Short v. Nevada Joint Union High School Dist.

• Decision Date: 23 January 1985
• Citation: 163 Cal.App.3d 1087,210 Cal.Rptr. 297
• Parties: , 22 Ed. Law Rep. 844 Kennith SHORT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NEVADA JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 22834.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 297

210 Cal.Rptr. 297

163 Cal.App.3d 1087, 22 Ed. Law Rep. 844

Kennith SHORT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NEVADA JOINT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 22834.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Jan. 23, 1985.

As Modified Feb. 14, 1985.

Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant, A. Irving Scott, James K. Mirabell, Sacramento, Schneider, Collison & Lange, and Larry G. Sage, Grass Valley, for defendants and respondents.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

Plaintiff Kennith L. Short, formerly chief of security at Nevada Union High School, brought suit after the Nevada Union Joint High School District (District) eliminated the high school's security department, an action which effectively terminated plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff claimed the elimination of the security department was a subterfuge undertaken to mask the District's true purpose, which was to get rid of plaintiff.

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of defendants District and school administrators Theis Murphy, Bruce Griffith, and Kermit Young, entered after the trial court granted defendants' motions for nonsuit (Code Civ.Proc., § 581c) on plaintiff's second cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations and for directed verdict as to plaintiff's first cause of action for breach of contract.

We conclude that plaintiff's evidence of breach of contract was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of "dual motive" discharge, i.e., that permissible and impermissible reasons influenced the District's decision to eliminate the security department. We hold that the District's decision is unlawful if it would not have been made but for impermissible reasons. We hold further that once plaintiff established his prima facie case, the burden of persuasion shifted to the District to prove the decision would have been made even in the absence of impermissible reasons. Because we conclude defendant District failed to rebut conclusively plaintiff's showing, we reverse the judgment as to the District.

We also conclude plaintiff presented no evidence that defendants Murphy, Griffith and Young interferred with his contract with the District. We therefore affirm the judgment as to the individual defendants.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A detailed factual summary is necessary to this appeal.

Plaintiff, with over 20 years experience in law enforcement, was asked in 1975 to set up a security department at Nevada Union High School (hereafter the high school or NUHS). Plaintiff did so and assumed the position of chief of security. In 1978 defendant Murphy became principal of the high school and in that capacity was plaintiff's supervisor. In June of 1978 Murphy rated plaintiff's job performance as satisfactory or better, although she disagreed with the attitude plaintiff sometimes exhibited toward students.

During Murphy's tenure as principal of NUHS, plaintiff was reduced from full- to half-time status, working in the mornings while another security officer was hired to work afternoons. Murphy disagreed with this change; she thought a single full-time officer would be preferable to two part-time officers. She recommended to the school board (board) that plaintiff be returned to full-time status as he was the senior officer. The board agreed, and in May of 1979 plaintiff was returned to full-time status.

Defendant Young was a vice-principal at NUHS. In January of 1980 plaintiff informed Murphy of a "personal problem" of a sexual nature between a female student and defendant Young. Murphy had previously dealt with the problem and believed it had been solved by the time plaintiff approached her with it. Murphy spoke to Young about the allegation.

Murphy believed that any further investigation into the matter should be performed by the Nevada County District Attorney's office rather than by plaintiff, and she so informed plaintiff by memo dated January 28, 1980. The memo directed plaintiff not to investigate staff members without obtaining Murphy's authorization. Murphy testified she felt the district attorney had the professional expertise needed to perform such investigations.

However, plaintiff did not share his supervisor's view; he continued his own investigation of the incident. Plaintiff also appealed Murphy's directive to George Bryant, the district superintendent, who modified the directive to require his own, rather than Murphy's, prior approval for investigations of staff.

In the fall of 1980, plaintiff filed a report with the Commission for Teacher Preparation and Licensing (Ed.Code, § 44210 et seq.), alleging that defendant Griffith, another vice-principal, had used excessive force against a disadvantaged student. Plaintiff's filing this report on his own initiative made Griffith angry and contributed to the latter's view that plaintiff should be fired. Griffith testified he had met with Superintendent Bryant and had told him that plaintiff should be fired "for cause" for being insubordinate.

