Siegel v. Lifecenter Organ Donor Network

• Decision Date: 23 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. C–100777.,C–100777.
• Parties: Daniel SIEGEL et al., Appellants, v. LIFECENTER ORGAN DONOR NETWORK et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

969 N.E.2d 1271

2011 -Ohio- 6031

Daniel SIEGEL et al., Appellants,

v.LIFECENTER ORGAN DONOR NETWORK et al., Appellees.

No. C–100777.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

First District, Hamilton County.

Decided Nov. 23, 2011.

John H. Metz, Columbus, for appellants.

Rick L. Weil, Cincinnati, for appellee LifeCenter Organ Donor Network.

Graydon, Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., and Harry J. Finke IV, Cincinnati, for appellees Cincinnati Eye Bank and Donna Schruffenberger.

SYLVIA S. HENDON, Judge.

{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Daniel and Frances Siegel, appeal from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees LifeCenter Organ Donor Network, Lynne Beebe, the Cincinnati Eye Bank, and Donna J. Schruffenberger. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court's judgment in favor of LifeCenter and Beebe on the state-law claims. We affirm in all other respects.

Facts

{¶ 2} Jessica Ann Siegel was 16 years old when she died unexpectedly of complications following surgery. Within hours of her death and shortly before midnight, LifeCenter employee Lynne Beebe telephoned Jessica's father, Daniel Siegel, at home, asking if he would consent to donating Jessica's organs. This conversation was recorded and is in the record on appeal. According to Beebe's deposition testimony, she believed that Daniel had consented to the removal of Jessica's organs during this call. She therefore had completed a consent form to this effect with Daniel over the telephone. Daniel testified that he had not consented.

{¶ 3} Shortly after finishing the conversation with Daniel, Beebe faxed the completed consent form to Donna Schruffenberger at the Eye Bank. Based on the consent form, Schruffenberger removed Jessica's eyes.

{¶ 4} This lawsuit followed. The Siegels sued defendants-appellees for conversion, assault, battery, desecration of a corpse, interference with the right of sepulcher, mental anguish, and emotional distress. They also asserted a civil rights violation.

{¶ 5} Following extensive discovery and motion practice, defendants-appellees moved the trial court for summary judgment. The trial court entered judgment in favor of all the defendants-appellees as to all counts on the basis of the good-faith exception to civil liability contained in R.C. 2108.20. The trial court also overruled various other motions that the Siegels had filed. The Siegels now appeal.

I. Summary Judgment in Favor of LifeCenter

{¶ 6} In the Siegels' first assignment of error, they claim that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of LifeCenter. The Siegels are correct as to the state-law claims, only.

{¶ 7} Our standard of review is de novo . Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241. Summary judgment is appropriate only if, after viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56; Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 364 N.E.2d 267. If any doubts exist, the issue must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358–59, 604 N.E.2d 138.

{¶ 8} The trial court granted summary judgment to LifeCenter based on the good-faith exception to liability in R.C. 2108.20. At the time of Jessica's death in 2006, however, the good-faith exception was contained in former R.C. 2108.08. Former R.C. 2108.08 provided: “A person who in good faith acts, or attempts to act, in accordance with sections 2108.01 to 2108.12, 2108.15, 2108.17, and 2108.18 of the Revised Code, or the anatomical gift laws of another state, is not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for his act.” The code sections delineated in former R.C. 2108.08 were collectively referred to as the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”). The UAGA controlled who could consent to organ donation and how.

{¶ 9} The question presented here is whether there is a genuine issue of fact concerning whether LifeCenter and Beebe acted in good faith when attempting to obtain Daniel's consent.

Good Faith

{¶ 10} Ohio courts have not adopted a definition of “good faith” under Ohio's UAGA. But other jurisdictions have addressed the meaning of “good faith” contained in similar anatomical-gift statutes. See Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc. (1987), 136 Misc.2d 1065, 1068, 519 N.Y.S.2d 928;Schembre v. Mid–America Transplant Assn. (Mo.App.2004), 135 S.W.3d 527, 532;Lyon v. United States (D.Minn.1994), 843 F.Supp. 531, 533;Ramirez v. Health Partners of S. Ariz. (1998), 193 Ariz. 325, 972 P.2d 658, ¶ 15;Kelly–Nevils v. Detroit Receiving Hosp. (1994), 207 Mich.App. 410, 526 N.W.2d 15;Rahman v. Mayo Clinic (Minn.App.1998), 578 N.W.2d 802, 805;Andrews v. Alabama Eye Bank (Ala.1999), 727 So.2d 62. All of these courts have cited with approval the Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.1979) 623 definition of “good faith,” i.e., “an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.”

