Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, Civil Action No. 362.
Decision Date | 02 May 1941 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 362. |
Citation | 38 F. Supp. 629 |
Parties | SHREVEPORT LONG LEAF LUMBER CO., Inc., v. WILSON. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Hunter & Hunter, of Shreveport, La., and Wilkinson, Lewis, Wilkinson & Naff, of Shreveport, La., for plaintiff.
Campbell & Campbell, of Minden, La., for defendant.
The defendant has filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is not the necessary diversity of citizenship, since he is a citizen of Louisiana, and the plaintiff is a corporation chartered under the laws of the state of Louisiana.
There is much conflict in the considerable body of evidence furnished at the trial of the motion as to whether or not the defendant is a resident of Louisiana or of Arkansas. It is practical, therefore, before reaching the consideration of the evidence in this opinion, to determine with which side rests the burden of proof — whether it remains constantly with the plaintiff who has sought our jurisdiction in the filing of the suit, or whether it rests with the defendant who urges the want of diversity in his motion.
Without citing the supposed variations in our jurisprudence, which probably arose because of the multifariousness of the factual situations, we come directly to the case of McNutt et al. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135, wherein Chief Justice Hughes, as the organ of the court, engages in a detailed comparative study of the apparently conflicting jurisprudence, and finally concludes for the benefit of the bench and bar with the clarifying pronunciation: 298 U.S. at page 181, 56 S.Ct. at page 781, 80 L.Ed. 1135.
After engaging in a discussion of the applicable articles of the Judicial Code and the decisions thereunder from the year 1875 to the year 1936, the paragraph of summation is as follows:
(298 U.S. at pages 188, 189, 56 S.Ct. at page 785, 80 L.Ed. 1135.)
See KVOS v. Associated Press, 299 U. S. 269, 57 S.Ct. 197, 81 L.Ed. 183.
Therefore, we find that the burden is with the plaintiff to show its right to our jurisdiction by the preponderance of the evidence, even though the issue was raised by the defendant in his motion to dismiss.
Wilson's citizenship in Arkansas precedes that in Louisiana, and we subscribe to the presumption that a legal domicile once gained continues until another is clearly and legally acquired. This rule is subordinate to, however, and does not change the dominant rule of the burden of proof just expressed.
The next thing at law to determine is the meaning of the word "citizen" as used in the statute conferring jurisdiction on federal courts in cases "between citizens of different states."
From 25 C.J., verbo Federal Courts, Sec. 60, p. 748, we quote:
"Domicile is the test of citizenship for the purpose of the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States." Bjornquist v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 1 Cir., 250 F. 929, 933, 163 C.C.A. 179, 5 A.L.R. 951, certiorari denied 248 U.S. 573, 39 S.Ct. 11, 63 L.Ed. 427.
See, also, Simkins' Federal Practice, Sec. 86, p. 119; Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Petrowsky, 2 Cir., 1918, 250 F. 554, 162 C. C.A. 570, certiorari denied 247 U.S. 508, 38 S.Ct. 427, 62 L.Ed. 1241.
"Citizenship" and "domicile" are synonymous. Domicile in its common meaning is residence at a particular place plus the intention of remaining at that place permanently or for an indefinite length of time. A more legally technical definition is found in 19 C.J., verbo Domicile, Sec. 1, p. 392:
The following quotation from the case of Greene v. Windham, 13 Me. 225, 228, is very much in line, as the facts of the case will show:
We find that declarations made by a party as to his domicile when part of the res gestae, prior to the institution of a suit, are admissible, even when objected to because of their self-serving character. 19 C.J. verbo Domicile, Sec. 60. See also Gardner v. O'Connell, 5 La.Ann. 353. Our decision in this case would not be different even if all the evidence of this character were to be excluded, because the sum total of it is merely corroborative of facts which are otherwise preponderantly proved by evidence of unquestioned admissibility.
We now have to declare what were the main facts proved to the satisfaction of the court by the...
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