Shuler v. United States
| Decision Date | 28 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–CF–107.,13–CF–107. |
| Citation | 98 A.3d 200 |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Cedrick Lorenzo SHULER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Thomas T. Heslep, Washington, DC, was on the brief for appellant.
Ronald C. Machen Jr., United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Suzanne Grealy Curt, and David B. Goodhand, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief for appellee.
Before FISHER and BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, Associate Judges, and KING, Senior Judge.
Following a jury trial, appellant Cedrick Lorenzo Shuler was acquitted of the initial charge of first-degree murder while armed, D.C.Code §§ 22–2401, –3202 (1981) (current versions at D.C.Code §§ 22–2101, –4502 (2012 Repl.)), and convicted of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder while armed, D.C.Code §§ 22–2403, –3202 (1981) (current versions at D.C.Code §§ 22–2103, –4502 (2012 Repl.)), for the February 22, 1998, fatal shooting of Renee Best. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) giving a supplemental instruction on second-degree murder for the first time during jury deliberations in response to a jury question; and (2) reinstructing the jury on premeditation and deliberation, transferred intent, and the obligation of the jury to acquit appellant of first-degree murder before considering second-degree.1 We affirm.
On February 22, 1998, in an attempt to avenge the killing of a close friend, Hosea Stringfield, appellant Shuler asked his friend Alvin Barnes to “go with him to get,” i.e., kill, the alleged perpetrator,Walter Jones. They found Jones speaking with Renee Best, an unrelated female, off the 4600 block of Hillside Road, Southeast, Washington, D.C. With appellant leading the way, they walked through an alley past bystanding eyewitness, Ricky Black. Upon approaching Jones and Best, appellant inexplicably first shot Best in the face, which ultimately led to her death. Although appellant also shot at Jones and managed to hit him in the leg, Jones ultimately escaped. Afterwards, Barnes questioned appellant about why he “shot the girl,” to which appellant replied:
Thirteen years later, on June 22, 2011, a grand jury returned an indictment charging appellant with first-degree murder while armed for the killing of Best.2 The jury trial commenced on October 1, 2012. The government's case relied primarily on the eyewitness accounts of Barnes 3 and Black, 4 due to the age of the murder. At the close of the government's case, the trial court outlined its proposed jury instructions on first-degree murder, and neither party asked for an instruction on second-degree murder.
During closing arguments, defense counsel sought to attack the credibility of Barnes and Black. Specifically, to further emphasize the defense's theory at trial that appellant was never at the scene of the crime, defense counsel insinuated that the eyewitness testimony of Barnes and Black placing appellant at the scene could not be trusted because Barnes and Black “[were] receiving a benefit” and testified “for compensation.”
After closing arguments, the trial court proceeded to instruct the jury on the charge of first-degree murder while armed, with instructions on the two alternative theories of mens rea liability: (1) appellant intended to kill Best, or (2) the transfer of appellant's intention to kill Jones to Best under the principle of transferred intent.5 The trial court additionally instructed the jury on the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard and witness credibility.
During jury deliberations, the jury submitted numerous questions regarding the charge and the applicable law. A few hours into deliberations,6 the jury sent the court its first note, which included two questions about the possibility of considering a lesser included offense:
Is there any chance that we could reach a verdict on a related, but lesser offense, or is the offense charged the only one we can decide?
If we conclude that Mr. Shuler had intent to commit serious bodily injury (but we are not convinced that he had intent to kill), does that satisfy the elements of the crime?
Based on this note, the trial court stated that it was “inclined to give a lesser included of [second-degree murder] while armed” instruction as an answer to the jury's question, and inquired if either party objected. Defense counsel objected, stating that “had [he] known that the lesser included second degree [murder instruction] was going to be included, it is highly possible that [he] would have argued some of the facts in closing argument a little different[ly] or ... added something.” However, the government retorted: “Well, the theory of [the defense's] case was that Mr. Shuler wasn't there.” The trial court agreed with the government, noting that “the defendant's theory was that he wasn't even there and that he didn't do it,” and that defense counsel, “on the issue of first degree premeditated murder[,] ... didn't even argue the elements.” The trial court was, therefore, unconvinced that an instruction on the “lesser included [offense] of second degree murder would have changed [appellant's] argument.” With the government agreeing that “the [c]ourt is correct that it has the discretion” to give the instruction, the trial court instructed the jury that they could “go on to consider second degree murder while armed” as a lesser included offense “[i]f [they] find [appellant] not guilty of first degree ... murder while armed.”
