Shorter v. Baca
| Decision Date | 21 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CV 12–7337–DOC (AGRx). |
| Citation | 101 F.Supp.3d 876 |
| Parties | Lecia L. SHORTER, Plaintiff, v. Leroy BACA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
David Howard Kwasniewski, Dylan Ruga, Ji–In Lee, Steptoe and Johnson LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.
Amber A. Logan, Henry Patrick Nelson, Rina Michelle Mathevosian, Nelson and Fulton, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [79]
Before the Court is Defendant County of Los Angeles, Leroy Baca, Deputy Jacqueline Ortiz, and Deputy Alejandra Avalos's (“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment, or, in the Alternative, for Summary Adjudication of Issues (“Motion”) (Dkt. 79). Oral arguments were held in this matter on April 3, 2015. The Court requested additional briefing on April 6, 2015. After considering the papers and arguments raised by the parties, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion.
This case arises from the alleged mistreatment of Plaintiff Lecia Shorter, while incarcerated for a 32–day period as a pretrial detainee. While in the County's custody, Shorter alleges that Defendants denied her needed medical care, subjected her to unsanitary living conditions, deprived her of food, clean clothes, and access to exercise, and conducted overly invasive searches. Shorter further contends that she was misclassified as mentally ill and denied access to her attorney. Plaintiff raises claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 premised on violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. She also brings state law claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, assault and battery, negligent hiring and supervision, and negligence. Many of the facts below are disputed, but are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party.
Plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee at the Century Regional Detention Facility (“CRDF”) in Lynwood, California from November 15, 2011 until December 17, 2011. Shorter Decl. (Dkt. 71–3) ¶ 2. Shortly after arriving, Plaintiff was taken to the mental health unit and given a yellow shirt and blue pants, indicating that she was a mental health inmate. Id. ¶ 25; Walton Dep. (Dkt. 83–2) at 119:2–21. Plaintiff states that a mental health professional never asked questions about her mental health status. Shorter Decl. ¶ 26. Defendants assert that Social Worker Kimberly Ronan performed a psychological assessment on November 16, 2011. Plaintiff was then placed in her housing unit, Module 2300, for further observation and stabilization. Mathevosian Decl. (Dkt. 90) ¶ 6, Ex. H (“Inmate Mental Health Documentation”). The social worker noted that Plaintiff's classification was due to her “past [history] in jail” and her “current uncoop[erative] behavior.” Id. at 4. However, the records also indicate that she “did not appear to be a threat to self or others.” Id. Module 2300, part of the facility's high observation housing (“HOH”), is intended for persons who are mentally ill. Walton Dep. at 44:13–23.
Plaintiff asserts that, during her 32–day incarceration, she was housed in a single-person cell and was forced to remain in that cell at all times, without any personal property, physical activity, or mental stimulation. Shorter Decl. ¶ 2. The only time she left her cell was for court and clinic visits, the three times she showered, one attorney visit, and one day that she was permitted to watch television, handcuffed to a table, for a few hours. Id. On several occasions, Plaintiff was denied food after her purported refusal to cooperate with a strip search. Shorter Decl. ¶¶ 4–5. Plaintiff was not given clean clothes on a regular basis. Id. ¶ 13. On December 2, 2011, about halfway through her stay, Deputy Avalos began a practice of not opening the door chute so that Plaintiff could throw out her trash. Id. ¶ 14. Instead, the trash accumulated in a pile on the floor of Plaintiff's cell. Id. Plaintiff's cell never appeared to be cleaned during Plaintiff's incarceration. Id. ¶ 14.
Only detainees in HOH were handcuffed at all times when not in their cells, Avalos Dep. at 15:14–25, including during “rec time.” Walton Dep. at 97:19–24. Unlike those in general population, HOH detainees were also not permitted to have writing materials. Walton Dep. at 123:18–24.
During her incarceration, Plaintiff was subjected to nine visual body cavity searches.1 Shorter Decl. ¶¶ 3–6. To complete a search, Plaintiff was required to remove all of her clothing, lift her breasts, pull apart her inner thighs in order to open her vagina, and bend over and cough. Id. ¶ 3.
Plaintiff was “searched-out” each time she returned from the Criminal Courts Building (“CCB”). Id. ¶ 11. On six occasions after returning from CCB, Plaintiff performed the “search out” without incident. Id. ¶ 3. However, on three occasion, Plaintiff testifies that she had difficulty complying with the “search out” requests of Deputies Avalos and Ortiz. Id. ¶ 4–6.
