Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols.
| Decision Date | 14 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 11-2224 (KBJ) |
| Parties | DAVID SICKLE, et. al., Plaintiffs, v. TORRES ADVANCED ENTERPRISE SOLUTIONS, LLC, et. al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Plaintiffs David Sickle and Matthew Elliott ("Plaintiffs") are military sub-contractors who formerly maintained a sub-contractor relationship with defense contractor Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, LLC ("Torres AES"). Plaintiffs allege that Torres AES and Scott Torres—whom Plaintiffs characterize as a "principal and owner" of Torres AES (2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 26, ¶ 4) (collectively, "Defendants")—conspired to terminate Plaintiffs' relationship with Torres AES improperly and in retaliation for Elliott's having sought workers' compensation benefits under the Defense Base Act ("DBA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651-55. (See 2d Am. Compl., ¶¶ 2, 4.) This Court dismissed Plaintiffs' initial complaint in its entirety on exhaustion and preemption grounds, see Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., LLC, 17 F. Supp. 3d 10, 21, 22 (D.D.C. 2013); however the D.C. Circuit partially reversed that ruling, see Sickle v. Torres Advanced Enter. Sols., LLC ("Sickle II"), 884 F.3d 338, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (). On remand, Plaintiffs have filed a Second Amended Complaint that repleads the claims that the Circuit panel reinstated: both Plaintiffs allege that Torres AES breached their respective contracts when it terminated their employment without proper notice (see 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30-31), and Sickle also claims that Defendants are liable for common law retaliatory discharge, conspiracy, and prima facie tort arising from the termination of his contract .
Before this Court at present is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. ( ), ECF No. 27.) Defendants argue that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Scott Torres (see Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. ( ), ECF No. 27-1, at 15-22), and they further insist that Sickle has failed to plead a plausible claim for retaliatory discharge (see id. at 23-30), and that the amended complaint's conspiracy and prima facie tort claims are implausible (see id. at 34-36).1 With respect to the breach of contract claims, Defendants assert that the claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be dismissed because the governing law does not recognize that cause of action (see id. at 30-33), and that, while Plaintiffs have stated plausible claims for general breach of contract against Torres AES, the recoverable amounts in controversy with respect to those claims fall below the $75,000 threshold for federal court jurisdiction (see id. at 33).
For the reasons explained below, this Court finds that Defendants' motion to dismiss must be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The motion will be granted with respect to all of the claims filed against Scott Torres, because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over that defendant, and the motion will also be granted withrespect to Plaintiffs' claims for retaliatory discharge, conspiracy, prima facie tort, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing—none of which are cognizable under Virginia law (which the Court concludes is applicable to the claims made in the instant lawsuit). Defendants' motion to dismiss will be denied with respect to the remaining breach of contract claims, however, because, given the lack of information in the contracts concerning how damages are to be calculated in the event of a breach, it is not implausible that Plaintiffs' damages for Torres AES's failure to provide the requisite notice exceed the $75,000 threshold. A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will follow.
Torres AES contracts with the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and Sabre Security International (another defense contractor) to provide security and other services at United States military installations abroad. (See 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 4.) Torres AES is a Virginia limited liability company, and it maintains its principal place of business in Falls Church, Virginia. (See id. ¶ 3.) Scott Torres avers that he is a resident of Kansas who worked for Torres AES from 2006 until February of 2018. He further avers that he occupied various positions while with Torres AES, including pricing analyst,project manager, project coordinator, and program and security contracts manager. (See id. ¶ 5.)
