Siders v. Zickler

Decision Date09 March 2021
Docket NumberNO. 2020-CA-00513-COA,2020-CA-00513-COA
Citation312 So.3d 1224
Parties James Alan SIDERS, Appellant v. Jane ZICKLER, Appellee
CourtMississippi Court of Appeals

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: NICHOLAS KANE THOMPSON

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: S. CHRISTOPHER FARRIS, Hattiesburg

BEFORE WILSON, P.J., McDONALD AND LAWRENCE, JJ.

WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Pursuant to the property settlement agreement (PSA) incorporated into his divorce decree, James (Jim) Siders agreed to maintain a life insurance policy designating his ex-wife, Jane Zickler, as the beneficiary. Jim failed to maintain the policy, and the chancellor found Jim in contempt and ordered him to obtain a new policy with the same face value as the original policy and designate Jane as the policy's owner. On appeal, Jim argues that the divorce decree and PSA did not require him to maintain a life insurance policy because he allowed his only such policy to lapse before he signed the PSA. He also argues that Jane's contempt action is barred by the statute of limitations and equitable estoppel and that the chancellor erred by ordering him to make Jane the owner of the new policy. For the reasons discussed below, we find no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. Jim and Jane married in 1978. They had two children, born in 1981 and 1985. In August 2003, they negotiated a PSA and filed a joint complaint for an irreconcilable differences divorce. In October 2003, the chancery court granted them a divorce, incorporating the PSA as part of the divorce decree.

¶3. As relevant here, the PSA states, "[Jim] shall continue to maintain the life insurance policy that is now in effect and shall name [Jane] as irrevocable beneficiary of said policy. If [Jane] dies, then the children of the parties shall be named as irrevocable beneficiaries." Jane alleges that she insisted on this provision in consideration for not pursuing alimony.

¶4. However, Jim alleges that he did not have a life insurance policy "in effect" when he signed the PSA or when the divorce was granted. Previously, Jim had an Equitable Variable Life Insurance policy with a face value of $211,543 ("the Equitable policy"). However, Jim alleges that he had allowed the Equitable policy to lapse in 2002.

¶5. Jim alleges that in November 2003, about one month after the parties' divorce, he obtained a new ten-year term life insurance policy with a face value of $250,000 ("the term policy"). In August 2013, Jane requested a copy of the beneficiary statement for Jim's policy to confirm that she was listed as the sole primary beneficiary. However, the beneficiary statement she received listed the parties' children and Jim's new wife as additional primary beneficiaries. Jane objected, and Jim had the policy changed to make Jane the sole primary beneficiary. Unbeknownst to Jane, this policy lapsed just a few months later, in or around November 2013.

¶6. Jim argues that the PSA did not require him to maintain a policy because no such policy was "in effect" when he signed the PSA. Thus, Jim argues that he obtained the ten-year term policy "voluntarily." He also alleges that Jane was aware of the terms of the new policy and "accepted" it without "complaint," including its ten-year term. Jane denies Jim's allegations. She alleges that she knew nothing about the specific terms of the policy because the only documents that Jim ever provided to her were the beneficiary statements.

¶7. It is unclear when exactly Jane discovered that Jim had again failed to maintain a life insurance policy naming her as the primary beneficiary. In 2019, Jane filed a petition for contempt, alleging that Jim should be held in contempt for failing to maintain a policy.

¶8. The chancellor held a hearing on Jane's motion, although no transcript was included in the record. The chancellor also directed the parties to submit letter briefs on the motion. The chancellor found that the Equitable policy was in effect prior to the divorce and that Jim failed to show that it had lapsed prior to the divorce. The chancellor found Jim in contempt for failing to maintain the policy and ordered him to obtain a new policy with same face value ($211,543) and to make Jane the owner of the new policy.

¶9. Jim filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment and later filed an amended motion to alter or amend the judgment. Jim's amended motion attached what purports to be a letter from the insurance company and an unsigned draft affidavit that Jim's attorney had prepared for an employee of the company. The documents purport to show that the Equitable policy lapsed in June 2002. The chancellor denied Jim's motion, and Jim appealed.

¶10. On appeal, Jim argues that the chancellor erred by finding him in contempt and by denying his motion to amend the judgment. He claims that the divorce decree did not require him to maintain a life insurance policy because no policy was "in effect" when he signed the PSA; that the chancellor improperly shifted the burden of proof; that the chancellor had no authority to order him to make Jane the owner of the new policy; and that Jane's contempt action was barred by the statute of limitations or equitable estoppel.

ANALYSIS

¶11. "We employ a limited standard of review in domestic relations cases." Gerty v. Gerty , 265 So. 3d 121, 130 (¶33) (Miss. 2018) (quoting In re Dissolution of Marriage of Wood , 35 So. 3d 507, 512 (¶8) (Miss. 2010) ). We will not reverse the chancellor's findings of fact unless they are not supported by substantial evidence or the chancellor clearly or manifestly erred or abused her discretion. Id. We review issues of law, including the interpretation of a property settlement agreement, de novo. Id.

