisements in the District sufficient to satisfy § 13-423(b).

Our case law has not construed § 13-423(b)'s "arising from" requirement restrictively. Most recently, for example, in Trerotola, supra, we interpreted that nexus to mean only "that the claim raised must have a discernible relationship to the `business' transacted in the District." 601 A.2d at 64 (citations omitted). We went on to explain that this "discernible relationship" is shown if "`certain minimum contacts' between the nonresident and the forum" exist. Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., supra, 444 U.S. at 291, 100 S.Ct. 559). These minimum contacts reflect "`conduct and connection with the forum state ... such that the nonresident should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.'" Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, supra, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. 559). Stated differently, § 13-423(b) bars only "claims `unrelated to the acts forming the basis for personal jurisdiction.'" Id. at 63 (quoting Willis v. Willis, 211 U.S.App.D.C. 103, 655 F.2d 1333, 1336 (1981) (other citation omitted)). Section 13-423(b) thus operates as a due process check on the reach or scope of the "transacting business" provision of the long-arm statute.

Here, the trial court found that Shoppers "owns numerous stores in Maryland and Virginia, several of which are located within a few miles of the District of Columbia border." The trial court also determined that Shoppers "contracts with and advertises in The Washington Post and the Yellow Pages, thereby targeting and soliciting customers in the District of Columbia area." In doing so, it "voluntarily availed itself of the privileges and protections of the District of Columbia...." Accordingly, the trial court concluded, Shoppers' "contacts with the District were of such quality and nature that it is reasonable for it...