On November 17, 2011, Deputies Avalos and Ortiz requested that Plaintiff remove her clothing and give it to them. Shorter Decl. ¶ 4. Next, Deputy Avalos directed Plaintiff to bend over, open her vagina, and cough. Id. At the time, Plaintiff was experiencing her menstrual cycle, and initially refused to put her hand close to her vagina due to how heavily she was bleeding. Id. However, she eventually complied with the instructions, removed her sanitary pads, bent over, and coughed. Id. Deputy Avalos told Plaintiff that was not good enough, and Deputy Ortiz said “I guess you want to stay like that all night.” Id. Plaintiff was then chained to her cell door “with nothing on except panties.” Id. The deputies also took Plaintiff's lunch, and Deputy Ortiz said “you also must not want dinner.” Id. Plaintiff remained chained to her door for an extended period,2 and without her clothing until the next day. Id. A man from the psych department came to her cell with questions while she was still mostly nude. Id. At around 3:00 p.m., the deputies returned her clothes. Id.
On November 23, 2011, Plaintiff was subjected to another body cavity search by Deputies Avalos and Ortiz. Id. ¶ 5. She removed her clothes, pulled down her underwear, pulled open her inner thighs, and coughed. Id. The deputies yelled, “We didn't see you, do it again.” Id. She repeated the action twice more, and the deputies insisted that Plaintiff did not “search out” properly. Id. Plaintiff asked for instruction on the proper method of performing the search, and the Deputies declined to show her. Id. The Deputies refused Plaintiff's request to get their supervisor. Id. Deputy Ortiz stated “you must want to stay like that all night and you don't want to eat.” Id. Plaintiff remained chained to the cell door for four or six hours. Id.; Shorter Dep. at 59:23. Her dinner was eventually provided, but subsequently removed, as the person delivering the food did not want to “get in trouble.” Shorter Decl. ¶ 5.
On November 29, 2011, Deputies Ortiz and Avalos again told Plaintiff that she was not searching out properly. Id. ¶ 6.
She was chained to the cell door and left there wearing only a shirt. At one point, Deputy Avalos returned to the cell and tightened Plaintiff's handcuffs. Plaintiff remained chained to the door without bottoms for three hours until a male officer unlocked the handcuffs. Id.
During the three searches in front of Deputies Avalos and Ortiz, Plaintiff spent approximately 15–20 minutes fully naked, and was forced to open her vagina multiple times. Id. ¶ 4.
On several occasions, Plaintiff was transported to the CCB for a “dry run.” Shorter Decl. ¶¶ 10–11, Lee Decl. Ex. 4 (“Inmate Total Movement History”). During a dry run, an inmate, instead of appearing in court, simply waits in the building before returning to the detention center. Avalos Dep. at 49:6–7. On each of these occasions, despite a lack of contact with anyone other than Los Angeles Sheriff Department (“LASD”) personnel, Plaintiff was still subject to the visual body cavity search upon her return. Id. ¶ 11.
Plaintiff has a history of blood clots and fainting. Shorter Decl. ¶ 15. She was prescribed Coumadin, a blood thinner, for treatment in 2006. Id. While on Coumadin, Plaintiff must have blood tests to monitor her International Normalized Ratio (“INR”). Id. Plaintiff states that while she was incarcerated, Defendants failed to test her blood for an extended period, and instead simply began dispensing Coumadin to Plaintiff. When her blood was tested on November 30 to determine her INR, it was 4.4, meaning her blood was dangerously thin. Id. Defendants ceased dispensing Coumadin to Plaintiff from December 1 until her release on December 17. Id. ¶ 18. Upon her release, Plaintiff went to the hospital to have her blood tested and her INR was 1.0, meaning her blood was dangerously thick. Id. ¶¶ 19–20.
Plaintiff also requested to see a dentist but was never permitted to see one. Id. ¶ 23. After her release she went to a dentist, and the tooth she had complained about eventually fell out. Id.
Plaintiff commenced her suit on August 27, 2012 proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 1, 2012 (Dkt. 8). Plaintiff retained counsel through the Court's Pro Bono Civil Rights Panel on October 6, 2014, after the initial discovery cut-off (Dkt. 68). On November 11, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of taking the depositions of Defendants Avalos, Ortiz, and the County of Los Angeles 30(b)(6) representative (Dkt. 78).
Defendants now move for summary judgment as to all counts. They argue, first, that Plaintiff cannot...
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Governmental Documents
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Governmental Documents
...opinion, as long as the conclusion is based on a factual investigation and satisfies the trustworthiness requirement. Shorter v. Baca , 101 F.Supp.3d 876 (C.D. California, 2015). Factual determinations in government reports, whether they contain facts, opinions, or both, are admissible unde......