Siegel v. Ragen, 49 C 47.

• Decision Date: 17 June 1949
• Docket Number: No. 49 C 47.,49 C 47.
• Parties: SIEGEL et al. v. RAGEN et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

88 F. Supp. 996

SIEGEL et al. v. RAGEN et al.

No. 49 C 47.

United States District Court N. D. Illinois, E. D.

June 17, 1949.

Luis Kutner, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Ivan A. Elliot, Atty. Gen., of State of Ill., Henry F. Tenney, Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

CAMPBELL, District Judge.

This is an action under the Civil Rights Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 43, brought on behalf of the plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs are all inmates of State penitentiaries — two at Stateville and one at Menard. They allege that the rights and privileges granted to them under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution have been violated. More specifically, the amended complaint sets forth the following allegations:

(a) HARP — (1) That defendants have beaten him, and that defendant Ragen made the statement, "I will kill you before you get out of here"; (2) That, as a result of the above beatings, plaintiff has become seriously injured and in need of medical attention. He claims, however, that he is afraid to have a necessary operation performed, lest he be put to death in the process; (3) That Ragen, on two occasions, destroyed petitions for writs of habeas corpus; (4) That he has been tried for prison rule infractions by a method known as "trial by ticket", thereby depriving him of his liberty without due process; (5) That plaintiff has deposited certain valuables with Ragen for which he was given a receipt for only 1¢; (6) That Ragen has mismanaged and misused the prisoners' Amusement Fund; (7) That defendants maintain a system of isolation confinement, which is cruel and inhuman, for minor infractions of prison rules of which the prisoners have no knowledge.

(b) MEYER — (1) That plaintiff is a habeas corpus expert and that Ragen abolished the "legal department" which plaintiff was directed to establish at the prison by a judge of this Court; (2) That plaintiff was placed in solitary confinement because of a document found in his cell of which he had no knowledge; (3) That plaintiff has been placed in segregation as a result of a dining room disturbance, in which plaintiff in no way participated; (4) That Ragen confiscated plaintiff's personally owned typewriter, thereby depriving him of his legal right to assist in the prosecution of this action and an appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court; (5) That plaintiff's health is impaired as a result of his segregation confinement; (6) Same as (5) and (6) of (a).

(c) SIEGEL — (1) That Ragen wrongfully accused plaintiff of stating to other inmates that Ragen had stolen $20,000 from the prisoners' Amusement Fund; that as a result of this encounter, Ragen had plaintiff placed in segregation for several months and then transferred to the Menard prison; (2) That the transfer was cruel and inhuman, and was for the purpose of inflicting humiliation, agony and physical and mental torture; (3) Same as (5) and (6) of (a).

It is further alleged that Ragen has not read the Rules and Regulations of the Prison to the prisoners as required by the Statutes of Illinois; that Ragen has not credited earned interest to a trust fund which is the separate property of the inmates of the prison; that the officials of the prison have had watches and automobiles repaired in the prison shops without cost and without compensating the inmates who performed the work; that special privileges have been granted to certain inmates; that the food has been inferior and that the officials of the prison appropriate the best food for themselves and in greater quantities than is their just proportion.

Defendants duly moved to strike the complaint and dismiss the action for the following reasons; (a) The complaint fails to state a cause of action under the Constitution or the laws of the United States; (b) That the allegations are insufficient to constitute a federal violation under the Civil Rights Act or to fall within the terms of the United States Constitution or any Amendment thereto; (c) The facts alleged in the complaint fail to show that plaintiffs were deprived of any rights, privileges and immunities accorded them under the Constitution or laws of the United States; or that they have been discriminated against by reason of race, color or otherwise, within the scope of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments; (d) The complaint shows that the matters alleged are solely matters of State law; (e) The Court has no jurisdiction because (1) there is no diversity of citizenship and (2) plaintiffs, by reason of their convictions have lost their status as citizens; (f) The complaint abounds in scandalous, redundant and immaterial matters; (g) The complaint offers mere conclusions of plaintiffs.

The pertinent section of the Civil Rights Act states: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 8 U.S.C.A. § 43.

The fact that plaintiffs are incarcerated in a penitentiary under convictions for felonies, does not deprive them of the right to invoke the provisions of the Civil Rights Act, since that Act applies to any person within the jurisdiction of the United States. Sellers v. Johnson, D.C., 69 F.Supp. 778; Gordon v. Garrson, D.C., 77 F.Supp. 477, 479.

Under the present state of the law, misuse of power by a state official is action taken under color of a statute within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, and would render an official liable therefor. In the case of Gordon v. Garrson, supra, Judge Lindley ably sets forth the current law on the subject: "It is clear that misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of the state, is action taken `under color of any statute' within this section. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495, 162 A.L.R. 1330; Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3...