Siedlecki v. Arabia

• Decision Date: 08 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-1263,96-1263
• Citation: Siedlecki v. Arabia, 699 So.2d 1040 (Fla. App. 1997)
• Parties: 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2342 Robert J. SIEDLECKI, Cynthia H. Siedlecki, American National Corporation and Biscayne Insurance Company, Inc., Appellants/ Cross-Appellees, v. Leonard ARABIA, Appellee/ Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 1040

699 So.2d 1040

22 Fla. L. Weekly D2342

Robert J. SIEDLECKI, Cynthia H. Siedlecki, American National Corporation and Biscayne Insurance Company, Inc., Appellants/ Cross-Appellees, v. Leonard ARABIA, Appellee/ Cross-Appellant.

No. 96-1263.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

Oct. 8, 1997.

Alan S. Becker and Gary C. Rosen of Becker & Poliakoff, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellants/cross-appellees.

Daniel S. Pearson and Christopher N. Bellows of Holland & Knight, Miami, for appellee/cross-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Appellants appeal from a jury verdict holding them liable for fraud and breach of contract. Appellee cross-appeals the amount of damages awarded to it in the final judgment and the trial court's denial of attorney's fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The only issue we address on direct appeal is a breach of contract claim against a corporation. The facts essential to this issue are as follows.

Appellee, Leonard Arabia, entered into a written contract with Appellants Robert and Cynthia Siedlicki, American National Corporation ("ANC"), and Biscayne Insurance Company ("BIC"). The contract was signed by Arabia and the Siedlickis personally, as the controlling officers, directors, and owners of ANC, and as the officers and directors of BIC. The contract provided that Arabia would invest in and work for BIC, and in return, ANC, as the sole owner of BIC, would pay Arabia the sum of $2000 per month. After Arabia had worked for BIC for two years, he sued BIC for breach of contract for failing to pay him $2000 per month, which he alleged the contract required. The jury found that BIC breached a contractual duty to Arabia and awarded Arabia $48,000 for two years of uncompensated work.

On appeal, BIC argues that because it did not have a legal duty under the contract to pay Arabia, the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict as to the breach of contract claim against it. Arabia argues only that BIC should be liable for ANC's contractual obligations because BIC was a signatory to the contract. We disagree with Arabia's position because we fail to find any authority that would support his theory of law under the circumstances of this case. Here, the contract at issue specifically stated that ANC would pay a sum of $2000 to Arabia for work he performed for BIC. Nowhere in the contract did BIC agree to undertake that duty, and neither party has shown us any place in the record that would indicate BIC agreed to undertake ANC's contractual duty. Absent a legal obligation to perform, BIC cannot be found liable for breach of contract. See generally City-Wide Sanitation Co. v. City of Pembroke Pines, 214 So.2d 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968)(holding that party to contract cannot be held liable for breach for nonperformance of an alleged duty that does not appear in the contract). As such, the trial court erred in denying BIC's motion for directed verdict on the breach of contract claim. As to all other issues on direct appeal, we affirm.

On cross-appeal, we address three issues. Arabia first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in reducing the amount of punitive damages the jury awarded for Arabia's fraud claim. We agree. A trial court may enter an order of remittitur only when the record affirmatively shows the jury's verdict to be excessive or when the jury was influenced by something outside of the record. Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So.2d 430 (Fla.1978). The trial court does not sit as a seventh juror with veto power over the jury's award of punitive damages. Laskey v. Smith, 239 So.2d 13 (Fla.1970). So long as the record indicates that the jury's damage award is not "out of all reasonable proportion to the malice, outrage, or wantonness of the tortious conduct," then the jury's award of punitive damages must stand. Arab Termite & Pest Control v. Jenkins, 409 So.2d 1039, 1042 (Fla.1982). Here, the trial court cited specific reasons from the record to justify reducing the award, but it ignored other evidence in the record that supports the jury's award. This was improper, as a court is never free to reduce a verdict by remittitur to that amount which it considers the jury should have allowed. Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So.2d 622 (Fla.1976). Although the amount of punitive damages the jury awarded here may be considered large, the amount was supported by the record as a whole and was not so large that it shocked the judicial conscience to the extent a remittitur was required. Bill Branch Chevrolet, Inc. v. Burkert, 521 So.2d 153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Further, considering the fraud claim involved, the record does not affirmatively show that the jury's damage award was excessive, nor is there any indication that the jury was influenced by matters outside of the record. See Canty, 359 So.2d at 430. Therefore, ...