Siegel v. State of N.Y., 1594

• Decision Date: 22 October 1982
• Docket Number: D,No. 1594,1594
• Citation: 691 F.2d 620
• Parties: Benjamin SIEGEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE OF NEW YORK and Edward J. Kuriansky, Deputy New York Attorney General for Medicaid Fraud, Defendants-Appellants. ocket 82-2204.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 620

691 F.2d 620

Benjamin SIEGEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE OF NEW YORK and Edward J. Kuriansky, Deputy New York Attorney General for Medicaid Fraud, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 1594, Docket 82-2204.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Aug. 12, 1982.

Decided Oct. 22, 1982.

Eleanor Jackson Piel, New York City (Harold I. Cammer, Robert Cammer, Cammer & Shapiro, P.C., New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.

Arthur G. Weinstein, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., New York City (Richard D. Carruthers, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Patricia A. Lind, Legal Intern, New York City, of counsel), for defendants-appellants.

Before VAN GRAAFEILAND, PIERCE and PRATT, Circuit Judges.

PIERCE, Circuit Judge:

This case presents the novel issue of whether federal due process requires a state prosecutor to fulfill an off-the-record promise made in plea bargaining negotiations, ¹ despite New York State's announced policy of enforcing only those portions of a plea agreement which are actually placed on the record at the plea proceeding. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Robert W. Sweet, Judge, found that such a promise must be enforced and, accordingly, enjoined the state prosecutor from breaching the promise. Because we find that New York State's policy of recognizing only on-the-record plea bargains comports with due process and because the plaintiff, in offering his plea, failed to place on the record the promise which he now seeks to enforce, we vacate the injunction and remand to the district court with an instruction to dismiss the complaint.

I

A. State Court Proceedings

Plaintiff-appellee, Benjamin Siegel, is a 63-year-old wholesale meat salesman. In March, 1979, Siegel testified before a New York County grand jury investigating alleged criminal activities in the nursing home industry. Siegel denied ever discussing or paying kickbacks to persons in the nursing home industry, and he denied any knowledge of other persons in the meat industry paying such kickbacks.

Following his testimony, Siegel was indicted in New York County on three counts of perjury in the first degree, a class D felony. Siegel entered a plea of not guilty. On November 21, 1979, Judge Aloysius Melia ² denied Siegel's motion to dismiss the indictment and several other motions, and granted a motion to suppress one of the tape recordings which was to be used as evidence. Judge Melia remarked that the case appeared suited to disposition by a negotiated guilty plea.

On January 21, 1980, in a reported hearing in open court, the prosecutor, a Special Deputy Attorney General assigned to the New York City regional office of the Hospital Division of the Deputy Attorney General for Medicaid Fraud, and the appellee and his counsel informed Judge Melia that Siegel was prepared to plead guilty to a single reduced count of perjury in the second degree, a class E felony, in exchange for dismissal of the other counts and the promise of a sentence of five years probation plus a fine. After ascertaining that Siegel was acting of his "own free will," that he understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, and that he understood the sentence he would receive, Judge Melia accepted Siegel's guilty plea to a single count of perjury in the second degree and imposed a sentence of five years probation and a $2500 fine.

Six months later, on July 22, 1980, Long Island regional office of the Deputy Attorney General for Medicaid Fraud issued a subpoena to Siegel seeking to have him testify before a grand jury investigating kickbacks in the health care industry. Siegel moved in Queens County Supreme Court to quash the subpoena claiming that, at the time of the plea, the prosecutor had made an off-the-record promise that Siegel would not have to testify before the grand jury concerning the subject matter of his perjury indictment. Justice George Balbach, to whom the motion was assigned, conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing with regard to the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of Siegel's guilty plea. During this hearing Justice Balbach heard testimony from Siegel's two defense attorneys and from both the New York City and the Long Island Special Deputy Attorneys General handling the case. By opinion dated December 17, 1980, Justice Balbach granted Siegel's motion to the extent of modifying the subpoena to preclude the prosecutor from questioning Siegel about "those facts which were discussed during his prior appearance before the New York County Grand Jury on March 13, 1979." Matter of John Doe, SP No. 4164, slip op. at 16 (Sup.Ct. Queens Co. Dec. 17, 1980). Although the trial judge found that the prosecutor made "no definite promise" concerning future grand jury appearances, the judge found that the prosecutor's equivocal responses during plea negotiations led Siegel to reasonably believe that he would not subsequently be obliged to testify before a New York State grand jury with respect to the subject matter of his previous New York County grand jury testimony.

