Shropshire v. Galloway
| Decision Date | 17 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2:17cv935 |
| Parties | PHILIP SHROPSHIRE, Plaintiff, v. CHRIS GALLOWAY, ZACHARY REIDER, and FIELDWORKS LLC, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Electronic Filing
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking redress for his termination from Fieldworks, LLC, where he worked for six or seven weeks in the summer of 2016 as a "canvasser" attempting to register new voters. Plaintiff claims that his firing was the result of racial discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff's original complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), with leave to amend. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint along with numerous submissions that relate to the standards employed at summary judgment. Presently before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint. After being granted leave and filing the current submissions, it has become clear that plaintiff's efforts to set forth facts making a plausible showing of entitlement to relief for race discrimination and retaliation are inherently deficient. Accordingly, defendant's motion will be granted as to the federal and state discrimination and retaliation claims and the court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any other state law claim that might be lurking in plaintiff's submissions.
It is well-settled that in reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "[t]he applicable standard of review requires the court to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989). Under the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007), dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only where the averments of the complaint plausibly fail to raise directly or inferentially the material elements necessary to obtain relief under a viable legal theory of recovery. Id. at 544. In other words, the allegations of the complaint must be grounded in enough of a factual basis to move the claim from the realm of mere possibility to one that shows entitlement by presenting "a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In contrast, pleading facts that only offer "'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,'" nor will advancing only factual allegations that are "'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability." Id. Similarly, tendering only "naked assertions" that are devoid of "further factual enhancement" falls short of presenting sufficient factual content to permit an inference that what has been presented is more than a mere possibility of misconduct. Id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8 () (quoting Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) & Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)); accord Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) () (citing with approval Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (2d ed. 1997) ().
This is not to be understood as imposing a probability standard at the pleading stage. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (same). Instead, "[t]he Supreme Court's Twombly formulation of the pleading standard can be summed up thus: 'stating ... a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest the required element ... [and provides] enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.'" Phillips, 515 F.3d at 235; see also Wilkerson v. New Media Technology Charter School Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008) () (quoting Phillips, 515 F.3d at 235) (citations omitted). "Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
It also is well settled that pleadings filed by pro se litigants are to be construed liberally. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002). And in such circumstances the court has an obligation to "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688 (quoting Holley v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)).
But the above-referenced standards are not to be read as a license to excuse or overlook procedural shortcomings in pleadings submitted by those who choose to represent themselves. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113 ().Thus, a complaint drafted without the benefit of counsel nevertheless must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). And, while Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Rule 12(b)(6) is not without meaning. Krantz v. Prudential Investments Fund Management, 305 F.3d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 2002). It follows that in order to comply with the applicable pleading standards "more detail is often required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant." Id. at 142 - 43 (quoting Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1357 at 318 (2d ed. 1990)). This principle appears to be even more well-grounded after Twombly.
The complaint and record as developed in conjunction with the pending motion when read in the light most favorable to plaintiff establishes the background set forth below.
Plaintiff is an African American male who began employment with Fieldworks in the first days of June of 2016. Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 27) at ¶¶ 5, 8. Plaintiff was hired by Joel Williams, who also is African American. He was hired to canvass local neighborhoods and recruited individuals to become registered voters. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. He worked in neighborhoods that were predominately populated by African Americans and delivered a high level of productivity. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11. Williams led plaintiff to believe he was averaging 19.6 voter registrations per day. Id. at ¶ 10.
Plaintiff's high level of productivity was well received and he quickly was promoted to the position of field manager and received a two dollar an hour raise. Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff trained several other canvassers who were likewise very productive. Id. at ¶ 10. Williams never registered any complaints about plaintiff's work performance. Id.
Williams left the employment of Fieldworks in July of 2016 and was replaced by Zachary Reider, "a white teenager from Idaho who clearly knew nothing about [the City of Pittsburgh.]"Id. at ¶ 12. Reider was a "public Bernie Sanders supporter" who plaintiff believes should not have been hired for a variety of reasons. Id. He immediately was perceived by the staff as "an abusive, mean spirited, sarcastic boss who seemed to hate the people he was supposed to manage and nurture." Id. It is plaintiff's belief that Reider ran the office with "just a toxic brew of arrogance, stupidity and incompetence." Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff received a lot of complaints from his fellow workers about Reider even though there was little plaintiff could do about Reider's management style. Id. at ¶ 12.
Matters came to a head on July 18, 2016, when plaintiff received an email from Reider directing plaintiff to show up for a meeting on his scheduled day off. Id. at ¶ 13. During the email exchange that followed it became "apparent to [plaintiff] that [Reider] had no idea about the history of ACORN and the local Pittsburgh District Attorney Stephen Zappala, or the man who put ACORN canvassers in jail." Id. Plaintiff sent Reider an email begging him not to "break Pennsylvania state law" by tying pay to quotas on the production of voter registrations. Id. at ¶ 13. In the email plaintiff cited a Pennsylvania statute governing solicitations of voter registrations and referenced some previous media publications involving legal challenges that had occurred in the region. Id.
Plaintiff then went to work on July 20, 2016, and attended the morning meeting of staff. Id. at ¶ 14. Based on "the very disturbing and arrogant tone from [Reider's] emails[,] [plaintiff] simply didn't believe that he was going to respect the law on quotas and voter registrations that [have been] established here in Pennsylvania." Id. As a result, plaintiff mentioned two things in the meeting. The first was a conversation plaintiff had with the representative of the County office that was...
To continue reading
Request your trial