Shotwill v. Louisville, N.O. & T. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1892
• Parties: BOURBON SHOTWELL ET AL. v. LOUISVILLE, NEW ORLEANS & TEXAS RAILWAY CO. ET AL
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

11 So. 455

69 Miss. 541

BOURBON SHOTWELL ET AL. v. LOUISVILLE, NEW ORLEANS & TEXAS RAILWAY CO. ET AL

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 8, 1892

FROM the chancery court of Coahoma county, HON. W. R. TRIGG Chancellor.

The large body of land in controversy, situated in Coahoma county, was, previous to the late war, owned by one Shotwell. The bill in this case was filed September 15, 1890, by his heirs (together with R. N. Miller and J. B. Chrisman, to whom they had conveyed a half-interest in the land) against the Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co., and certain persons claiming portions of the land by purchase under it. The complainants alleged that they were the real owners of the land, which they claimed under the original title, and also as purchasers of a district No. 1 levee tax, title. This tax-title, however, constituted the real basis of their claim, because they alleged that the taxes had not been paid and that the land was duly sold to said levee board January 11, 1872. The object of the bill was to establish their title, and to cancel, as clouds upon the same, the claim of defendants to the land based upon certain tax-sales hereinafter set forth. The title of the railway company being sustained by the court, and it being the main defendant, the others claiming under it by purchase, it is unnecessary to make any further reference to such other defendants. It is also deemed unnecessary to make any further mention of the claim of complainants as holders of the original title, since they allege a valid sale of the land to the levee board of district No. 1, January 11, 1872, and assert title thereunder as purchasers, and the court treats them as purchasers.

Claim to a certain half-section of the land is practically abandoned by the complainants in this court, and, as it was not sold for taxes at the same time as the other land or dealt with in the same manner, to prevent complication of statement, no further allusion will be made to it, and the history of the different tax-titles with reference only to the other land will be given. Such history, in brief, is as follows:

1. The land was sold, under the act of 1867, to the liquidating levee board in May, 1868, for liquidating levee taxes claimed to be due for the fiscal year ending May 1, 1868.

2. It was sold to the state, for state and county taxes claimed to be due thereon, in July, 1868.

3. A part of it seems to have been again sold to the liquidating levee board, in May, 1869, for liquidating levee taxes alleged to be due thereon for the year ending May 1, 1869.

4. A part of it was again sold to the liquidating levee board, in May, 1870, for liquidating levee taxes.

5. It was again sold to the liquidating levee board, in May, 1871 for liquidating levee taxes.

6. It was sold, July 11, 1872, to the levee board of district No 1, under the act of 1871 (Laws, p. 37).

7. A part of the land was again sold to the liquidating levee board, in May, 1873, for liquidating levee taxes.

8. It was sold to the state, May 10, 1875, under the abatement act.

9. On the third day of October, 1881, Gwin and Hemingway liquidating levee commissioners, by virtue of a decree of the chancery court of Hinds county in the case of Green v. Gibbs conveyed the land, as the property of the late liquidating levee board, to the Memphis & Vicksburg Railroad Co., from which the Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co., derived title.

10. In pursuance of the act of March 14, 1884 (Laws, p. 182), the auditor of public accounts executed to the Louisville, New Orleans & Texas Railway Co. a quitclaim deed to the title of the state of Mississippi to said land. This deed did not recite the payment of any taxes.

11. On May 23, 1888, in pursuance of the act of March 2, 1888 (Laws, p. 40), W. W. Stone, auditor of public accounts, executed a deed conveying said lands to said railway company. The deed was in due form under said act, and recited that the railway company claimed title to the land by purchase under the decree in the case of Green v. Gibbs, and recited also that all taxes thereon since the date of said purchase had previously been paid, except $ 635.10, taxes for 1882, 1883, 1886 and 1887, then paid to the auditor.

12. On May 1, 1890, W. W. Stone, auditor, executed to complainants a deed to the land in controversy. This deed recites the sale to the levee board of district No. 1, January 11, 1872, and the payment by complainants, R. N. Miller and J. B. Chrisman, to the state, of $ 2,749.37, all taxes due on the land.