When school resumed in September 1980, Murphy, Griffith and Young held a meeting with plaintiff. At this meeting, Murphy presented plaintiff a revised job description which forbade him to investigate staff and administrators without prior approval from Murphy.

Murphy explained that plaintiff's role as security guard was to be highly visible on campus and to serve as a deterrent to crime; "deep" investigations, on the other hand, were to be carried out by the sheriff's department or the district attorney. Under plaintiff's new job description he remained free to bring the sheriff's department into a case on his own initiative if he felt it was warranted.

Young testified that in the meeting, plaintiff refused Murphy's instruction not to use students as informants ("snitches") against other students. Young testified that "Well, for one, we talked about the Snitch System. He [plaintiff] said, You're going--basically--'You're going to have to look the other way because I'm going to continue doing things the way I want to do them.' " Young felt plaintiff had been insubordinate in refusing Murphy's instruction not to use student informants.

Sometime between September and November 1980, the county counsel instructed Murphy that if plaintiff was to be fired for cause, appropriate documentation would have to appear in his file. Beginning in November, Murphy began sending memoranda critical of plaintiff's job performance to Deputy County Counsel Larry Sage. Sage would review the documents to see whether they were "sufficiently worded legally;" thereafter, the documents would be placed in plaintiff's personnel file. Between 18 and 22 of such documents were placed in plaintiff's file between September and November.

By November 1980, Murphy, Griffith, and Young were all of the view that plaintiff's insubordination justified his termination "for cause." They discussed terminating plaintiff for cause with Deputy County Counsel Sage, and Griffith and Sage testified that at a board meeting he had overheard both Griffith and Young say, in the presence of the board, words to the effect, "I can't function here if [plaintiff is] going to continue functioning the way he is, make a choice." Sage interpreted the statement to mean that plaintiff's conduct had to be corrected, not that plaintiff should be fired.

Young strongly advocated that plaintiff be fired for cause.

At the November 1980 school board meeting, the board, in closed session, discussed two options for dismissing plaintiff from his position--termination "for cause" for insubordination, and termination because of lack of funds. Deputy County Counsel Sage recommended use of the "budget" or "lack of funds" option.

At the November 1980 board meeting, the board decided to place the elimination of the security department on the public agenda of the December 1, 1980, meeting. At the December meeting the board voted to eliminate the security department, ¹ terminating plaintiff and his assistant effective January 18, 1981. The only grounds cited were lack of work and lack of funds.

School board member Randy Wall testified without contradiction that at no time did the board discuss with plaintiff the impending elimination of his job. Wall explained that the board never talks to personnel who are about to be laid off. Wall testified that several students' allegations against Griffith and Young came to the attention of the board and that the board was of the view that the incidents were being investigated by the proper authorities. According to Wall, it was the board's view that the District's internal security chief was not one of those proper authorities.

During the summer and fall of 1980, when documentation of plaintiff's insubordination was accumulating in his file, the District faced a fiscal crisis. Tyrus Blount, then-business manager for the District, testified without contradiction that the District had been embroiled in fiscal difficulties ever since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. Blount explained that the District was experiencing growth in student enrollment and could not discharge any of its teaching staff in order to meet budget requirements; consequently, non-teaching areas were targeted for severe cuts. On August 1, 1980, Blount sent a letter to the school board warning of the fiscal crisis to be expected in the coming school year.

Between August and November 1980, cuts were made in various non-academic services. In September, the Board imposed a bus transportation fee but in October angry parents forced a "deferral" of the fees. The board made further cuts and decided not to fill a counseling position which had already been budgeted.

At the December board meeting, business manager Blount described the District's fiscal outlook as very bleak. At trial, Blount testified that following the December meeting it became necessary to make further cuts, including the layoff of all employees in the transportation agency (40 to...