Shweika v. Dep't of Homeland Sec.

• Decision Date: 25 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–1645.,12–1645.
• Citation: 723 F.3d 710
• Parties: Mazen SHWEIKA, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY and District Director, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

723 F.3d 710

Mazen SHWEIKA, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY and District Director, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 12–1645.

United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit.

Argued March 7, 2013.

Decided and Filed July 25, 2013.

ARGUED:Michael R. Dezsi, Law Office of Michael R. Dezsi, PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Christopher W. Dempsey, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF:Michael R. Dezsi, Law Office of Michael R. Dezsi, PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant. Christopher W. Dempsey, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

Before MOORE, SUTTON, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge.

For the past nine years, Mazen Shweika (“Shweika”) has prosecuted a single applicationfor naturalization before both the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. This ongoing process now raises a narrow question: Does the administrative-hearing requirement in 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) establish a jurisdictional limitation on judicial review of the denial of an application for naturalization? We answer the question in the negative and conclude that the district court erred in determining that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we VACATE the district court's judgment and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE

Shweika filed his application for naturalization in April 2004. Three years passed without USCIS completing its review of his application. In response, Shweika obtained a writ of mandamus from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, which compelled USCIS to finish its review by May 30, 2008. Shweika v. Cannon, No. 1:07–cv–10870 (E.D.Mich.), R. 23 (02/29/2008 Order at 5) (Page ID # 170). On May 29, 2008, USCIS denied Shweika's application because he failed to provide certified copies of documents related to a prior arrest, and thus could not meet his burden to establish his good moral character.¹ R. 1–3 (§ 1446 Decision at 5) (Page ID # 12). Shweika sought an administrative hearing to appeal the denial of his application for naturalization. See8 U.S.C. § 1447(a).

Although regulations require that USCIS schedule an administrative hearing within 180 days of a timely request, 8 C.F.R. § 336.2(b), ten months passed without a hearing. In May 2009, Shweika returned to the district court in what is the instant litigation. Shweika v. DHS, No. 1:09–cv–11781 (E.D.Mich.). Again, he sought a writ of mandamus to compel USCIS to decide his naturalization application; alternatively, he sought a hearing de novo before the district court. R. 1 (Compl.) (Page ID # 1–6). In January 2010, the government moved either to remand the case to USCIS or to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because Shweika had not exhausted his administrative remedies. R. 13 (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss or Remand) (Page ID # 55–62). In a February 9, 2010, order, the district court found that mandamus relief was unnecessary because Shweika's administrative hearing was scheduled to occur on February 11, 2010. R. 16 (02/09/10 Order at 3) (Page ID # 119). However, the district court did not dismiss the case, noting that “[f]ollowing next week's hearing, Plaintiff's naturalization application will be ready for review by this Court.” Id. at 4 (Page ID # 120). Instead, the district court stayed proceedings and allowed the administrative process to continue.

Shweika's February 11 hearing did not go as planned. The presiding immigration officer announced that he would conduct a de novo review of Shweika's application, contrary to Shweika's expectations. Appellees' App. at 67–69 (Admin. Hr'g Tr.). The officer asked about a prior conviction from 1992, and then turned to allegations by Shweika's ex-wife suggesting that Shweika committed domestic violence. Id. at 75–80, 100–02. Shweika's attorney asked the officer to stop the hearing on the grounds that the inquiry exceeded the scope of Shweika's appeal; the officer refused and asserted that he had authority to pursue the line of questioning. Id. at 103–07. The officer resumed his questioning, at which point Shweika, on the advice of counsel, left the hearing. Id. at 109.

