Sieglein v. Schmidt

• Decision Date: 25 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2616, Sept. Term, 2013.,2616, Sept. Term, 2013.
• Citation: 224 Md.App. 222,120 A.3d 790
• Parties: Stephen SIEGLEIN v. Laura SCHMIDT.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

224 Md.App. 222

120 A.3d 790

Stephen SIEGLEIN

v.Laura SCHMIDT.

No. 2616, Sept. Term, 2013.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Aug. 25, 2015.

John H. Doud, III, Baltimore, MD, for appellant.

Heather Akehurst–Krause (SARC Legal Services Program, on the brief), Bel Air, MD, for appellee.

Panel: ZARNOCH, GRAEFF, LEAHY, JJ.

Opinion

LEAHY, J.

Appellant Stephen Sieglein (“Father”) and Appellee Laura Schmidt (“Mother”) were married in a religious ceremony in Havre de Grace, Maryland on April 12, 2008. Two years later, both parties enrolled in an “in vitro” fertilization plan and signed the contracts and documents necessary to participate.

A child conceived via donated egg and donated sperm was born to the parties.

The parties separated shortly after the birth of the child, and Father contested legal parentage, seeking to eschew any rights or obligations regarding the minor child. On October 11, 2012, the Circuit Court for Harford County issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order establishing legal paternity and Father's joint and several responsibility for support of the minor child. Following a temporary order as to child support, visitation, and custody, the circuit court entered a Judgment of Absolute Divorce on June 19, 2013. On February 10, 2014, the circuit court issued an order finding Father to be voluntarily impoverished, ordering the payment of child support and arrearages, and granting Mother's request for injunctive relief in the form of a protective order. Father now entreats this Court to declare, inter alia, that because the child is “not the natural child of the parties, nor is he the adopted child of the parties[ but] ... was conceived in[ ]vitro ... through the employment of [anonymously] donated eggs and donated sperm,” he is not a parent and bears no legal responsibility for the child under Maryland law.

Father presents the following questions for our review, which we have reordered:

I. Did the Court below err in ruling that Appellant was the parent of a child conceived through ‘in vitro’ fertilization with a donated egg and donated sperm?

II. Did the Court err and/or abuse her discretion in granting an Injunction against Appellant?

III. Did the Court err and/or abuse her discretion in finding that Appellant was “voluntarily impoverished”?

Because Mother and Father, during their marriage, willingly and voluntarily agreed to conceive a child through assisted reproductive services using anonymously donated genetic material and that volitional action resulted in the birth of a child, we hold that Maryland Code (1974, 2011 Repl. Vol.), Estates and Trusts Article (“ET”) § 1–206(b) applies to establish that both spouses are the legal parents of the minor child. Therefore, both spouses are “jointly and severally responsible for the child's support, care, nurture, welfare, and education.” Maryland Code (1984, 2012 Repl. Vol.), Family Law Article (“FL”) § 5–203. Additionally, we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in issuing an injunction against Father, or in finding Father to be voluntarily impoverished.

BACKGROUND

The majority of the facts in this case are undisputed. Prior to their first meeting, both parties had children from past relationships,¹ and sometime after the birth of his first child, Father underwent a vasectomy. Thereafter, the parties met through an online dating site. As Father emphasizes, his online dating profile stated: “[w]ant kids: No.” Notwithstanding, the parties began a relationship and were married in April of 2008.

Following their marriage, Mother expressed a desire to have another child. She was unable to conceive, however, and Father, after some discussion and evaluation, declined to have his vasectomy reversed. Mother and Father sought assisted reproductive services from Shady Grove Fertility Reproductive Science Center including: in vitro fertilization, intracytoplasmic sperm injection, assisted hatching, and embryo freezing. The consent acknowledgment form required by Shady Grove Fertility Reproductive Science Center provided, in pertinent parts:

I/We have been fully advised of the purpose, risks and benefits of each of the procedures indicated above, as well as Assisted Reproduction generally, and have been informed of the available alternatives and risks and benefits of such alternatives. This information has been supplemented by my/our consultation with my/our medical team. I/We have had the opportunity to ask questions and all my/our questions have been answered to my/our satisfaction.

I/We have read the Assisted Reproduction document in its entirety and have had ample time to reach my/our decision, free from pressure and coercion, and agree to proceed with my/our participation in Assisted Reproduction services as stated above.

