Shorter v. Shelton, Record No. 2893.
| Decision Date | 23 April 1945 |
| Docket Number | Record No. 2893. |
| Citation | 183 Va. 819 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | MATTIE M. SHORTER v. D. R. SHELTON. |
Present, Campbell, C.J., and Hudgins, Gregory, Browning, Eggleston and Spratley, JJ.
1. LANDLORD AND TENANT — Tenancy at Will — Estate Declared to Be at Will of One Party. — Where no term is mentioned, and the estate is expressly declared to be at the will of one of the parties, nothing being said as to its binding effect on the other, it is an estate at the will of both parties, and either may terminate it at his option.
2. LANDLORD AND TENANT — Tenancy at Will — How Created. — An estate at will arises where lands or tenements are expressly demised by one person to another to be held during the joint wills of both parties; or it may arise by implication of law wherever one person is put in possession of another's land with the owner's consent, but under an agreement which does not suffice to create in the tenant an estate of freehold or for years.
3. LANDLORD AND TENANT — Tenancy at Will — Occupancy of Hotel Room for as Long as Tenant Wished — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to recover for an alleged wrongful eviction from a hotel room, plaintiff contended thas she occupied the room as a monthly tenant, while defendant contended that she was merely a tenant at will. Plaintiff had continued to occupy the room after leasing the hotel to defendant, and her version of the arrangement was that it was agreed that she should occupy the room as long as she wanted to.
Held: That plaintiff occupied the room merely as a tenant at will, which tenancy defendant had a right to terminate at his pleasure.
4. LANDLORD AND TENANT — Rights and Liabilities as to Possession — Right of Landlord to Re-Enter When Possession Wrongfully Withheld. — At common law a landlord, entitled to possession of the leased premises which were being wrongfully withheld from him, had the right to make re-entry by such reasonable force as was necessary, short of that which threatened death or serious bodily harm, to regain possession.
5. LANDLORD AND TENANT — Rights and Liabilities as to Possession — Effect of Unlawful Detainer Statutes on Owner's Right to Take Possession. — The unlawful detainer statutes, sections 5445-5447 of the Code of 1942, do not in express terms deprive the owner of the common-law right to take possession by reasonable force of premises to which he may be entitled.
6. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER — Purpose — Nature of Action — Effect of Judgment. — While the purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes, sections 5445-5447 of the Code of 1942, is to prevent violence and disturbances which are likely to follow when one entitled to the lawful possession of premises undertakes to assert his rights by force, the right of action is civil in character and the result, if the plaintiff prevails, is merely to restore the possession to one from whom it has been forcibly taken, or to give possession to one from whom it is being unlawfully withheld. The judgment has only the effect of placing the parties in statu quo.
7. LANDLORD AND TENANT — Rights and Liabilities as to Possession — Owner with Right of Entry Not Liable for Entering through Force. — The real owner or premises, having a right of entry, will not commit a trespass by entering, though with force, unless he also commit a breach of the peace, but he may be turned out in an action of forcible entry.
8. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER — Statutes Give No Right to Independent Action for Damages. — The unlawful detainer statutes, sections 5445-5447 of the Code of 1942, do not undertake to give a party forcibly dispossessed any right to institute a separate and independent action for damages therefor.
9. LANDLORD AND TENANT — Rights and Liabilities as to Possession — Liability of Landlord for Retaking Possession by Force. — Where the landlord has become entitled to immediate possession of the premises through expiration of the term or otherwise, he may take such possession by force without incurring civil liability in case no more force than is reasonably necessary is employed, and although he may be subject to punishment criminally, under statutes relating to forcible entry and detainer.
10. LANDLORD AND TENANT — Rights and Rights and Liabilities as to Possession — Right of Force — Case at Bar. — In the instant Force — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, an action to recover for an alleged wrongful eviction from a hotel room, plaintiff contended that even though defendant was entitled to possession of the room the court erred in instructing the jury that he had the right to take possession thereof with only such force as was reasonable necessary in order to evict her, insisting that defendant had no right to use any force whatever.
Held: No error.
