Shreve v. Hot Shoppes, Inc.

Decision Date25 May 1961
Docket NumberNo. 15985.,15985.
Citation292 F.2d 761,110 US App. DC 268
PartiesMary H. SHREVE, Appellant, v. HOT SHOPPES, INC., and Charles Kittredge, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Mr. Lyle L. Robertson, Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Norman A. Gray and Robert L. MacCutcheon, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant.

Mr. William E. Stewart, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Richard W. Galiher, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee Hot Shoppes, Inc.

Mr. Howard J. McGrath, Washington, D. C., for appellee Kittredge.

Before PRETTYMAN, BASTIAN and BURGER, Circuit Judges.

BURGER, Circuit Judge.

Appellant took special and temporary employment as a waitress with appellee Hot Shoppes, Inc., on an agreement with the manager of one of its restaurants that she would be provided with transportation to her home at the end of her shift. When the night manager found that he could not leave the premises at the required hour to carry out this agreement, the hostess made inquiries among the other employees and arranged for appellant's transportation with another waitress whose husband was calling for her at approximately 1:30 a. m. En route the car was involved in an intersection collision with a vehicle driven by appellee Kittredge. Appellant brought this action against both appellees and the jury returned a verdict for the appellees. The appeal is taken from the denial of the appellant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.

We find no error with respect to the judgment for appellee Kittredge. The case was submitted to the jury on disputed evidence and the instructions with respect to the liability of Kittredge adequately stated the relevant law.

Appellee Hot Shoppes contends that appellant is limited to the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the District of Columbia, D.C.Code § 36-501 (1951), which adopts the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-950, as amended, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 907-933. The District Court submitted to the jury the question whether appellant was in the course of her employment and thus relegated to her remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act. This was error because the applicability of the law is a question for the court. Since the jury returned a general verdict for appellee, we have no way of knowing whether the fact finders reached their conclusion because they...

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9 cases
  • Caporossi v. Atlantic City, New Jersey
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • August 7, 1963
    ...v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Amer., 280 F.2d 355, (5 Cir. 1960); Shreve v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 184 F.Supp. 436 (D.C. 1960), aff'd. 110 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 292 F.2d 761; Moffett v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 85 F.Supp. 174, (D.C.N.Y.1949), aff'd. 184 F.2d 859 (2 Cir.), cert. den. 340 U.S. 948, 71 S.Ct. ......
  • Harrington v. Moss
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • October 17, 1979
    ...determining if there is a substantial question as to whether Ms. Moss' claim is covered by the Act, see Shreve v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 110 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 269, 292 F.2d 761, 762 (1961), we note the jury found that (1) both Moss and Harrington had the status of employees at the time of the s......
  • Houston v. Bechtel Assoc. Professional Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • September 23, 1981
    ...Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476, 67 S.Ct. 801, 805, 91 L.Ed. 1028 (1947); Shreve v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 184 F.Supp. 436 (D.D.C.1969), aff'd, 292 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir.1961); Harrington v. Moss, 407 A.2d 658 (D.C.App.1979)2. LHWCA thereby strips an employee of the right to maintain a tort action against ......
  • Sjostrom v. Sproule
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 2, 1964
    ...Co., 330 U.S. 469, pages 479-481, 67 S.Ct. 801, 91 L.Ed. 1028; Shreve v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., D.C., 184 F.Supp. 436, affirmed, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 292 F.2d 761; Watson v. Grimm, 200 Md. 461, 90 A.2d 180, pages We agree with the defendant that the fact that the company car had been disabled ......
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