Shugart v. State, 10-98-206-CR

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Before Chief Justice DAVIS; VANCE; GRAY; GRAY
• Citation: Shugart v. State, 32 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App. 2000)
• Decision Date: 25 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 10-98-206-CR,10-98-206-CR
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Waco 2000) SHAWN SHUGART, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Page 355

32 S.W.3d 355 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000)

SHAWN SHUGART, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 10-98-206-CR

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

October 25, 2000

From the 12th District Court Madison County, Texas Trial Court # 9889

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Chief Justice DAVIS, Justice VANCE, and Justice GRAY.

OPINION

VANCE, Justice.

Shawn Shugart was charged with two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and one count of possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 22.02, 46.10 (Vernon 1994). The case was tried to a jury, which made no finding on count one, a finding of "not guilty" on count two, and a "guilty" finding on count three. Shugart did not elect to have the jury assess punishment. The Court sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment. He appeals, asserting four issues for review. His first two claims assert that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to sustain a verdict for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution because the evidence shows that the injuries inflicted were superficial, there were no threats or other assertive conduct accompanying the use of the weapon, and there was no testimony that the weapon was designed for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury or death. His third and fourth issues assert that the court erred in excluding testimony concerning the contents of a letter written by Shugart and by refusing to submit an instruction on the defense of necessity. We will affirm the judgment.

FACTS

Shugart maintained a relationship with a co-inmate, Reynaldo Delarosa. While in the "day room," Shugart approached Delarosa, and an argument erupted. Delarosa walked away, but Shugart approached him again and slapped him. Shugart then stabbed Delarosa with a homemade weapon. The weapon was described as a metal rod, approximately four inches in length, sharpened to a point on one end with a cloth wrapped around the other end. Another inmate, Ricky Sessions, attempted to intervene, and Shugart struck him with the weapon as well. Delarosa and Sessions were both treated for minor injuries. Delarosa's injuries were to his chest, and Sessions' injuries were to his ear and chest. Although the injuries were not life threatening, the nurses who treated Sessions and Delarosa testified that such a weapon could cause serious bodily injury.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first two issues, Shugart asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that the weapon possessed was a "deadly weapon," where there is no evidence the weapon was designed to inflict death or serious bodily injury, and the injuries actually inflicted were not serious.

Legal Sufficiency Standard

In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, asking whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Weightman v. State, 975 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); Westfall v. State, 970 S.W.2d 590, 595 (Tex. App.--Waco 1998, pet. ref'd).

Factual Sufficiency Standard

In conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we must ask whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof. Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Mata v. State, 939 S.W.2d 719, 729 (Tex. App.--Waco 1997, no pet.) (Justice Vance, concurring)). When performing our review, we give due deference to the fact finder's assessment of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Id. at 13. We will find the evidence factually insufficient only where necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Id.

Application of Standards

The court's charge defined "deadly weapon" as "anything made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury, or that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." Serious bodily injury was defined as bodily injury that "creates a substantial risk of death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or the impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ."

The Evidence is Legally Sufficient

Shugart argues that his weapon was intended for self-defense and so could not be "manifestly" designed to inflict serious bodily injury as a matter of law. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (Vernon 1994). However, "[s]ubsection (A), by its clear language, describes a deadly weapon by its physical characteristics." McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). For this reason, the Court of Criminal Appeals has rejected the theory that an object can be a deadly weapon under this subsection for reasons other than its physical characteristics. Id. Because it is the physical characteristics of an object which control the determination under subsection (A), the motivation behind the creation of an object, i.e., whether the person who created the weapon intends to deploy it offensively or defensively to inflict death or serious bodily injury, does not control the classification of the object as a deadly weapon. See id. An object which is manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury in self-defense is a deadly weapon under subsection (A). Shugart's claim that items intended for self-defense cannot be deadly weapons has been rejected by the Court of Criminal Appeals and does not establish a basis for finding the evidence legally insufficient.

Shugart also asserts that because the weapon did not, in fact, inflict death or serious bodily injury, it was imperative that the State establish the capability of the weapon to cause serious bodily injury or that it was displayed or used in a manner showing an intent to use it to cause death or serious bodily injury. He cites Garza v. State, 695 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. App.--Dallas, 1985), aff'd, 725 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). However, in Thomas v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals established that the State may prove that an object is a deadly weapon "by adducing sufficient evidence that it was, in fact, 'manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury[.]' If the evidence is adequate for such purpose, then it is sufficient to establish the object as a deadly weapon. No other proof is required." Thomas v. State, 821 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). More specifically, the Court states that "it is not necessary to verify that the object was really capable of causing death, either in the manner of its actual use or in the manner of its intended use." Id.

Here, the evidence establishes through the testimony of officers Eunice Cole, Brian Buster, and Carl Krischke that the device used by Shugart was a metal rod, "like an ice-pick type weapon," sharpened to a point on one end with a cloth wrapped around the other end for use as a handle. Cole speculated that the metal rod was originally some sort of spring out of a night light. This description invokes the term "shank," commonly used to describe "homemade stabbing devices" used as weapons in prison. See Berry v. State, 833 S.W.2d 332, 333 (Tex. App.--Waco 1992, no pet.). Viewing it in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find the evidence legally sufficient to justify a finding that the device was "manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury." Thomas, 821 S.W.2d at 620.

Shugart suggests that, even if there is evidence that the weapon was made or adapted to cause serious bodily injury, the fact that it could not cause such injury should bar a finding that it is a deadly weapon. However, as stated previously, it is not necessary to verify the object was really capable of causing death, either in the manner of its actual use or in the manner of its intended use. Id.

The nurse who treated Delarosa, Shannon Winters, testified that the weapon could possibly cause serious injury to the eye or ear, and could cause death if used to penetrate the arteries in the neck. Katy Hawkins, the nurse who treated Sessions, testified similarly. Carl Krischke, one of the guards who responded when Shugart attacked Delarosa and Sessions, testified that he had seen inmates seriously injured with weapons like the one Shugart had and that he believed Shugart's weapon could have caused serious bodily injury. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that the weapon was, in the manner of its use or intended use, capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(B).

The Evidence is Factually Sufficient

Shugart advances two theories to establish that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the deadly-weapon element. First, Shugart asserts the evidence implying that the weapon was designed only for self-defense outweighs the evidence showing it was "manifestly" designed to inflict serious bodily injury. As we established above, whether the creation of the weapon was motivated by a desire for self-defense is not the focus of the inquiry, and any evidence tending to establish this motivation could not overwhelm the evidence showing the physical characteristics of the object. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(17)(A); McCain, 22 S.W.3d at 502.

Shugart also claims that the evidence is factually insufficient to show that the object was a deadly weapon under subsection (B) because "based...