Shultz v. Reed's Shipyard of Boothbay, Inc.
Decision Date | 26 March 1969 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 10-130. |
Parties | George P. SHULTZ, Secretary of Labor United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. REED'S SHIPYARD OF BOOTHBAY, INC., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Albert H. Ross, Regional Atty., Floyd G. Ansley, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Labor, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.
Robert S. Marsh, President, Reed's Shipyard of Boothbay, Inc., pro se for defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DIRECTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is an action under Section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1964), to enjoin violation of the overtime and record-keeping provisions of the Act and to restrain withholding of payment of overtime compensation found to be due employees under the Act. All of the relevant facts have been stipulated, and the single issue presented is whether certain employees whom defendant engages to repair, maintain and otherwise work on various boats and vessels in its shipyard are "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" within the meaning of Section 7 of the Act. It is conceded that defendant has not paid these employees the overtime rates prescribed by Section 7 of the Act, nor made available for plaintiff's inspection its payroll records as required by Section 11 of the Act.
At a pretrial conference held on January 9, 1969, the parties agreed that the issue presented by the action be determined by the Court upon the basis of the stipulation of facts, briefs and oral argument. The parties have also agreed to stipulate the amount of any overtime compensation which may be due these employees for the period pertinent to this action, in the event the Court determines that their employment duties are covered by the Act. Having considered the stipulation of facts thus presented by the parties and the written arguments of counsel, oral argument having been waived, the Court now makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and directs entry of its judgment, as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
In accordance with the stipulation of the parties, the Court finds the facts are:
The relevant provisions of the Act are as follows:
Sec. 7(a) (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce for a workweek longer than forty hours, unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed * * *.
There can be no question but that the stipulated facts establish, as a matter of law, that defendant's employees, in repairing, maintaining and otherwise working on the above-described boats and vessels in defendant's shipyard, were "engaged * * * in the production of goods for commerce" within the meaning of Section 7(a) (1). By Section 3(i) ships are expressly included in the statutory definition of "goods." See Bodden v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 188 F.2d 773, 775 (5th Cir. 1951); Slover v. Wathen, 140 F.2d 258, 259 (4th Cir. 1944); Bracey v. Luray, 138 F.2d 8, 11 (4th Cir. 1943). By Section 3(j) "production of goods" includes by express terms "working on" such goods, and embraces the activities of those who repair and maintain as well as those who directly produce instrumentalities and facilities utilized in commerce. See Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 130, 63 S.Ct. 494, 87 L.Ed. 656 (1943); Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 524-526, 62 S. Ct. 1116, 86 L.Ed. 1638 (1942); Bodden v. McCormick Shipping Corp., supra 188 F.2d at 775; Slover v. Wathen, supra 140 F.2d at 260. Since the commercial fishing boats regularly fished waters beyond the territorial limits of the State of Maine, they were undeniably engaged in "commerce" as defined in Section 3 (b), which makes it clear that "commerce" as used in the Act includes acts and transactions not only "among the several...
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