Rather than require Shweika to return for a hearing that would satisfy the agency's desired review, USCIS instead denied Shweika's application for naturalization on the basis of the record before it. R. 20–2 (§ 1447 Decision at 6) (Page ID # 156). In discussing the hearing, USCIS noted that “ ‘immigration officials may draw a negative inference from a naturalization applicant's silence.’ ” Id. at 5 (Page ID # 155) (quoting United States v. Posada Carriles, 541 F.3d 344, 357 (5th Cir.2008)). The decision then stated that Shweika failed to prosecute his application, cf.8 C.F.R. § 335.7 (deeming the failure to provide testimony a failure to prosecute), but separately stated that he “fail[ed] to establish [his] fulfillment of the requirements for naturalization, including those of good moral character.” R. 20–2 (§ 1447 Decision at 6) (Page ID # 156). Accordingly, USCIS denied Shweika's naturalization application, but informed him that “[t]his decision is made without prejudice to your right to seek review in accordance with section 310 [8 U.S.C. § 1421] of the Immigration and Nationality Act.” Id.

Shweika resumed his case in the district court. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), a district court has broad authority to review the denial of an application for naturalization: the district court conducts a de novo review of the denial; “the court shall make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law”; and, if the petitioner requests, the court “shall ... conduct a hearing de novo on the application.” 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). The district court held its own evidentiary hearing, during which it permitted USCIS to ask Shweika about any information not obtained at the administrative hearing. Thereafter, the district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Shweika had established his good moral character. R. 48 (02/15/12 Order at 2) (Page ID # 418).

In the same order, the district court ordered additional briefing on the question of whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction to grant Shweika's application for naturalization. At issue was the proper interpretation of language in § 1421(c) stating that a district court's de novo review may be sought by “[a] person whose application for naturalization under this subchapter is denied, after a hearing before an immigration officer under section 1447(a) of this Title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (emphasis added). The district court determined that, although a broad “[administrative-] exhaustion requirement is not expressly provided for in the statute ... it has been inferred from the review process established by the [A]ct.” R. 53 (03/27/12 Op. & Order at 12) (Page ID # 503) (referring to the Immigration Act of 1990). The district court then interpreted “the Act and its implementing regulations” to impose the following administrative-exhaustion requirements: “the applicant has been examined by [USCIS], has had the application denied, has again been examined by [USCIS] in a ‘review hearing,’ and has again had the application denied.” Id. at 14 (Page ID # 505). The district court then concluded that the statutory administrative-exhaustion requirements impose jurisdictional limitations on a district court.

Applying its jurisdictional analysis to the instant case, the district court found that Shweika failed to exhaust his administrative remedies—in particular, Shweika failed to satisfy § 1421(c)'s administrative-hearing requirement. Shweika attended and participated in an administrative hearingon February 11, 2010. Nevertheless, the district court read into § 1421(c)'s administrative-hearing requirement an all-or-nothing completion requirement. According to the district court, “[t]he reasonable implication of the phrase ‘after a hearing’ is that the applicant is required to complete the hearing.” Id. at 15 (Page ID # 506). The district court then found—notwithstanding its observation that USCIS itself equivocated over whether it denied Shweika's application on the merits or for failing to prosecute his application, see id. at 17 & n. 1 (Page ID # 508)—that Shweika failed to complete his administrative hearing, and thereby failed to satisfy § 1421(c)'s administrative-hearing requirement. On this basis, the district court dismissed Shweika's complaint with prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 26 (Page ID # 517). Shweika timely appealed.

II. SUBJECT–MATTER JURISDICTION

The crucial issue in this case concerns the district court's conclusion that § 1421(c)'s administrative-hearing requirement imposes a jurisdictional limitation on judicial review. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (“[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “We review de novo a district-court decision to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Hamdi v. Napolitano, 620 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir.2010). Here, we conclude that the district court erred in holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has recently sought “to bring some discipline to the use of” the term “jurisdictional.” Henderson v. Shinseki, –––U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1202, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011). “[A] rule should not be referred to as jurisdictional unless it governs a court's adjudicatory capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.” Id. Noting that “the distinction between jurisdictional conditions and claim-processing rules can be confusing in...