Shultz v. Louisiana Trailer Sales, Inc., 27956.
Decision Date | 16 July 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 27956.,27956. |
Parties | George P. SHULTZ, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUISIANA TRAILER SALES, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Harold C. Nystrom, Acting Solicitor of Labor, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C., Beverley R. Worrell, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Office of the Solicitor, Birmingham, Ala. Bessie Margolin, Carin Ann Clauss, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Louis A. DiRosa, New Orleans, La., for appellee.
David J. Humphreys, Washington, D. C., amicus curiae for Mobile Housing Assoc. of America.
Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, AINSWORTH and GODBOLD, Circuit Judges.
The sole question for determination in this matter involving a statutory interpretation is whether the overtime exemption provisions of Section 13(b) (10) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (10) (1966), are applicable to five employees of appellee Louisiana Trailer Sales, Inc., known as "servicemen" and "service-mechanics." The District Court found the employees to be within the overtime exemption provisions of the Act. We disagree for reasons which follow.
The pertinent facts have been stipulated. Appellee, a nonmanufacturing concern, is engaged in the sale of new and used house trailers or mobile homes. The parties further stipulated that the word "trailer" as used in the Act includes mobile homes. The hybrid nature of a mobile home, however — as a vehicle when moving from place to place, and as a residence when permanently mounted on a stationary base — has engendered much of this controversy in determining the intent of the Legislature in excluding trailers from the Act's coverage. In order to come within the exemption provisions of the Act, the servicemen must meet three essential requirements. They must be (1) mechanics, (2) who are primarily engaged in (3) servicing trailers. It is not disputed that the term "primarily engaged" as used in the Act contemplates in excess of fifty per cent of the employees' hours of work.1 The duties of the servicemen in question are detailed in the stipulation to include:
The Secretary contends that the term "mechanic" should be restricted to employees performing those services which are ordinarily performed in the automotive industry; for example, checking wheels, axles, brakes and signal lights, and in transporting these homes for delivery.2 The Secretary readily admits that the servicemen perform these functions but argues that the bulk of their duties consists of converting the mobile homes into permanent residences and in servicing and maintaining them thereafter and that they are not therefore "mechanics" servicing "trailers" within the intendment of the exemption.
The question admittedly is a close one because of ambiguities in the Act which are not resolved by statutory definition. The statute defines neither "mechanic" nor "trailer" and our resort to dictionaries produces only further ambiguities because of the various shades of meaning ascribed to both terms. The only light shed on the term "mechanic" is contained in the following language of House Report No. 1366, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, pp. 42-43:
"The term `mechanic\' is intended to include all employees doing mechanical work, such as get-ready mechanics, automobile, truck, farm implement, or aircraft mechanics, body or fender mechanics, used car reconditioning mechanics and wrecker mechanics."
The definition, containing as it does a variant of the term defined, is not too helpful. However, the illustrative grouping of words following the definition has a vehicular connotation and is suggestive of automotive units.3 The definition of "mechanic" was submitted by the House prior to the addition of the term "trailer" to the exemption provisions of Section 13(b) of the Act. The reasonable conclusion is that at that time at least there was no consideration of the applicability of the term "mechanic" to the mobile home industry, whose servicemen admittedly perform myriad diversified functions not usually associated with vehicles or performed by mechanics, ranging in nature from the installation of plumbing to constructing concrete block foundations for installation at building sites. Thereafter the legislative history is silent to any relating back of the term "trailer" to the term "mechanic." It is also noteworthy that in the Hearings before the House Labor Subcommittee during the first session of the 89th Congress, the mobile home industry's emphasis centered on obtaining the overtime exemption for its salesmen, not mechanics.4
As previously noted, the term "trailer" is not defined in the statute. The Act includes the term with the same series of words — automobiles, trucks and farm implements — contained in the House Report definition of "mechanic." The Act specifically refers back to the series as "such vehicles."5 The only sense in which the word "vehicle" could reasonably have been intended is that connoting a moving conveyance or means of transportation.6
A statute susceptible of more than one meaning must be read in the manner which effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose of the legislative draftsmen. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 1391, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948). To construe the word "mechanic" in conjunction with the word "trailer" as including the various house-repair, truck driver, and construction duties7 performed by these servicemen, is to frustrate the legislative intention and to extend the exemption beyond that which, in our opinion, was intended by Congress. Our appreciation of the overall purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act to improve generally the conditions of workers,8 along with our analysis of the 1966 amendment, causes us to conclude that Section 13(b) (10) was not intended to be interpreted in the broad sense found by the District Court.
Section 13(a) (19),9 the forerunner of Section 13(b) (10), provided all employees of automobile, truck and farm implement dealers a complete exemption from both the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Act. In 1966 when the Act was amended to include the present Section 13(b) (10), the provisions of the amendment, while broadening the exemption coverage to the aircraft and trailer industries, had an overall limiting effect. It not only narrowed the group of employees to be exempted to salesmen, partsmen and mechanics, but excluded the former minimum wage exemption applicable to this category of employees. It is apparent that the addition of the aircraft and trailer industries to the exemption was a recognition of certain disadvantages suffered by industries which were comparable to the automotive industries already enjoying the exemption.
The Fourth Circuit very recently had occasion to interpret 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (10) in the case of D. W. Snell v. Quality Mobile Home Brokers, Inc., d/b/a A to Z Mobile Homes, 4 Cir., 1970, 424 F.2d 233, under circumstances similar to those in the instant matter. In Snell the Court affirmed the District Court's decision in favor of an employee who sought to recover unpaid overtime wages and liquidated damages from his employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument of the employer that Snell was exempt from the overtime provisions of the Act because he was a mechanic primarily engaged in servicing trailers within the meaning of the exemption amendment and held:
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