I. The chancellor did not err by finding Jim in contempt or by denying his motion to amend the judgment.
A. The divorce decree required Jim to maintain a life insurance policy.

¶12. Jim's primary argument is that the PSA and divorce decree did not require him to maintain a life insurance policy. He emphasizes that the PSA states, "[Jim] shall continue to maintain the life insurance policy that is now in effect ...." (Emphasis added). Jim reasons that because he had allowed the Equitable policy to lapse before he signed the PSA, this provision did not require him to do anything. This argument fails because the PSA clearly required him to maintain a specific life insurance policy, and the Equitable policy is the only policy that the parties could have contemplated.

¶13. A property settlement agreement that is incorporated into a divorce decree "must be interpreted by courts as any other contract." Dennis v. Dennis , 234 So. 3d 371, 376 (¶15) (Miss. 2017) (quoting West v. West , 891 So. 2d 203, 210 (¶13) (Miss. 2004) ). When the agreement's language is "clear or unambiguous," we will enforce it as written. West , 891 So. 2d at 210 (¶14). If it "is not so clear, we will, if possible, harmonize the provisions in accord with the parties' apparent intent." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

¶14. Even if Jim permitted the Equitable policy to lapse prior to the parties' divorce, there is no evidence that Jane was aware of that fact. Moreover, Jim's signature on the PSA was tantamount to a representation to Jane—and to the chancery court —that the policy was still "in effect" when Jim signed the PSA. In addition, "grammar and usage establish that ‘the’ is ‘a function word indicating that a following noun or noun equivalent is definite or has been previously specified by context.’ " Nielsen v. Preap , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 954, 965, 203 L.Ed.2d 333 (2019) (brackets and ellipsis omitted) (quoting Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1294 (11th ed. 2005)). Thus, the PSA's statement that Jim "shall maintain the life insurance policy that is now in effect" shows that the parties had in mind a specific policy that Jim would continue to maintain. Based on the pleadings and evidence in the record, the Equitable policy is the only policy that the parties could have contemplated in the PSA. Jim's argument that the PSA did not require him to maintain a policy is without merit.

¶15. While not directly on point, this Court's decision in Morgan v. Morgan , 744 So. 2d 321 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), is instructive. In Morgan , the parties' property settlement agreement required the husband to convey title to a car (a Honda Civic) to the wife, make all remaining payments on the car note, and pay for insurance and car tag fees until the car note was paid off. Id. at 321-22 (¶1). Less than a year after the divorce, the Civic was totaled in a wreck. Id. at 322 (¶2). At the time, there were still twenty-seven monthly payments due on the car note. Id. The wife used the insurance proceeds to pay off the note, but the surplus proceeds were insufficient to pay for a comparable replacement car, and the husband refused to make any further payments toward a replacement car, insurance, or car tag fees. Id. On appeal, this Court held that the "true intent of the parties" was for the husband to provide the wife "a vehicle at no cost to her." Id. at 324 (¶¶11-12). We reasoned that the wife was entitled to "the full benefit of her bargain" under the parties' agreement and that the husband should not "enjoy[ ] an unexpected and inequitable windfall" by avoiding all remaining payments contemplated by the parties' agreement. Id. at 324-25 (¶¶15, 19). We held that based on the parties' agreement, the wife was entitled to an "equitable remedy" that would allow her to acquire a replacement car and compel the husband to make payments comparable to those contemplated by the parties' agreement. Id. at 324 (¶15) ;1 see also Lestrade v. Lestrade , 49 So. 3d 639, 644 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that in Morgan , "the property settlement agreement presupposed the continued existence of the [Civic] and was frustrated by its loss," and "[w]e allowed a slight modification of the agreement to preserve the parties' obligations as originally contemplated").

¶16. This is an easier case than Morgan . In this...

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3 cases
  • Stephens v. Stephens
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Mississippi
    • August 24, 2021
    ...settlement agreement that is incorporated into a divorce decree ‘must be interpreted by courts as any other contract.’ " Siders v. Zickler , 312 So. 3d 1224, 1228-29 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Dennis v. Dennis , 234 So. 3d 371, 376 (¶15) (Miss. 2017) ). We will enforce an agreemen......
  • Stephens v. Stephens
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Mississippi
    • August 24, 2021
    ...agreement that is incorporated into a divorce decree 'must be interpreted by courts as any other contract.'" Siders v. Zickler, 312 So.3d 1224, 1128-29 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Dennis v. Dennis, 234 So.3d 371, 376 (¶15) (Miss. 2017)). We will enforce an agreement's language as w......
  • Hendricks v. Roberts
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Mississippi
    • March 9, 2021

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