Shotts v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission

• Decision Date: 01 July 1968
• Citation: 431 Pa. 83,243 A.2d 326
• Parties: Paul K. SHOTTS and Nellie R. Shotts, his wife v. PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE COMMISSION, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 326

243 A.2d 326

431 Pa. 83

Paul K. SHOTTS and Nellie R. Shotts, his wife v. PENNSYLVANIA TURNPIKE COMMISSION, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

July 1, 1968.

Harry W. Lightstone, Pottsville, Henry E. Harner, George R. Specter, Pa. Turnpike Commission, Harrisburg, for appellant.

Albert M. Nichols, John F. Dent, Irving L. Bloom, Greensburg, for appellees.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MUSMANNO, Justice.

Paul K. Shotts and Nellie K. Shotts own a 135.24-acre tract of land in Fulton County. The Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, in laying out the project known as Rays Hill and Seidling Hill Tunnel By-Pass, condemned 21.25 acres of this tract, bisecting it, so that 60 acres lay on the north side of the route and 75 acres on the south side. On their land the Shotts operated a dairy farm equipped with all the necessary buildings for such purpose. 77 Acres in the northern portion of the tract were used as crop land and 45 acres (through which flowed a small stream) were used for pasture; 13 acres constituted wooded area.

The Board of View appraised the damage done the Shotts by taking of their land at $13,000. The Shotts appealed to Paul Shotts testified that his damages amounted to $35,000; his expert witness testified to damages amounting to.$19,000; the Commonwealth's expert witness found a loss in land value of only $8,650. The Shotts argue for retention of the verdict on the loss of crop land area plus damage to their remaining property because of drainage resulting from the highway construction which will contaminate the stream flowing through the pasture land, from which their cattle drink.

the Court of Common Pleas and the jury trial which followed resulted in a verdict of $25,583.33. The Commission moved for a new trial on the ground of excessiveness of verdict which was refused, and it has appealed to this court.

The appellant advances several arguments as to why it is entitled to a new trial, but, boiled down to its essence, it is that the great disparity between the amount awarded by the Board of View and the verdict of the jury shows that the jury must have been wrong. If the estimate of a Board of View is to be regarded as final and infallible, there would be no need in the law for appeal for a jury trial. What was said in Springer v. Allegheny County, 401 Pa. 557, 165 A.2d 383 is applicable here, namely,

'The value of the land appropriated was the only substantial issue that the jury had to resolve. * * * In arriving at a just determination of the fair market value, the jury had as a criteria the customarily widely disparate opinions of the real estate experts who testified for their respective sides. It was the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of the valuation witnesses' testimony and to determine what the land was fairly worth at the time of the condemnation. The jurors had a right to, and undoubtedly did, bring to bear, in appraising the expert testimony, what they had perceived with respect to the property at the time they formally viewed it for trial purposes and, further exercised their own good common sense. To overthrow the verdict on the ground that it was against the weight of the evidence would, in the light of the record, amount to a judicial usurpation of the jury's province.'

Our review of the record convinces us that the verdict is supported by the evidence and the realization that the jury, in its determination, naturally took into consideration its own observations from personal view of the premises involved. This view is evidentiary under Section 703 of the Eminent Domain Code, Act of June 22, 1964, P.L. 84, 26 P.S. § 1--703.

Affirmed.

DISSENTING OPINION

BELL, Chief Justice.

I dissent and would grant a new trial, because the jury's verdict is not only against the great weight of the evidence ^*--far beyond even the value of the property fixed by the owner's own witness and three times the value fixed by the Commonwealth's witness--but is so shocking as to be clearly a miscarriage of Justice. Feltovich v. City of Sharon, 409 Pa. 314, 186 A.2d 247; Frisina...