Shows v. Morgan

Decision Date17 March 1999
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 98-T-914-N.,Civ.A. 98-T-914-N.
PartiesW. David SHOWS, Plaintiff, v. Joe Eddie MORGAN, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Arlene M. Richardson, Hayneville, AL, J. Clay Benson, Jr., Paul D. Esco, Montgomery, AL, for plaintiff.

William R. Chandler, Kendrick E. Webb, Pamela Robinson Higgins, Webb & Eley, P.C., Montgomery, AL, for defendants.

ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

Plaintiff W. David Shows, who is white, has brought this lawsuit against three defendants: the Town of Hayneville, Alabama; the town's mayor, Joe Eddie Morgan, an African-American; and one of the town's police officers, Gerald Tippins, who is also an African-American. Shows alleges that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his civil rights by refusing to appoint him permanently as Police Chief of Hayneville because of his race, and by conducting a defamatory campaign against him, culminating in his wrongful removal from the position of Acting Police Chief. Shows bases his lawsuit on the following: the due-process and equal-protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, as enforced through 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981; the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201; and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981a, 2000e through 2000e-17. He also asserts state-law claims for libel and slander, invasion of privacy, and civil conspiracy. Shows has properly invoked the jurisdiction of the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (federal-question), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(a)(4) (civil rights), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII), and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction). Shows seeks injunctive relief, including reinstatement, and compensatory and punitive damages.

Currently, this lawsuit is before the court on a motion, filed by the defendants under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), seeking the dismissal of Shows's claims as follows: his Title-VII claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; his § 1981 and § 1983 claims for failure to state a claim, failure to allege that state-law remedies are inadequate, and as barred by qualified immunity and the applicable statute of limitations; and his state-law claims for failure to state claim, failure to comply with the applicable notice-of-claim statute, and as barred by discretionary-function immunity and the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that the motion to dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL SUMMARY

In considering a defendant's motion to dismiss, the court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Andreu v. Sapp, 919 F.2d 637, 639 (11th Cir.1990), and construes the complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

The facts as stated by Shows are as follows. Shows served as Acting Police Chief of Hayneville for approximately ten months in 1996, pending the selection of someone to fill the position permanently.1 In September 1996, the town advertised the position of Police Chief. Only two persons applied: Shows and another white candidate.2

A town council meeting was held on December 9, 1996, to interview applicants. Because Shows and the other candidate were not notified of the meeting, neither attended. On December 12, another council meeting was held to interview candidates. It is unclear from the record whether Shows or the other candidate was informed of this meeting or attended it. However, at a third meeting held on December 19, the town council interviewed Andre Porter, an African-American.3

In the months leading up to this meeting, Police Officer Tippins told unidentified persons that Shows had been convicted of burglary, that Shows had a "rap sheet" which was in Tippins's possession, and that Tippins "would personally see David Shows behind bars" for his participation in stealing drug money.4 Officer Tippins further accused Shows of hiding his criminal record and, with the consent of Mayor Morgan, changed the name-plate on Shows's desk from "Chief Shows" to "Thief Shows."5 In addition, Mayor Morgan searched Shows's evidence cabinet and his mail for information with which to attack him.6

At the December 19 meeting, the town council voted against Shows and, instead, selected Porter to be the permanent Police Chief. Only four of the five council members were present — three African-Americans and one white person — and the vote of the council was as follows: two African-American persons voted against Shows, and one African-American person and the one white person voted for Shows. Due to the absence of the fifth council member, Mayor Morgan cast the deciding vote against Shows, stating that he "could not work with Mr. Shows."7

Shows was more experienced than Porter, and he had a "stellar" record at his job, a high success-rate of solving crimes, and a good rapport with the community in general.8 Porter was a less-qualified candidate for the job; he was less reliable, and the Montgomery Police Department fired Porter from his job twice for insubordination and for untruthfulness.9 Shows claims that the town council removed him from his job as Acting Police Chief and denied him the job of permanent Police Chief for racially discriminatory reasons.10

II. DISCUSSION
A. Federal Claim: Title VII

Shows admits that he failed to file a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and that his Title VII claim is due to be dismissed.11 The defendants' dismissal motion is therefore granted to this extent.

B. Federal Claims: §§ 1983 and 1981

As stated, Shows has named as defendants two town officials and a municipality in his § 1983 and § 1981 claims. The two town officials are sued in both their individual and official capacities.

1. Mayor Morgan in His Individual Capacity

Mayor Morgan, to the extent he has been sued in his individual capacity for violating § 1983 and § 1981, has raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity insulates government agents against personal liability for money damages for actions taken in good faith pursuant to their discretionary authority. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2732, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 833 (11th Cir. 1990). As established by the Supreme Court in Harlow, the test for "good faith" or qualified immunity turns primarily on the objective reasonableness of the officials' conduct in light of established law: "governmental officials ... generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738. Where the law that the defendants allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of the alleged offense, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See id. at 807, 102 S.Ct. at 2732; Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 908 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir.1990). If the law was clearly established, however, the immunity defense will fail since "a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738.

The Eleventh Circuit follows a two-step analysis to determine whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity. See Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972 F.2d 1230, 1236 (11th Cir.1992). First, the defendant must prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority at the time of the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. See id. Once this is shown, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's actions violated clearly established statutory or constitutional law. See id.; Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 773 (11th Cir.1991); Dartland v. Metropolitan Dade County, 866 F.2d 1321, 1322 (11th Cir.1989).

The Supreme Court recently indicated that "normally," before addressing qualified immunity, the "better" approach is "to [first] identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have been violated." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, ___ n. 5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1714 n. 5, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 1793, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991) ("A necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is `clearly established' at the time the defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all," and courts should not "assum[e], without deciding, this preliminary issue."). But see Santamorena v. Georgia Military College, 147 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that, "(1) where the existence of a constitutional right (or duty) presents a perplexing question, (2) where the alleged right obviously was not already clearly established, and (3) where the qualified immunity determination does end the whole case," Lewis does not prohibit the court from first considering a qualified-immunity defense). The Supreme Court preferred this mode of analysis because "[a]n immunity determination, with nothing more, provides no clear standard [for official conduct], constitutional or non-constitutional." Id. Thus, though the Lewis approach contradicts "the generally sound rule of avoiding determination of constitutional issues," in a "normal" case, such as this, the trial court may clarify standards of official conduct which would otherwise "tend to remain uncertain, to the detriment both of officials and individuals." Id.

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