According to the operative complaint, Torres AES first hired Sickle in 2009, to work as a medic at Forward Operating Base Shield ("FOB Shield") in Iraq; and Sickle and Torres AES executed the one-year contract that is at issue in this case on June 1, 2010. (See 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 6.) The express terms of the contract permitted "[e]ither party" to terminate the agreement "for a material breach . . . effective upon receipt of thirty (30) days written notice if the Cause remains uncured." ( In addition, the contract vested "[e]ither Party" with the authority to "terminate this Subcontracting Agreement without Cause effective upon 28 days of receipt of written notice." (Id.) The contract further specified the form that any such notice of termination must take—namely, it must be "in writing and . . . personally delivered, delivered by overnight mail, or mailed, by certified mail-return receipt requested." (Id. ¶ 8.2.) The contract also contained the following choice-of-law provision: "[t]his Agreement, including all matters related to construction, performance and enforcement, shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia, without reference to conflicts of law principles[.]" (Id. ¶ 8.5.)
Torres AES separately contracted with Elliott to work at FOB Shield as a kennel master, managing trained dogs used by the military in Iraq. (See 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 7.) Elliot's contract term was approximately eleven months—from mid-February of 2010, through December 31, 2010. ( See id.) The written agreement between Torres AES and Elliot contained the same language as Sickle's contract regarding the ability of "[e]itherparty" to terminate the agreement "for a material breach . . . effective upon receipt of thirty (30) days written notice if the Cause remains uncured" (, and it also contained the same requirement regarding the form of the notice and its delivery (id. ¶ 8.2), and the same Virginia choice-of-law provision (id. ¶ 8.5). With respect to termination without cause, Elliott's agreement specifically authorized Elliott (alone) to "terminate this Subcontract Agreement without cause effective upon 28 days of receipt of written notice." (Id. ¶ 7.2.)
On March 15, 2010, Elliott allegedly injured his back while stacking sandbags at FOB Shield. (See 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9-10.) According to the Second Amended Complaint, Sickle witnessed this injury, and "determined [Elliott] had likely herniated a dis[c]." (Id. ¶ 9.) Sickle gave Elliott an initial injection of medication and then treated him with oral pain medication for three weeks, before ultimately recommending that Elliott undergo an MRI and "be followed by the [Department of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs] for care[,]" pursuant to the DBA. (Ex. A. to 2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 26-1, at 2 (emphasis omitted).) Sickle documented his care of Elliott and his treatment recommendations in an undated report (see id.), and Elliott subsequently applied for DBA benefits relating to this injury, submitting Sickle's report in support of his DBA claim (see 2d Am. Coml. ¶¶ 13, 15).
On April 30, 2010, Elliott took leave and traveled "home" to Wisconsin, intending to have his back evaluated before returning to Iraq on May 16, 2010. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 16). According to the Second Amended Complaint, "[p]rior to [Elliott's] return, and with knowledge of his DBA injury claim, Mr. Scott Torres on May 9, 2010[,] in anemail discharged Mr. Elliott without any notice." (Id.) The pleading further alleges that Elliott's DBA claim for disability benefits was denied at an unspecified point in this same time frame. (See id. ¶ 13.) Elliott then hired legal counsel in Washington, D.C. to assist with challenging the decision concerning his DBA claim. (See id. ¶¶ 13-16.)
With respect to Elliott's DBA benefits claim, Plaintiffs allege that "both Torres Defendants made representations to insurance company representatives that were sent to the District of Columbia concerning Torres [D]efendants' claims that Mr. Elliott was terminated and the reasons for that termination with knowledge that such would be made to the District of Columbia." (Id. ¶ 16; see also id. ¶ 17 ().) The initial denial of DBA benefits was subsequently reversed, and Elliott "began to receive medical benefits, treatment and bi-weekly temporary total disability benefits, and also received an MRI showing a herniated disc and received back surgery paid for by the insurance carrier on July 7, 2010." (Id. ¶ 13.)
Concerning Sickle, Plaintiffs allege that "[a]t the same time that Mr. Elliott was receiving his DBA benefits, Mr. Sickle received a one year contract with Torres from June 1, 2010 until June 1, 2011 to continue as medical officer at FOB Shield" (id. ¶ 14), but by the end of June 2010, Torres AES and Scott Torres were allegedly upset with Sickle for drafting the medical report that Elliott had used to support his claim for DBA benefits, because they believed that Elliott had "faked his injury" (id. ¶ 15). Plaintiffs...
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