Shupack v. Gordon

• Decision Date: 17 October 1906
• Citation: 64 A. 740,79 Conn. 298
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: SHUPACK v. GORDON.

64 A. 740

79 Conn. 298

SHUPACK

v. GORDON.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Oct. 17, 1906.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Ralph Wheeler, Judge.

Action by Morris Shupack against Abraham Gordon. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

The complaint alleged that on March 23, 1905, the defendant assaulted the plaintiff, struck him with his fist, and forced him violently to the ground, whereby the plaintiff received a fracture of the lower end of the radius of the right hand, suffered great pain, and was permanently deprived of the use of said hand. The answer denied each allegation of the complaint. The jury returned a verdict, finding the issues for the plaintiff and assessing the damages at $1,000, for which sum the court rendered judgment. For reasons of appeal the defendant quotes from the charge of the court four passages and claims that the court erred in instructing the jury in the language of each passage quoted.

William F. Henney and Frederick B. Hungerford, for appellant. Patrick F. McDonough, for appellee.

HAMERSLEY, J. (after stating the facts). It appears from the finding that upon the trial it was substantially conceded that on the day alleged the plaintiff and defendant met upon the sidewalk in front of the defendant's store, and that after angry words between them the plaintiff fell to the ground and received an injury to his right hand. The plaintiff testified, and claimed that the fall and injury was the direct result of a blow from the defendant's fist. The defendant testified, and claimed that he did not strike the plaintiff, but only shook his hand at him and ordered him to go along, and as the plaintiff backed he stumbled and fell over some boxes in front of the store, and in falling hurt his hand, which he extended to protect himself. The testimony of the plaintiff and defendant were in direct conflict, and the controlling question submitted to the jury was, did the plaintiff or the defendant tell the truth?

The charge appears in the finding in full. In the first part of the charge the court states the law applicable to the facts as claimed by both parties fully and correctly. The court then comments upon the evidence as follows:

"The evidence on one side differs widely from that on the other—all too widely. The truth in regard to the matter is to be carefully sought, and all the more carefully because it may not be easy or possible even to understand the motives and mental operations of people of another nationality. It may not be easy to understand clearly even what the meaning of the language used here in the court is to them.

"There is testimony tending to show that the plaintiff asked one McCue to have Martin and another go to a certain office and make a statement as to the occurrences on the 23d of March in front of the store of the Gordons, that after those persons had been there the plaintiff gave McCue the sum of $5, and that he at the time promised to give McCue $5 per day when he should attend court on the trial of the case out of the money to be recovered.

"If the purpose of the plaintiff was to corrupt the man McCue and so suborn perjury, nothing too severe can be said of the plaintiff's conduct or thought of it. If McCue and those witnesses actually saw the occurrence and knew the facts, and the plaintiff gave him some compensation to look up witnesses, or if by reason of his experience in other countries, or of his misunderstanding as to the modes of procedure in this country, the plaintiff was foolish or weak enough to give McCue money to make sure that McCue would not desert him, or would not refuse to attend court, the motive of the plaintiff might not deserve so severe a censure, and might not deprive his testimony, or that of McCue, of all value.

"You will weigh the testimony of all the witnesses carefully, you will consider their interests in the case, the relations of any witness to a party to the case, and the prejudice or interest may be calculated to affect the value of the testimony.

"Should the jury come to the conclusion that any witness has willfully sworn falsely in regard to any fact in the case, and that his testimony as to other material facts is worthy of no credit whatever, they may, of course, disregard it all."

The second paragraph of the foregoing extract,...