Sieglock v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-525.,02-525.
• Citation: 322 Mont 165,81 P.3d 495,2003 MT 355
• Parties: Victor D. SIEGLOCK, Bruce G. Hoover, Donna N. Wilcox, Gary W. Marquart, and Howie N. Groom, Individually, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

81 P.3d 495

2003 MT 355

322 Mont 165

Victor D. SIEGLOCK, Bruce G. Hoover, Donna N. Wilcox, Gary W. Marquart, and Howie N. Groom, Individually, and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 02-525.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs April 3, 2003.

Decided December 18, 2003.

For Appellants: Chris R. Young, Attorney at Law, Havre, Montana Charles T. Hvass, Jr., Russell A. Ingebritson, Ingebritson & Associates, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

For Respondent: Randy J. Cox, Scott M. Stearns, Boone Karlberg, P.C., Missoula, Montana.

Justice JIM REGNIER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Victor D. Sieglock and other Named Plaintiffs, employees and former employees of Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF), appeal from an Order entered by the First Judicial District Court of Montana, Lewis and Clark County, denying their motion to certify their lawsuit as a class action. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 In early 1998, BNSF published a list of names of the top three hundred overtime wage earners in its track department. The list included personal information about the employees, including their city and state of residence and social security number. Employees on the list resided in twenty-four different states, including eighteen employees from the state of Montana.

¶ 3 The railroad contends it compiled the list to identify budget overruns in an effort to determine why the railroad was experiencing such high levels of overtime wages. BNSF claimed it prepared the list to determine if the overtime was due to legitimate or fraudulent causes.

¶ 4 Donna Wilcox, Gary Marquart and Howie Groom initially filed a class action in United States District Court, District of Minnesota, on May 9, 2000, against BNSF, claiming damages resulting from release and circulation of the list. They claimed BNSF tortiously invaded plaintiffs' reasonable expectations of privacy when it both negligently and intentionally published private facts and breached its fiduciary duty for safe keeping of private facts. They sought an injunction prohibiting BNSF from continuing any other business practices which would encourage or condone publication of the information. Due to lack of complete diversity, the United States District Court in Minnesota dismissed their claims without prejudice.

¶ 5 On May 15, 2001, Sieglock and other Named Plaintiffs filed a class action in the First Judicial District Court of Montana, Lewis and Clark County. Named Plaintiffs were citizens of Montana, Texas, Minnesota and Washington. They based their cause of action upon BNSF's wrongful publication of private facts and private information, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent management based upon § 39-2-703, MCA. Sieglock filed a motion seeking class certification and the District Court held a hearing on the motion on April 17, 2002. In denying the class certification motion, the District Court held that Sieglock failed to meet the commonality requirement in Rule 23(a)(2), M.R.Civ.P., because the proposed class did not share common questions of law or fact. It is from this Order that Sieglock appeals. We restate the issues on appeal:

¶ 6 1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it failed to certify Sieglock's proposed class under Rule 23, M.R.Civ.P.?

¶ 7 2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by failing to consider or rule upon the request to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2) relating to the plea for injunctive relief?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 Trial courts have the broadest discretion when deciding whether to certify a class. McDonald v. Washington (1993), 261 Mont. 392, 399, 862 P.2d 1150, 1154. The judgment of the trial court should be accorded the greatest respect because it is in the best position to consider the most fair and efficient procedure for conducting any given litigation. McDonald, 261 Mont. at 399-400, 862 P.2d at 1154. Therefore, this Court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion to certify, unless there is an abuse of discretion. McDonald, 261 Mont. at 400, 862 P.2d at 1154.

DISCUSSION

¶ 9 Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it failed to certify Sieglock's proposed class under Rule 23, M.R.Civ.P.?

¶ 10 At the outset, we would like to point out that Rule 23, M.R.Civ.P., is identical to Rule 23, F.R.Civ.P.; therefore, federal authority is instructive on the issue of class certification. When certifying a class, the party seeking certification has the burden of proving that the proposed class meets all the requirements of Rule 23. Polich v. Burlington Northern, Inc. (D.Mont.1987), 116 F.R.D. 258, 260. Rule 23, M.R.Civ.P., states in pertinent part:

(a) Prerequisites to a class action. One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class,

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

(b) Class actions maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:

(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or

(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or

(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.

The trial court's threshold inquiry is whether the putative class action satisfies the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a); numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Polich, 116 F.R.D. at 260. The District Court concluded that Sieglock failed to meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2), M.R.Civ.P., because there were no common questions of law, therefore it denied class certification. The District Court focused on our recent decision of Phillips v. General Motors Corp., 2000 MT 55, 298 Mont. 438, 995 P.2d 1002, where we adopted the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement of Law (Second) of the Conflicts of Law for determining the applicable substantive law for torts. Phillips, ¶ 23.

¶ 11 The commonality element requires that all members of the proposed class share common questions of law or fact. Rule 23, M.R.Civ.P. Total commonality is not required, meaning all questions of law or all questions of fact need not be common. Weiss v. York Hospital (3rd Cir.1984), 745 F.2d 786, 808-09. The requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) are disjunctive, therefore, the party seeking classification must have either common questions of law or fact. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp. (9th Cir.1998), 150 F.3d 1011, 1019. Commonality is satisfied when the question of law linking class members is substantially related to resolving the litigation, even though individuals may not be similarly situated. Jordan v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir.1982), 669 F.2d 1311, 1320. Similarly, commonality will also be satisfied when there is a "common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class." Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019. The nature of the plaintiffs' claim is directly relevant in determining whether the matters in controversy are individual or suitable as a class action. Polich, 116 F.R.D. at 261.

¶ 12 Sieglock argues that the potential class shares common legal questions for invasion of privacy and breach of fiduciary duty under Montana law, asserting that each claim is identical. Section 39-2-703, MCA, states in pertinent part, "[e]very person or corporation operating a railway or railroad in this state is liable for all damages sustained by any employee. . . ." He further claims ...