The defendants answered the bill, denying all the material allegations thereof as to complainants' title, and asserting title in opposition, under the above conveyances. Among other things, they averred that, under the act of 1867, there could be no valid sale of the lands after the sale to the liquidating levee board under which they claimed, and they denied that there was a valid sale of the lands to the levee board of district No. 1, on January 11, 1872, as alleged in the bill.

It was alleged by complainants, and there was evidence tending to show, that the taxes to the liquidating levee board, and all state and county taxes for the years 1867, 1868, 1869, 1870 and 1871, had been paid before the sales above mentioned, or that redemptions were effected within the time required; and, for these and other reasons, it was contended that all the sales prior to that of January 11, 1872, were void. In view of the opinion of the court, which maintains the defendant's title under the sale of January 11, 1872, and by implication holds the previous sales invalid, it is not deemed necessary to make any further statement in regard to such previous sales. Complainants contended that the state acquired no title under such previous sales, and that, as there was no adjudged delinquency to the state for any year prior to 1874, the lands were not of a class which could be lawfully sold under the abatement act of 1875, and therefore it was insisted that the state never did acquire title to the lands. It was urged by them that the act of 1871, which created the levee board of district No. 1, and authorized it to incur large liabilities, imposed specific taxes on the lands within the district; and provided, in effect, that not only the taxes so levied, but also the lands acquired by the board through sale for unpaid taxes, should constitute a trust-fund for the discharge of these liabilities. Therefore, it was contended that the state could not by the act of 1876 assume title to the lands so sold to the levee board in any other capacity than as trustee for the payment of creditors of the board; that to assume title in any other capacity would be to impair the obligation of the contract with creditors created by the act of 1871, and, since it could only take and hold the title as such trustee, there was no authority for the conveyance of the land by the auditor to the railroad company under the act of 1884, and none for that made under the act of 1888. It was urged that the state had no title of its own, and that these conveyances were void; that, inasmuch as the sale to the levee board of district No. 1, of January 11, 1872, was valid, the complainants acquired a perfect title to the land by their deed from the auditor, of date May 1, 1890, the auditor being the successor of such levee board.

Referring to the purchase by complainants of the levee board's title, the bill contains the following allegation:

"14. Complainants further charge and show to the court that, on the first day of May, 1890, pursuant to the laws of the state of Mississippi, they purchased from the auditor of public accounts the title to all of said lands held by said levee board of district No. 1, and received a deed for the same from the auditor of public accounts, conveying the title of these lands to said complainants, which deed will be read in evidence on the final hearing of this cause as exhibit E, and made a part hereof; that said complainants paid to the said auditor of public accounts, as the consideration of the said deed, the sum of $ 2,827, being the levee taxes for which the said lands were sold January 11, 1872, due the levee board of district No. 1, and accrued and unpaid taxes since that sale, commissions, etc., required by law to be paid to purchase said lands."

The answer denied the authority of the auditor to make the conveyance to complainants, and denied their title, but did not deny the allegation as to the payment of taxes by complainants on procuring the deed from the auditor.

Besides a prayer to establish the tax-title asserted by complainants and to cancel as a cloud the tax-title asserted by the defendants, the bill contained the following prayer:

"And complainants further pray the court that if, upon the final hearing of this case, the court should be of the opinion that the defendants, or any of them, are the owners of any of these lands, then they pray the court to refer it to a commission to state the amount due these complainants of the $ 2,827, interest, costs, damages, etc., due thereon, by them paid of taxes to the auditor, as aforesaid, on the lands so found by the court to belong to the said defendants; and that the complainants be decreed to have a lien for the taxes so found due, costs, damages, etc., as paid by them on such lands, and that the said lands be ordered to be sold for the payment of the same to these complainants. But if these complainants are mistaken in their prayer for relief, then they pray for such other, further or different relief as, under the rules and practice of the chancery, court, they ought to receive upon the facts established upon the hearing of this cause, and as they are in duty bond, they will ever pray," etc.

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