Shotwell v. Morrow, 4624

• Decision Date: 09 April 1973
• Docket Number: No. 4624,4624
• Citation: Shotwell v. Morrow, 498 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973)
• Parties: E. F. SHOTWELL, Appellant, v. John A. MORROW, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Civil Court of Appeals

Page 432

498 S.W.2d 432

E. F. SHOTWELL, Appellant, v. John A. MORROW, Appellee.

No. 4624.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Eastland.

April 9, 1973.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 7, 1973.

David G. Stubbeman, Wagstaff, Harrell, Alvis, Erwin & Stubbeman, Abilene, for appellant.

Tom Gordon, Brooks, Jones & Gordon, Abilene, for appellee.

McCLOUD, Chief Justice.

John A. Morrow, purchaser, sued E. F. Shotwell, seller, seeking reformation and specific performance of a contract for the sale of two tracts of land. The case was submitted to a jury on three special issues which were answered favorably to the purchaser. The trial court's judgment reformed the contract and as reformed ordered specific performance. The seller, Shotwell, has appealed. We affirm.

The property is described in the contract of sale and purchase as follows:

'. . . lying and situated in Jones County, Texas:

FIRST TRACT: The South 100 acres of Survey 246, I. E. Sheffield Certificate No. 76, Abstract No. 308, Jones County, Texas:

SECOND TRACT: The North acreage (to be determined by a survey) out of 145.8 acre tract of the Jefferson McGrew Survey No. 245, which acreage lies North of a line beginning at the Northeast corner of the First Tract above described and running North 75 East to a point in the West Boundary Line of Public Highway No. 277, commonly known as the Anson-Hawley-Abilene Highway, Jones County, Texas.'

In a prior appeal of this case, where the purchaser sought only specific performance, this Court held that specific performance was not proper as to Second Tract described above because the description was insufficient to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. Shotwell v. Morrow, 461 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.Civ.App.--Eastland 1970, rev'd 477 S.W.2d 538). The Texas Supreme Court granted purchaser's application for writ of error and agreed with this Court that the description of Second Tract was insufficient to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds but decided that the cause should be remanded in the interest of justice . Morrow v. Shotwell, 477 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Sup.1972). While observing that the purchaser, Morrow, may have tried his case on the wrong theory the Court said:

'Our holding that the description of Second Tract is insufficient to meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds would ordinarily lead to an affirmance of the judgment of the court of civil appeals. As indicated earlier in this opinion, that judgment as to Second Tract is that the plaintiff Morrow take nothing. There is in the record strong evidence that the parties intended to describe a particular and identified tract of 12.375 acres in their contract, and that they were mutually mistaken in the belief that the description used was legally sufficient for that purpose. If that be a fact, Morrow would have been entitled to reformation of the contract had he sought it. Miles v. Martin, 159 Tex. 336, 321 S.W.2d 62 (1959); Kelley v. Ward, 94 Tex. 289, 60 S.W. 311 (1901); Gilbert v. Smith, 49 S.W.2d 702, 86 A.L.R. 445 (Tex.Com.App.1932). It thus appears that Morrow may have tried his case on a wrong theory.'

After the case was remanded to the trial court, the purchaser amended his pleadings, included a proper metes and bounds description of both tracts, asked that the contract be reformed because of mutual mistake, and sought specific performance of the contract as reformed.

The contract was signed on December 31, 1968, and at that time the purchaser delivered a check to the seller for $7,500. The purchaser went into immediate possession of the property in question and has remained in possession since that time. Seller returned the $7,500 to purchaser on March 24, 1969. The purchaser, Morrow, owned the property immediately north and south of the tract designated as First Tract in the contract. He had farmed the First Tract for several years as tenant of the seller. There is testimony that the parties agreed to survey both tracts and that they discussed the fact that First Tract was short and did not actually contain 100 acres.

The contract provided:

'The purchase price of $250.00 per acre, payable as follows:

$7,500.00 cash, as part payment, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged and confessed, and the execution of a Vendor's Lien note secured by a Deed of Trust for the balance of the purchase price which will be determined by the acreage in the two tracts as determined by a survey, at $250.00 per acre.'

The seller, Shotwell, contends that purchaser has failed to carry his burden in regard to reformation and the case should be reversed and rendered because Second Tract, as described in the original contract, does not comply with the statute of frauds, Tex.Bus. & Commerce Code § 26.01, V.T.C.A.

We think the rule announced in Lane v. Neifert, 240 Mich. 475, 215 N.W. 302 (Mich.Sup.1927) should be applied in a case of this nature. There the contract contained an improper description. The purchaser sought reformation and specific performance. The seller argued there, as the seller argues here, that the description of the property was insufficient under the statute of frauds and the contract could not be reformed. The Court said:

'. . . The mistakes were therefore not in the identity of the property, but in the descriptions of the parcels of which it was composed.

(2) In 23 R.C.L. 335, it is said:

'If the mistake of the parties in the conveying or leasing of property is in the identity of the property itself, reformation cannot be had, although the contract may be rescinded, for there has been no meeting of the minds of the parties. But where there is no mistake as to the identity of the property but merely a misdescription of it in the written agreement in relation to it or in the conveyance, reformation will be allowed."

The Court stated further:

'It is a well-known fact that such contracts are much used in the purchase and sale of property and that, pending the...