{¶ 11} In the interest of uniformity, we adopt this definition as well. See former R.C. 2108.09 (uniformity among the states is a goal of the UAGA). But we note that this definition applies only to those cases brought under the former law. In 2009, Ohio adopted a second Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, the “UAGA 2.” Under current law, the legislature has indicated that “good faith” means “honesty-in-fact” or “honesty-of-intent,” and is to be determined under a subjective standard. See official comment to R.C. 2108.20. Under former R.C. 2108.08, the question of good faith is determined under an objective standard. Id.

The Conversation Between Beebe and Daniel

{¶ 12} The Siegels first assert that the conversation between Daniel and Beebe creates an issue of whether the good-faith exception to liability applies in this case.

{¶ 13} When Beebe spoke with Daniel on the night of Jessica's death, Beebe referred to herself as an “afterlife specialist” and told Daniel that “there is a very good chance that Jessica could be a hero * * * through the gift of donation.” Beebe explained that Jessica's organs, bones, skin, and her connective tissue could be used to “really change the lives of several families that are in need right now” and asked him, “Is that the kind of gift that you would like to honor your daughter Jessica with?” Daniel replied, “Ah, yes it would.” Beebe then read Daniel a consent form. But she failed to read the first sentence that stated, “I hereby make this anatomical gift from the body parts of Jessica Siegel who died on 8/23/06 in Cincinnati, Ohio.” Beebe also did not read the consent form's footnote. The footnote stated, “Consent for bone of the lower body includes: hemi pelvis, tibia, fibula, femur and iliac crest, talus, patella, fascia, soft tissue.”

{¶ 14} After reading most of the consent form to Daniel, Beebe explained that Jessica's organs could be donated or could be used for medical and educational purposes. She asked if Daniel would “like to authorize both of those priorities.” Daniel's response was inaudible. Beebe then told Daniel that “the final step in the donation process is the completion of a medical-social behavioral risk questionnaire that is mandated by the Food and Drug Administration before the tissues can be transplanted. It takes about 15 minutes; we do it right over the phone * * *.” Daniel responded, “I don't know if I really want to do that right now.” So Beebe agreed to call Daniel back the next morning around 10:00 or 11:00. She also told Daniel, “We will go ahead and start the recovery process, we just won't be able to transplant until that interview.” Daniel responded, “No problem. Okay.” Beebe later testified that “the recovery process” referred to the harvesting of organs prior to transplantation, but she did not tell Daniel this during their conversation.

{¶ 15} Beebe called Daniel back at 8:05 a.m., two hours earlier than expected. Daniel told her that he needed to get his wife's “permission on everything.” Beebe called again at 9:22 a.m., and Daniel informed Beebe that they did not wish to donate.

Questions of Fact

{¶ 16} The Siegels claim that the type of language used by Beebe, such as “afterlife specialist,” “hero,” and “honor,” and Beebe's failure to read the complete consent form raise a question of whether Beebe had exercised good faith in her dealings with Daniel. They also argue that the use of the conditional “would” in the question “Is this the type of gift that you would like to honor your daughter Jessica with?” intentionally conveyed a hypothetical question only. The Siegels further contend that Beebe's representation that there was “a final step in the donation process” had communicated that nothing would happen until this last step was completed. Finally, the Siegels allege that the fact that there had been no definition of “recovery process” in the conversation was also indicative of a lack of good faith.

{¶ 17} Aside from the recorded conversation between Daniel and Beebe, the Siegels point to conversations between Beebe and hospital personnel following Jessica's death, the timing of the telephone calls to Daniel, other recorded phone calls by LifeCenter employees pertaining to procuring Jessica's organs, and the training that LifeCenter employees receive as evidence that LifeCenter and Beebe had not acted in good faith.

{¶ 18} In response, LifeCenter essentially contends that the recorded telephone conversation between Daniel and Beebe is dispositive of the issue of good faith. LifeCenter argues that summary judgment was properly entered because it appeared that Daniel had consented to the removal of Jessica's eyes after Beebe had completed the consent form with Daniel over the telephone.

{¶ 19} Based on the arguments and evidence presented, we are convinced...