Siddiqui v. Colvin
Decision Date | 24 March 2015 |
Docket Number | Civil No. TMD 13–1080. |
Citation | 95 F.Supp.3d 833 |
Parties | Fatimah SIDDIQUI, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Stephen F. Shea, Elkind and Shea, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiff.
David Nathaniel Mervis, Social Security Administration, Baltimore, MD, for Defendant.
Fatimah Siddiqui (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or the “Commissioner”) denying her applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment or Alternative Motion for Remand (ECF No. 18) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 20).1 Plaintiff contends that the administrative record does not contain substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision that she is not disabled. No hearing is necessary. L.R. 105.6. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Alternative Motion for Remand (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff was born in 1982, has a GED, and previously worked as a barista/cashier, lab technician, waitress, photographer, customer representative, debt collector, and patient registrar. R. at 24, 102, 356–57. Plaintiff applied for DIB protectively on April 2, 2009, and for SSI on April 23, 2009, alleging disability beginning on April 18, 2008, due to depression, bipolar disorder
, and anxiety. R. at 15, 58–65, 99, 124. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's applications initially and again on reconsideration, so Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). R. at 27–37. On October 31, 2011, ALJ Larry K. Banks held a hearing in Washington, D.C., at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. R. at 352–87. On January 25, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled from the alleged onset date of disability of April 18, 2008, through the date of the decision. R. at 12–26. Plaintiff sought review of this decision by the Appeals Council, which denied Plaintiff's request for review on February 8, 2013. R. at 4–6, 10. The ALJ's decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481 ; see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106–07, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 2083, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000).
On April 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. Upon the parties' consent, this case was transferred to a United States Magistrate Judge for final disposition and entry of judgment. The case subsequently was reassigned to the undersigned. The parties have briefed the issues, and the matter is now fully submitted.
On August 5, 2009, Plaintiff underwent a consultative psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Taller, which the ALJ summarized in his decision:
. She was oriented to person, place and time. [Plaintiff] had no loosening of thoughts. [Plaintiff] displayed good memory. Her insight and judgment were both fair. However, [Plaintiff] did have moderate mental limitations with low self-esteem, low interest level and poor sleep habits.
In regard to her activities of daily living, Mikhael Taller, M.D., stated that [Plaintiff] had mild to moderate mental limitations. [Plaintiff] reported that she was able to care for her personal needs. [Plaintiff] noted that she was able to go to public places without having problems. [Plaintiff] stated that she was able to understand and follow simple instructions. Overall, Mikhael Taller, M.D., reported that [Plaintiff] had moderate mental limitations.
R. at 21 (citation omitted) (citing R. at 227–35).
On August 11, 2009, F. Ewell, Ph.D., evaluated on a psychiatric review technique form (“PRTF”) Plaintiff's mental impairments
under paragraph B of Listings 12.04 and 12.08 relating to affective disorders and personality disorders. R. at 240–52. Dr. Ewell opined that Plaintiff's mood disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, and personality disorder caused her to experience (1) moderate restriction in activities of daily living; (2) moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning; (3) moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) one or two episodes of decompensation of extended duration. R. at 243, 246 249. Dr. Ewell did not find evidence to establish the presence of the criteria under paragraph C of these listed impairments. R. at 250. Dr. Ewell thus assessed Plaintiff's mental residual functional capacity (“RFC”) (R. at 236–39) and opined that she was moderately limited in her ability to (1) understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions; (2) maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; (3) perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; (4) sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision; (5) work in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them; (6) complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; (7) accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; (8) get along with co-workers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; (9) maintain socially appropriate behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness; and to (10) respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. Plaintiff otherwise was not significantly limited. R. at 236–37. Dr. Ewell's RFC assessment thus provided:
R. at 238. On August 12, 2010, another state agency consultant, Aroon Suansilppongse, M.D., affirmed Dr. Ewell's determination. R. at 307.
, heart disease, arthritis, degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, thyroid problems or asthma. Although, [Plaintiff] stated that she had poor concentration.
In regard to her activities of daily living, Shakuntala Dhir, M.D., stated that [Plaintiff] had mild to moderate mental limitations. [Plaintiff] reported that she was able to care for her personal needs. [Plaintiff] was able to perform her own personal shopping for groceries, clothes and household needs. [Plaintiff] noted that she was able to go [to] public places without having problems. [Plaintiff] was able to carry out a normal day's activities on an independent and sustainable basis. [Plaintiff] stated that she was able to understand and follow simple instructions. Overall, Shakuntala Dhir, M.D., reported that [Plaintiff] had moderate mental limitations.
R. at 21 (citations omitted) (citing R. at 278–91).
The ALJ noted the following in his decision:
Hilo Find, M.D., reported that [Plaintiff] had moderate reduction in her mental capacities. At times, [Plaintiff] was non-compliant with her medications. Although, when she was compliant with her medications, [Plaintiff] experienced relatively normal mental limitations. Her thought content was good. [Plaintiff] had never been physically abused. Her affect was appropriate. [Plaintiff] displayed no suicidal or homicidal thoughts. She had no delusional thoughts
. She was oriented to person, place and time. She was logical. Her speech was articulate. Her Global Assessment of Functioning [GAF] score of 55 would indicate an individual that had moderate mental limitations and who would be able to engage in work-related activities.
R. at 21–22 (citing R. at 257–77, 313–28).2
The ALJ noted in his decision Plaintiff's allegations:
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