Shuler v. Wainwright

Citation341 F. Supp. 1061
Decision Date04 May 1972
Docket NumberCiv. No. 64-129.
PartiesRobert SHULER and Jerry Chatman, Petitioners, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Tobias Simon, Elizabeth J. duFresne, Miami, Fla., for petitioners.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., and Nelson E. Bailey, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, Fla., for respondent.

OPINION AND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CHARLES R. SCOTT, District Judge.

Petitioners, death row inmates at the Florida State Prison, Raiford, Florida, seek the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and allege, inter alia, three issues which are presently before this Court. These issues are that (a) defendant petitioners were convicted in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution through the state's knowing and deliberate use of faked plaster foot casts as evidence, (b) the suppression of exculpatory statements by the prosecution was in violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, and (c) the tangible evidence seized from the petitioners' homes was illegally and unconstitutionally obtained without a search warrant and contributed to the conviction of the defendants. Upon careful consideration of the argument of counsel and the Court file and on the basis of extensive legal research, this Court concludes that petitioners are, indeed, entitled to relief on the basis of independent consideration given each of the above issues. Therefore, this Court hereinafter grants and issues this writ of habeas corpus.

An understanding of the present posture of this case appears to be an indispensable prerequisite to an appreciation of the issues herein. Upon pleas of not guilty petitioners were jointly tried in the Circuit Court of Lake County, Florida, on July 5, 6 and 7, 1960, for the alleged crime of rape after having been indicted by the Lake County Grand Jury. At trial the jury returned a verdict of guilty and failed to recommend mercy. Thereinafter, petitioners were each sentenced and committed on September 22, 1960, to death by electrocution in accordance with the mandate of F.S.A. § 794.01.1 On appeal the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the convictions2, considering only two arguments:

(1) That the confessions were not freely and voluntarily made by them, and
(2) That the evidence adduced by the State was insufficient to establish the corpus delicti.3

About a year later, on June 23, 1962, Shuler and Chatman (the petitioners herein) each filed handwritten, independent petitions for writs of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court of Florida alleging, inter alia, that the confessions were procured illegally and that the searches which produced tangible evidence used at trial were illegal. These petitions were denied without opinion.4 Thereafter, a second petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed before the Supreme Court of Florida on September 25, 1962, by counsel for the petitioners. Petitioners alleged that the convictions were based upon perjured testimony and faked evidence and that the State had suppressed favorable evidence. Subsequent to the issuance of a rule to show cause, the Supreme Court of Florida appointed a commissioner, Retired Circuit Judge L. L. Parks, to take testimony, receive evidence and report to the court on specified issues. Judge Parks discharged his duty in a two-day hearing commencing March 14, 1963, and in filing a report adverse to petitioners on May 1, 1963. The Supreme Court of Florida adopted in toto the report of the commissioner, discharged the rule to show cause and denied the petition.5

A petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed herein on May 28, 1964. The substantial allegations of the petition are that the State used faked evidence to procure the convictions, that the state suppressed exculpatory statements, that the State utilized evidence illegally and unconstitutionally obtained without a search warrant to procure the convictions and that the confessions were illegally obtained. Pursuant to the issuance of an order to show cause, a response was filed.

On May 18, 1971, this case was reassigned and transferred to this division of this Court. Subsequent to several hearings concerning issues relating solely to the constitutional questions regarding capital punishment, an order was entered on August 30, 1971, requiring in part that counsel for the parties file memoranda regarding the issues herein and that a hearing be held. Counsel for the parties agreed at the hearing on November 23, 1971, that an evidentiary hearing was not required on three of the issues raised in petitioners' memorandum filed herein November 9, 1971.6 These three issues are those discussed supra in paragraph one.7 All parties agreed to submit these three issues to the Court on the basis of the entire record in the case, including the original trial transcript of the proceedings in the Circuit Court of Lake County, the transcript of habeas corpus proceedings before Commissioner Parks in March 1963, and the Commissioner's report to the Supreme Court of Florida. Thereafter, the parties filed memoranda with the Court.8 The transcribed statements of the victim were filed herein by respondent on January 26, 1972. It was agreed and stipulated at the final hearing on January 27, 1972, that these statements of the victim are authentic.

Counsel for the parties have orally stipulated that there has been an exhaustion of State remedies on each of the three issues presently considered. Upon consideration, the Court concludes independently that this is the case, for each of the three issues before this Court have been separately considered and ruled upon by the Supreme Court of Florida. The Supreme Court of the United States has denied a petition for a writ of certiorari.9 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 73 S.Ct. 437, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 68 S.Ct. 1270, 92 L.Ed. 1647 (1948); Thomas v. Decker, 434 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1970); cf. Picard v. Conner, 404 U.S. 270, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed. 2d 438 (1971).

I. THE "FAKED" PLASTER FOOTCASTS

Petitioners, black men, were convicted of the crime of rape. The victim was a white woman. At the trial circumstantial evidence was introduced which tended to prove the presence of the defendants at the scene of the alleged crime. Near perfect plaster of paris footcasts were part of this circumstantial evidence. These footcasts were introduced into evidence on the basis of the testimony of Deputy Sheriff James Yates.10 The State relied in part on this evidence and argued to the jury that "... quite often it (circumstantial evidence) is more positive than any direct evidence".11

Sometime shortly before the filing of the second petition for writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court of Florida, Noel Griffin, Jr. and Thomas Ledford, formerly employed as Deputy Sheriffs of Lake County, Florida, at the time of the criminal investigation and trial, came forward and publicly stated that the plaster of paris footcasts introduced at trial had been fraudulently manufactured in the back yard of, and by, Deputy Sheriff L. G. Clark. At the commissioner's hearing extensive evidence was taken regarding these footcasts.

At the evidentiary hearing before the commissioner, Special Agent Richard W. Flach of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was called as a witness by the petitioners. Flach, who was a professional of 20 years' experience in the FBI's Washington laboratory and who customarily examined evidence involving botanical materials, soils, rocks, minerals and anything of a mineral nature, was qualified as an expert without objection. Flach testified that he had received "... a pair of boots, two left shoes, six plaster casts, six specimens of soil from a scene and five specimens of soil taken from a back yard".12 It was developed without objection that the six specimens from the "scene" were those taken from the "scene" of the alleged rape, that is, from around the home of the victim, and that the five specimens from the "back yard" were those taken from the yard of Deputy Sheriff L. G. Clark. The respective soil samples were compared with soil clinging to the plaster of paris footcasts. Special Agent Flach concluded:

... I could state that the soil that I removed from the six casts could not have come from the scene of the alleged rape, and that the soil on the casts that I had removed could have come from the scene — I mean from the backyard specimens, the same scene as the backyard specimens.13

On cross-examination there was an attempt to discredit this testimony by exploring the possibility of whether the effect of washing caused by rain and slope could have removed so much of thhe top-soil from the ground at the crime scene as to make the comparison and conclusion impossible. However, such a possibility was deemed "a very extreme remote possibility"14, and Flach concluded that he could "... make a very positive statement ... and say it (the soil clinging to the footcasts) did not come from the crime scene because it was so entirely different".15

Petitioners next called Special Agent Curtis Thompson of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who was qualified without objection as an expert witness. Thompson was also a veteran of 20 years' experience with the FBI's Washington laboratory and in his professional capacity examined such evidence as shoe prints.

Thompson compared the six plaster footcasts with the four shoes. He found that two of the casts could not have been made by any of the shoes. He was able to state positively that three of the remaining casts were made by three of the remaining shoes. He observed that the casts were "almost perfect" and "very very clear".16 Such footcasts, he concluded...

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