In a memorandum opinion dated July 27, 1981, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed. Matter of Benjamin S., 83 A.D.2d 630, 441 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2d Dep't 1981). The appellate court found that there was no record support for the lower court's finding that the specific issue of future grand jury appearances had been raised in the plea negotiations. Nonetheless, the Appellate Division ruled that the prosecutor's statements to the effect that Siegel would not be required to "give information," "talk about," or "be questioned about" matters covered in his previous grand jury testimony constituted "knowing consent that (Siegel) was not to be called before a Grand Jury by (the prosecutor's) office to discuss those matters." 83 A.D.2d at 633, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 703. The Appellate Division also ruled that specific performance of the constructive plea bargain would not impermissibly infringe upon the right of the Queens County grand jury to gather evidence.

In a unanimous opinion dated February 18, 1982, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division's order. Matter of Benjamin S., 55 N.Y.2d 116, 447 N.Y.S.2d 905, 432 N.E.2d 777, reh'g denied, 56 N.Y.2d 570, 450 N.Y.S.2d 186, 435 N.E.2d 403 (1982). The court ruled that the alleged promise concerning future grand jury appearances was unenforceable, as a matter of law, because it was not placed on the record at the time the guilty plea was entered.

Shortly thereafter, Siegel moved pursuant to N.Y.Crim.Proc.Law art. 440 (McKinney 1971) to reopen his plea proceedings and place on the record the alleged off-the-record promise or, in the alternative, for a vacatur of the judgment of conviction. In support of this motion Siegel contended that his plea of guilty and the conviction based thereon were procured by the prosecutor's misrepresentation concerning future grand jury appearances, in violation of his due process rights. By opinion and order dated March 5, 1982, the New York County Supreme Court, Trial Term, denied the motion, stating that the relief requested was essentially identical to the relief previously rejected by the New York Court of Appeals. Both the Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.

B. Proceedings Below

On May 13, 1982, Siegel filed a complaint in the Southern District of New York, alleging that his federal due process rights were violated when the prosecutor failed to fulfill his promise that Siegel would not be required to testify before the grand jury concerning his prior testimony. The complaint was founded on the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and the federal statute forbidding deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Siegel sought either an order permitting him to withdraw his guilty plea or, alternatively, an order reopening the state plea proceedings and placing the alleged off-the-record promise on the record.

On May 17, 1982, Judge Sweet, upon plaintiff's application, signed an order directing the defendants-appellants, State of New York and Edward J. Kuriansky, Deputy New York Attorney General for Medicaid Fraud, to show cause why they should not be preliminarily enjoined from requiring Siegel to be questioned concerning matters covered by his previous grand jury testimony. To accommodate the district court and opposing counsel, the State agreed that Siegel would not be called before the grand jury prior to June 16, 1982.

By opinion dated June 15, 1982, the district court granted Siegel's requested preliminary injunction. Siegel v. State of New York, No. 82 Civ. 3095 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 1982). The district court did not apply this Circuit's settled preliminary injunction standard, ³ but fully discussed and finally determined the merits of Siegel's complaint. The court stated that "(t)he action of the Court of Appeals has served, in the view of this court, to deprive Siegel of his due process right to enforce his plea bargain and to challenge the voluntariness of his plea." It further stated that "(g)iven the resolution of the issue of the existence of an off-the-record agreement by the Appellate Division and its affirmance of the quashing of the subpoena by the Supreme Court, the writ of habeas corpus will be granted to enforce the plea bargain and to quash the subpoena." Id., slip op. at 4. Because the district court has fully and finally adjudicated the claims raised in Siegel's complaint, we will review the decision as if it were a permanent, rather than a preliminary injunction. See Part IV infra.

II

In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61, 92 S.Ct. 495, 497-498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), the Supreme Court endorsed the process of plea bargaining as not only an "essential" but also a "highly desirable" component of the administration of criminal justice which, if "(p)roperly administered, ... is to be encouraged." Plea...