Error to a judgment of the Circuit Court of Nottoway county. Hon. J. Garland Jefferson, Jr., judge presiding.
The opinion states the case.
Allen & Allen, for the plaintiff in error.
J. Segar Gravatt and H. H. Watson, for the defendant in error.
Mrs. Mattie M. Shorter filed her notice of motion for judgment in the court below against D. R. Shelton, alleging, in substance, that while she "occupied and resided in room number 29 in the Crewe Hotel, Crewe, Virginia, under a lease, contract, agreement or understanding with the defendant", who was the operator of the hotel, he (the defendant) wrongfully evicted her by force and violence from the room, as the result of which she was embarrassed and humiliated, and her nervous system was shocked and injured. She claimed damages of the defendant for the alleged acts. There was a trial by a jury which resulted in a verdict for the defendant upon which the lower court entered judgment. To review this judgment the present writ has been allowed. For convenience the parties will be referred to as they appeared in the court below.
The plaintiff contends before us, as she did in the court below, that she occupied the room as a monthly tenant, and that since she had not been given the thirty days' notice in writing required by Code, section 5516, the defendant was not entitled to possession of the room.
The defendant contends that Mrs. Shorter was merely a tenant at will of the room which entitled him to possession of it at any time without notice. This view the lower court sustained and so instructed the jury.
In his brief before us the defendant also contends that the relation of landlord and tenant does not exist between the operator of a hotel and a guest therein, and that under well-recognized principles applicable to innkeepers, he had the right to require the plaintiff to move from room number 29, occupied by her, to any other room of like character in the building which he might select for her. However, no such defense was asserted in the court below and the case was tried upon the theory that the relation of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. Hence, we shall deal with it upon the assumption that such relation existed.
The plaintiff and her husband built the Hotel Crewe in 1929, and occupied as their residence therein rooms numbers 29 and 24 until the husband's death in 1939. After her husband's death the plaintiff continued to occupy room number 29. On October 23, 1942, she entered into a written agreement whereby she leased the hotel to the defendant, D. R. Shelton, and Mrs. Julia B. Madison, for a period of five years beginning November 5, 1942. On November 14, 1942, Mrs. Madison assigned her interest in the lease to D. R. Shelton who thereafter became the sole operator of the hotel.
On November 6, 1942, when Shelton and Mrs. Madison took over the operation of the hotel, Mrs. Shorter moved into room number 24, for which she paid the sum of $25 per month. On December 6 she returned to room number 29 which she occupied until the date of her eviction on July 19, 1943. For this latter room she paid the sum of $30 per month on the sixth day of each month, the last payment being on July 6, 1943.
There was no written contract between the parties as to the terms under which Mrs. Shorter occupied these rooms, and her oral testimony with respect to the agreement is vague and indefinite. Her first contention was that at the time she entered into the written lease with Shelton and Mrs. Madison, it was verbally agreed that she might retain a room in the hotel as her residence. This claim was so patently in violation of the parol evidence rule that it was abandoned by her counsel.
She next said that after the execution of the written lease both Shelton and Mrs. Madison agreed that she might occupy room number 24 for $25 per month and room number 29 at $30 per month. On direct examination she made no statement as to the duration of the term. When pressed as to this, on cross-examination, she stated that Shelton agreed, to use her own words, "that I could stay there as long as I wanted to."
Shelton, the defendant, testified that when he took over the operation of the hotel, Mrs. Shorter requested that she be allowed to occupy room number 29 until she could adjust some of her personal affairs; that she first suggested thirty days; that she requested an extension until January 1, and later until March 15, 1943, to each of which extensions he agreed; and that while he told her that he did not care to charge her for the occupancy of the room, she insisted that she pay the sum of $30 per month, which he accepted.
On March 1, 1943, Shelton wrote Mrs. Shorter demanding possession of the room on March 15, in accordance with this agreement. She paid no attention to this notice, and on March 18 he wrote her requesting that she vacate the room by April 1. When Mrs. Shorter paid no attention to the last notice Shelton consulted the Area Rent Office of the Office of Price Administration at Petersburg, and was assured that no regulations of that office stood in the way of his procuring possession...
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