Shuler v. Gregory Elec.

• Decision Date: 07 November 2005
• Docket Number: No. 4039.,4039.
• Citation: 622 S.E.2d 569
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Kenneth SHULER, Husband, Jason Brandon Shuler, Minor Child and William Bryant Shuler, Minor Child, Beneficiaries of Linda Shuler, Deceased Employee, Respondents, v. GREGORY ELECTRIC, Employer and Comptrust AGC of South Carolina, Appellants.

622 S.E.2d 569

Kenneth SHULER, Husband, Jason Brandon Shuler, Minor Child and William Bryant Shuler, Minor Child, Beneficiaries of Linda Shuler, Deceased Employee, Respondents, v. GREGORY ELECTRIC, Employer and Comptrust AGC of South Carolina, Appellants.

No. 4039.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard September 13, 2005.

Decided November 7, 2005.

Rehearing Denied December 15, 2005.

Richard C. Detwiler and Mikell H. Wyman, both of Columbia, for Appellants.

E. Courtney Gruber and R. Walter Hundley, both of Charleston, and W. Scott Palmer, of Santee, for Respondents.

HEARN, C.J.:

Gregory Electric appeals from an order of the circuit court affirming the single commissioner and full commission's award of workers' compensation benefits to the survivors of Linda Shuler, who died on her return home from a doctor's office where she received treatment for a previous compensable injury. We affirm.

FACTS

Shuler worked as an electrician's helper for Gregory Electric (Employer). In August of 2001, Shuler injured her right hand while holding a ladder for a co-worker. It is undisputed that Shuler's hand injury was work-related, and as a result of the injury, Shuler received treatment from an employer-authorized physical therapist and doctor in Columbia, South Carolina. On November 15, 2001, Shuler left her home in Orangeburg, South Carolina at approximately 2:20 p.m. to receive physical therapy on her hand. Although she did not have an appointment, she was able to see the physical therapist and doctor that afternoon, and left the doctor's office at 6:30 p.m.

While exiting off of I-77 South onto I-26 East, Shuler drove into the guardrail on the right side of the exit ramp, overcorrected, and crashed headfirst into the guardrail on the left side of the exit ramp. Some time after the accident occurred, Albert Chatfield, III, was driving on the exit ramp and had to swerve into the right lane in order to avoid Shuler's car, the trunk of which was protruding into the road. Chatfield testified that he was "not very sure" of what time it was when he discovered Shuler's car, but guessed it was somewhere between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m. Because Shuler's windows were very tinted and her doors were locked, Chatfield did not realize anyone was in the vehicle, but he called 911 because Shuler's vehicle posed a hazard for other motorists.

Trooper Brian E. Kyzer from the South Carolina Highway Patrol responded to Chatfield's call and arrived at the scene at 8:27 p.m. When Trooper Kyzer arrived, he shined a flashlight into Shuler's car and saw that she was inside, slumped toward the passenger's seat. He called an ambulance, but Shuler's injuries were fatal.

The parties dispute Shuler's activities between the time she left the doctor's office and the time Shuler's car was found. Trooper Kyzer testified that he found bags from a grocery store and a dollar store in Shuler's backseat and that Shuler's daughter had told him Shuler planned to go shopping after her visit to the doctor.¹ Based on his investigation, Trooper Kyzer surmised that the accident occurred at 8:15 p.m., give or take a few minutes.

The single commissioner awarded benefits to Shuler's husband and her dependent children, finding the accident arose out of and in the course of her employment. In making this finding, the commissioner noted that Shuler was bound by the terms of the Workers' Compensation Act at the time of the accident and that she could have lost her right to weekly benefits if she failed to receive the authorized medical treatment as directed. The single commissioner further found that Shuler's car could have been on the side of the road for some time before it was discovered, that Trooper Kyzer's estimated time of the accident was not based on any personal knowledge, and that the exact time of Shuler's accident could never be definitively established. The commissioner took judicial notice of "the fact that 6:30 — 7:30 p.m. is considered by many to be the `supper hour,'" and found that even if Shuler stopped at a grocery store after her visit to the doctor's office, "such a stop would be insubstantial and would be covered under the allowed `personal comfort' deviation." Finally, the commissioner found that Shuler was being paid mileage by Employer for this trip to her physical therapist and doctor.

