Sickles v. Cabot Corp.
Citation | 379 N.J. Super. 100,877 A.2d 267 |
Parties | Louis SICKLES, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. CABOT CORPORATION, Phelps Dodge Corporation, Columbian Chemicals Company, Degussa Engineered Carbons, LP, Degussa AG, and Degussa Corporation, Defendants-Appellants. |
Decision Date | 07 July 2005 |
Court | Superior Court of New Jersey |
Brown and Connery and Jennifer L. Merzon (Jones Day) of the Washington DC bar, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys for appellant Cabot Corporation (Michael J. Vassalotti and Ms. Merzon, Westmont, on the joint brief).
Dechert and Gary W. Kubek (Debevoise & Plimpton) of the New York bar, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys for appellants Phelps Dodge Corporation and Columbian Chemicals Company (Michelangelo Troisi, of counsel; Michelle Hart Yeary and Mr. Kubek, on the joint brief).
Campbell, Campbell, Edwards & Conroy and Hima Vatti (O'Melveny & Myers) of the Washington DC bar, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys for Degussa Engineered Carbons, LP, Degusssa AG, and Degussa Corporation (C. Scott Toomey, Turnerville, William A. Rupert and Ms. Vatti, on the joint brief).
Sufrin Zucker Steinberg Sonstein & Wixted, Krishna B. Narine, of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, Steven E. Connolly (Schiffrin & Barroway) of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, and Isaac L. Diel, admitted pro hac vice, of the Kansas bar, attorneys for respondent (Ms. Narine, Mr. Connolly and Mr. Diel, of counsel; David W. Sufrin, Camden, on the brief).
Before Judges NEWMAN, AXELRAD and BILDER.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
AXELRAD, J.T.C. (temporarily assigned).
A purchaser of Goodyear tires filed a class action suit against companies which produce, manufacture and sell carbon black, a primary ingredient in tires. At issue in this appeal is whether an indirect purchaser of an allegedly price-fixed product may state a claim for antitrust violations under the New Jersey Antitrust Act (ATA), N.J.S.A. 56:9-1 to -19, and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20. We hold that neither statute provides a cause of action to a pass-through purchaser such as the putative class plaintiff, and reverse the order of the Law Division denying defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e).
Defendants are Cabot Corporation (Cabot); Phelps Dodge Corporation (Phelps Dodge); Columbian Chemicals Company (Columbian); Degussa Engineered Carbons, LP (DEC); Degussa AG; and Degussa Corporation. Cabot, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Massachusetts, is the world's largest producer of carbon black, accounting for one-quarter of the worldwide production capacity and market share. Phelps Dodge is a New York corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona and wholly owns the subsidiary Columbian, which is engaged in the manufacture and sale of carbon black within the United States and throughout the world and maintains a carbon black facility in Ulysses, Kansas. DEC, a limited partnership with its principal place of business in New Jersey, is co-owned by Degussa AG and engages in the manufacture and sale of carbon black throughout the world.
Carbon black is a mixture of partially burned hydrocarbons produced by a combustion of natural gas. It is used as a reinforcing agent in rubber products such as tires, tubes, cables and conveyor belts and is the primary ingredient in car and truck tires. It is also used as an ingredient in countless other products such as dry-cell batteries, electrical conductors, and carbon brushes, and as a pigment in printing, carbon paper, typewriter ribbon inks, paints, photocopier toner and record discs.
The complaint alleged that defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in anti-competitive activities in violation of the ATA to artificially raise, stabilize, and maintain the price of carbon black sold by defendants from January 1999 through November 2002, resulting in plaintiff and other similarly situated consumers paying more for tires containing carbon black than they would have in the absence of defendants' alleged unlawful conduct. Plaintiff further claimed that defendants coordinated and cooperated with one another to implement output restrictions and price increases and agreed not to compete against one another to increase their respective market shares. Plaintiff also alleged these acts constituted an unconscionable practice under the CFA.
By order of November 29, 2004, the trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. On February 24, 2005, we granted defendants' motion for leave to appeal. Defendants raise the following issues on appeal:
We find these arguments persuasive.
We recognize the indulgent standard that applies to review of complaints in the context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 771-72, 563 A.2d 31 (1989). A motion to dismiss under Rule 4:6-2(e) should be "approach[ed] with great caution" and should only be granted in "the rarest of instances." Ibid. We must view the allegations with great liberality and without concern for the plaintiff's ability to prove the facts alleged in the complaint. Id. at 746, 563 A.2d 31.
However, a court must dismiss the plaintiff's complaint if it has failed to articulate a legal basis entitling plaintiff to relief. Camden County Energy Recovery Assocs., L.P. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 320 N.J.Super. 59, 64, 726 A.2d 968 (App.Div.1999). "A motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must be evaluated in light of the legal sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint." Donato v. Moldow, 374 N.J.Super. 475, 482, 865 A.2d 711 (App.Div.2005). The plaintiff's obligation on a motion to dismiss is "not to prove the case but only to make allegations, which, if proven, would constitute a valid cause of action." Leon v. Rite Aid Corp., 340 N.J.Super. 462, 472, 774 A.2d 674 (App.Div.2001).
We review such a motion by the same standard applied by the trial court; thus, considering and accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint, we determine whether they set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. Donato, supra, 374 N.J.Super. at 483, 865 A.2d 711.
The ATA was passed in 1970 "to promote the unhampered growth of commerce and industry throughout the State by prohibiting restraints of trade which are secured through monopolistic practices and which act or tend to act to decrease competition between and among persons engaged in commerce and trade." N.J.S.A. 56:9-1 (Historical and Statutory Notes). Under the ATA, "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of the provisions of this act may sue therefor and shall recover threefold the damages sustained by him, together with reasonable attorneys' fees, filing fees and reasonable costs of suit." N.J.S.A. 56:9-12.
We follow federal antitrust law in interpreting our own antitrust statute. See N.J.S.A. 56:9-18 (). See also Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 89 N.J. 306, 313, 446 A.2d 83 (1982) ( )(quoting State v. Lawn King, Inc., 84 N.J. 179, 192, 417 A.2d 1025 (1980)).
Passed by Congress in 1890, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1, declares illegal "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations...." Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15, provides a private right of action to "any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."
This private right, however, does not extend to indirect purchasers, as only overcharged direct purchasers, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution, are parties "injured in [their] business or property" within the meaning of the Clayton Act. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 881, 98 S.Ct. 243, 54 L.Ed.2d 164 (1977). In Illinois Brick the State of Illinois, on behalf of itself and 700 municipalities who were indirect purchasers of concrete block, brought an antitrust action under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, alleging concrete block manufacturers and distributors had fixed...
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