The acknowledgment was signed by both Mother and Father and witnessed on January 20, 2010. Thereafter, Mother and Father participated in the assisted reproductive care program.

The parties opted to pursue ‘In Vitro’ Fertilization (“IVF”)² and it was through this method that a child was conceived and born of the marriage of Mother and Father on March 25, 2012. It is uncontested that both parties enrolled in the program and signed the necessary contracts and documents in the first two months of 2010.³ Both Mother and Father appear on the birth certificate.⁴ Both parents participated in the care of the minor child immediately following birth.

Only one month after their child was born, Mother and Father separated. On May 3, 2012, Mother filed a complaint for limited divorce in the circuit court asserting the grounds of “Cruelty/Excessively Vicious Conduct Against Me,” “Cruelty/Excessively Vicious Conduct Against My Children,” and voluntary separation. Soon thereafter, Mother filed a petition for child support, and Father filed his answer on June 12, 2012, denying parentage of the minor child.

On July 11, 2012, the circuit court held a pre-trial conference and set a hearing date of August 31, 2012, to address the issue of paternity. On July 23, 2012, Father filed a motion for determination of a question of law pursuant to Maryland Rule 2–502, requesting that the circuit court decide “whether or not [Father] is a ‘parent’ as that term is employed and understood under Maryland law, so as to obligate him under [Mother's] claim for child support.”

On August 13, 2012, a hearing was held to address Mother's petition for child support and Father's motion for determination of the legal question regarding parentage. Father argued that the Court of Appeals “has separated the obligation of support from the question of [ ] legitimacy [in] the Estates and Trusts Article[, and] the test that the Court of Appeals applies is genetics.” Father contended that, if he is not a “parent” to the minor child under Maryland law, then the court cannot impose a child support obligation upon him. Nevertheless, Father's counsel acknowledged the problems inherent in the argument, stating:

[I]t is an interesting part of the discussion because you have to recognize that what I am asking you to do is to rule that this child has no natural parents because we didn't know who the anonymous donors are. That's a byproduct of the in[ ]vitro process and that's why it's a question of legislative intent.

Mother countered that Father is the legal parent of the minor child and is responsible for support of that child pursuant to ET § 1–206(b), which provides: “A child conceived by artificial insemination of a married woman with the consent of her husband is the legitimate child of both of them for all purposes.

” (Emphasis added).

On October 11, 2012, the circuit court (William O. Carr, J.), filed its memorandum opinion and order establishing Father's legal paternity and responsibility for support. The court found:

[T]he Estates and Trusts Article unequivocally states that a child conceived via the artificial insemination of a married woman with the consent of her husband is the legitimate child of both spouses.

* * *

[Father] married [Mother] in 2008. When [Mother] expressed a desire to have a child, [Father] accompanied her to a fertility clinic to explore the IVF process, and they both signed the consent forms for the IVF treatment. [Father] remained in the marital home with [Mother] throughout the pregnancy, and his name appears on the child's birth certificate as the father.

* * *

[T]he genetic paternity of the child is not in dispute, and no blood tests are needed to determine who the father of the child is. Instead, the presumption in § 1–206(b) is that [Father] consented to the artificial insemination process, making the child the legitimate child of [Father]. This presumption is not overcome by applying the Best Interests of the Child standard.... [Father] jointly engaged in efforts with [Mother] to create a child, and it is in the best interest of the child to receive support and care from both parents.

(Emphasis added).

The parties next appeared in the circuit court before Judge Angela M. Eaves on December 17, 2012, for a hearing on the pendente lite establishment of custody and child support. On the same day just before the hearing, Mother filed an amended complaint for limited divorce seeking sole legal and physical custody of the minor child, child support, and injunctive relief pursuant to FL § 1–203(a)(2).⁵ In support of the amended complaint, Mother cited to a then existing Final Protective Order issued by the District Court for Harford County requiring Father to vacate the home and stay away from Mother, contending Father constructively deserted her by causing her to flee the marriage in order to preserve her health, dignity, safety and welfare.

At the hearing on December 17, Father maintained that he did not recognize the minor child as his child and was not seeking custody or visitation. Declining to revisit the issue of legal paternity, the circuit court found that Father—who, as discussed in detail infra, was currently unemployed—had voluntarily impoverished himself, and the court...