Employer appealed to the full commission, which adopted the single commissioner's order verbatim. Employer then appealed to the circuit court, which also affirmed the award of benefits. The circuit court found that because Employer reimbursed Shuler for mileage while traveling to the doctor's office, her accident fell within an exception to the general rule that an employee is not covered by workers' compensation while traveling to and from work. The circuit court also found Shuler was performing a special errand by visiting her physical therapist and doctor, which qualified her trip for another recognized exception to the going and coming rule. While the circuit court disagreed that Shuler's trip to the store fell within the personal comfort doctrine, it found she was entitled to benefits because at the time of the accident she had resumed her business route. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally, it is a question of fact whether an injury arose out of and was in the scope of employment. Sharpe v. Case Produce, Inc., 336 S.C. 154, 159, 519 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1999) (citation omitted). Because causation is a question of fact, the full commission's decision on the issue must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 160, 519 S.E.2d at 105. However, we may reverse or modify the commission's decision if it is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276, 288-89, 599 S.E.2d 604, 610-11 (Ct.App.2004). Substantial evidence is that which, in viewing the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the full commission reached. Gray v. Club Group, Ltd., 339 S.C. 173, 183, 528 S.E.2d 435, 440 (Ct.App.2000) (citation omitted).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. Arising Out of and in the Scope of Employment

Employer first argues Shuler's accident, which occurred on her way home from an unscheduled, unannounced doctor's appointment, neither arose out of nor was in the scope of her employment as an electrician's helper. In support of its argument, Employer cites to Douglas v. Spartan Mills, Startex Div., 245 S.C. 265, 140 S.E.2d 173 (1965).

In Douglas, the claimant sustained a compensable injury while working as a doffer at a mill and received temporary disability benefits. He returned to work, but filed a claim seeking additional benefits for permanent partial disability and disfigurement. Id. at 266-267, 140 S.E.2d at 173-174. A hearing was set for the morning of September 20, 1965, but claimant misread the notice and reported for work that morning. Id. at 267, 140 S.E.2d at 174. Claimant's attorney called the mill, and claimant's supervisor notified him of his hearing and allowed him to leave. Claimant went home, changed clothes, and was on his way to the hearing when his steering gear failed, and he ran into a bridge abutment. Claimant sought workers' compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained in the accident, and the single commissioner, full commission, and circuit court all agreed that he was entitled to benefits. Id. However, the supreme court reversed, finding the accident did not arise in the course of employment. Specifically, the court stated: "The causative danger here was the defective steering apparatus on the claimant's automobile, which we think was clearly independent of the relation of master and servant and not incidental to the character of the business or the employment." Id. at 269, 140 S.E.2d at 175. The court further noted that "[t]he only connection which the employer had with the particular accident was that the employer cooperated with and accommodated the claimant and his attorney in notifying the claimant and letting him off from work for the purpose of attending a hearing which claimant had sought for his own benefit." Id. at 270, 140 S.E.2d at 175.

Like the claimant in Douglas, Employer points out that Shuler was operating her personal vehicle at the time of the accident and was exposed only to the dangers of driving an automobile on a public road. However, unlike the claimant in Douglas, Shuler was traveling from a medical visit, albeit unplanned, that was necessitated by her previous compensable injury. Because she was bound by the Workers' Compensation Act, she was required to visit this particular doctor's office in Columbia or she risked losing her benefits. See S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-60 (1985) ("The refusal of an employee to accept any medical, hospital, surgical or other treatment when provided by the employer or ordered by the Commission shall bar such employee from further compensation until such refusal ceases . . . unless in the opinion of the Commission the circumstances justified the refusal. . . .").

Not only is Douglas distinguishable from the case at hand, but so too are all reported South Carolina cases. Thus, we consider jurisprudence from other jurisdictions to determine the compensability of additional injuries a claimant sustains while journeying to or from a doctor's office for a previous work-related injury. Although there is authority to the contrary,² most states that have addressed this issue find an injury suffered during such a journey is compensable. 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law, § 10.07 (Compensable Consequences) (2004).

In Taylor v. Centex Constr. Co., 191 Kan. 130, 379 P.2d 217 (1963), the Kansas Supreme Court held that an injury sustained by an employee while traveling to medical treatment for a prior compensable injury arose out of and in the course of employment. In Taylor, claimant suffered an eye injury...