Sicola v. First Nat. Bank of Altoona

• Decision Date: 22 May 1961
• Citation: 404 Pa. 18,170 A.2d 584,87 A.L.R.2d 1044
• Parties: , 87 A.L.R.2d 1044 Frank J. SICOLA, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA. Louis C. SCHMITT, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA. Paul STRONG, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA. Alfred J. CORBO, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA. Joseph G. BUCK, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA. Anthony LEPORE, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 584

170 A.2d 584

404 Pa. 18, 87 A.L.R.2d 1044

Frank J. SICOLA, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA.

Louis C. SCHMITT, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA.

Paul STRONG, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA.

Alfred J. CORBO, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA.

Joseph G. BUCK, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA.

Anthony LEPORE, Appellant, v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ALTOONA.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 22, 1961.

Merle K. Evey, Hollidaysburg, Stephen M. Feldman, Joseph G. Feldman, Feldman & Feldman, Philadelphia, for appellants.

Robert C. Haberstroh, Altoona, for appellee.

Before% charles alvin jones, c./ J., and BELL, MUSMANNO, BENJAMIN R. JONES, COHEN, BOK and EAGEN, JJ.

BOK, Justice.

Six persons, now appellants, sued the defendant bank for malicious prosecution. They have appealed because the court below sustained preliminary objections to their complaints.

The bank had plaintiffs arrested for obtaining money under false pretenses and for conspiracy committed on January 18 and 30, 1958. Plaintiff Strong was acquitted by a jury on December 9, 1959, and on January 12, 1960, the indictments against the other plaintiffs were nolle prossed. The complaints in the instant cases were filed on March 9, 1960.

The preliminary objections asserted, and the court below held, that the complaints were tardily filed because of the Statute of Limitations, Act of July 1, 1935, P.L. 503, 12 P.S. § 51, which provides:

'Evern suit to recover damages for malicious prosecution or for false arrest, because of right of action hereafter accruing, must be brought within one (1) year from the date of the accruing of such right of action, and not thereafter * * *.'

The court below felt that the injury to the plaintiffs occurred at the moment of their arrest and hence that their right of action accrued at that time. Its reason was that the requirement of a favorable termination of the criminal proceedings was a condition precedent to recovery for malicious prosecution in order to avoid the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, that is to say, one criminal verdict and another and different civil verdict. This was clear error.

We accept the allegations of the complaints as true. Ayers v. Morgan, 1959, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788. The cited case, involving the discovery nine years after a surgical operation that the defendant doctor had left a sponge inside a patient, also informs us that a statute of limitation must be read in the light of common sense and reason, and that the Legislature is presumed not to intend unreasonable or absurd results.

The elements of the action before us are malice, want of probable cause, and a favorable outcome of the criminal process. Curley v. Automobile Finance Co., 1941, 343 Pa. 280, 23 A.2d 48, 139 A.L.R. 1082; Smoker v. Ohl, 1939, 335 Pa. 270, 6 A.2d 810. And as we said in Beadle v. Friel, 1936, 320 Pa. 560, 183 A. 761, 763: 'It is clearly settled also, that the [criminal] proceeding must be determined finally before any action lies for the injury.' See also Manning v. Newville Water Co., 1933, 111 Pa.Super. 229, 169 A. 254, 257, where the court said:

'A cause of action must be complete before an action can be commenced, and the subsequent occurrence of a material fact will not avail in maintaining it.'

A plaintiff in malicious use of process does not make out a case simply by proving his arrest and acquittal. Miller v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 1952, 371 Pa. 308, 89 A.2d 809. The other two elements must also appear. Want of probable cause does not in itself prove malice as a motive. Simpson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 1946, 354 Pa. 87, 46 A. 674. However, malice may be inferred from want of probable cause, but not want of probable cause from malice. If probable cause exists, malice is...