The following day, the jury again communicated with the trial court, this time asking if it could “proceed to consider” second-degree murder if it had not yet reached a verdict on first-degree murder. The trial court responded, with the parties' agreement, by sending a note to ask whether the jurors “believe that they've made all reasonable efforts to reach a unanimous verdict” on first-degree murder. The jury did not immediately respond to this question. However, later that afternoon, the jury sent another note asking:
We have a question about the meaning of the principle of transferred intent. If the shot that killed Renee Best was never intended to hit or kill [Jones], does transferred intent apply? The question concerns the possibility that Renee Best was shot on purpose but in an unpremeditated way.
While discussing with the parties about how to answer this question, the trial court noted: Noting that the jury had yet to respond to the pending “reasonable efforts” question, and that the question specifically mentioned the “possibility that ... Best was shot ... in an unpremeditated way,” the trial court and both parties became concerned that the jury had begun to consider second-degree murder without resolving first-degree. The trial court thus called the jury back into the courtroom to explain that it could not answer their question regarding transferred intent until they answered the earlier question regarding “reasonable efforts.”
The next morning, the jury answered that “they were still in deliberations about first degree murder.” However, the jury additionally informed the court that, because their “question about transferred intent [wa]s relevant” to their deliberations about first-degree murder, they have halted further deliberations to await the court's response to that question. At this point, the trial court believed that the jury was confused about the law because their transferred intent question, having specifically referenced the possibility that Best was shot “in an unpremeditated way,” “involved second-degree murder, which [the jury] should not ... [consider] if they haven't resolved the issue of first-degree murder.” While discussing the issue with the parties, the trial court emphasized that it “need[ed] to be careful” and avoid “steering [the jurors] one way or the other,” and proposed that the “safest way of answering their question” was to “give them the instruction[s] again on premeditation and deliberation and on transferred intent.”
Defense counsel “object[ed] to any instruction,” arguing that any instruction would “steer the jury in a direction.” The court disagreed, noting that it “ha [d] an obligation to be as helpful as [it] possibly can without ... directing [the jurors] one way or the other,” and reiterated that the “most neutral way ... [to] respond is by giving them” the instructions again. In response, defense counsel stated that “if the [c]ourt's going to give the instruction ... [he] would ask the [c]ourt to also ... instruct the jury on reasonable doubt and credibility of the witnesses” in order to “balance those instructions.” The trial court rejected defense counsel's proposal, noting that, because “[the jurors] haven't asked ... anything about reasonable doubt” or “about credibility of witnesses,” such an instruction would “inject [ ] something in there” rather than “balance anything out.”
Accordingly, the judge reinstructed the jury on the elements of first-degree murder and second-degree murder, as well as their obligation to acquit on the first-degree charge before considering the second-degree charge, and clarified the theory of transferred intent. Approximately forty minutes later, the jury announced its guilty verdict on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder while armed. This appeal followed.
“We review decisions on whether to reinstruct a jury for abuse of discretion.” Blocker v. United States, 940 A.2d 1042, 1046 (D.C.2008) (citations omitted). “[W]e have frequently recognized that the trial judge has considerable discretion in the matter of jury instructions [ ] and in responding to jurors' questions.” Yelverton v. United States,...
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...to a jury that the court is encouraging a conviction. See Welbeck, 145 F.3d at 497 ; Thurmond, 677 N.W.2d at 662 ; cf. Shuler v. United States, 98 A.3d 200, 209 (D.C.2014). When no prejudice is shown, the judgment of conviction will be affirmed. See Shuler, 98 A.3d at 209.[¶ 15] Here, none ......